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 Abstract 
 
Processing fluency has been shown to be flexible metacognitive cue for a range of judgements 
including truth, familiarity, and trust. Amongst these, affect judgements are of particular interest 
as 1) affect can be genuinely evoked by fluency, and 2) affect can be used as a cue for other 
judgements. However, there is disagreement towards the pattern of affective responses arising 
from fluency. The hedonic marking hypothesis (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 
2003) suggests that fluency is fundamentally positive, whilst the fluency amplification account 
(Albrecht & Carbon, 2014) suggests that the affective response can be positive or negative, 
depending on (and congruent with) the valence of stimuli being exposed to. Whilst these accounts 
have been used as competing explanations, this thesis argues that they both contribute to overall 
affective responses in a novel multi-source account.  
This thesis developed a novel set of business scenarios to manipulate fluency (using coherence) 
and valence (using risk). Evidence from three approaches is presented: 1) Meta-Analysis 
examining affective responses to fluency, with a sample of 108 publications (k = 591 effect sizes), 
2) Five behavioural experiments, and 3) Facial electromyography (fEMG). Across these 
approaches, neither hedonic marking nor fluency amplification in isolation could account for the 
full pattern of results. Instead, results were explained by the combined contribution of the two 
models, as predicted by the multi-source account. The unique findings were uncovered by 
manipulating stimuli valence, as well as separately measuring positive and negative affect, an 
approach not previously investigated in the literature, thereby adding methodological, as well as 
theoretical, contributions to the literature on fluency effects. Implications for future research are 
to adopt a separate measurement approach to investigate wider judgement domains, whilst 
practical implications for business assessment and agenda setting are also discussed.  
  
iii 
 
Declaration of Originality  
 
This thesis and the work to which it refers are the results of my own efforts. Any ideas, data, images or 
text resulting from the work of others (whether published or unpublished) are fully identified as such 
within the work and attributed to their originator in the text, bibliography or in footnotes. This thesis 
has not been submitted in whole or in part for any other academic degree or professional qualification. 
I agree that the University has the right to submit my work to the plagiarism detection service 
TurnitinUK for originality checks. Whether or not drafts have been so-assessed, the University reserves 
the right to require an electronic version of the final document (as submitted) for assessment as above. 
 
 
 
Signature: ……………………………. 
 
Date:   10th November 2019  
 
  
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would firstly like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisors, Dr Adrian Banks and Dr Philip 
Dean. Adrian, as my principal supervisor, I want to thank you for everything that you have done 
throughout the PhD process. Your generosity of time and advice has been invaluable, and I am indebted 
to your unparalleled insight and critical thinking. You have both challenged and supported me, and 
made this PhD an amazingly rewarding experience. I could not have wished for a better principal 
supervisor to guide me through the process.  
To my co-supervisor, Phil, thank you so much for joining the supervision team. Your input and feedback 
have been fantastic throughout, as has been your support with the technical aspects of fEMG – your 
advice has been instrumental in getting the work published. You have always been a friendly face in 
the department, and I wanted to thank you for all of the chats whilst waiting for participants and 
generally keeping my motivation levels up.  
I would also like to thank Professor Almuth McDowall, my Head of Department at Birkbeck and 
collaborator on several research projects. Your kind words encouraged me to push myself when I first 
started my PhD, and your patience and support at Birkbeck have helped me complete this thesis 
alongside work. I am continually inspired by your drive, knowledge, and passion.  
I have been incredibly lucky to work alongside some fantastic people over the course of this thesis. To 
the colleagues and collaborators across Surrey, Birkbeck, UCL, and LSE, it has been a pleasure working 
with, and learning from, you and I hope to continue to do so in the future.  
To my parents. Thank you so much for all of your support and guidance, for encouraging me to immerse 
myself in my studies, and for providing me with a loving home. My trips back to visit have always been 
a welcome retreat, with all of the Christmases, Birthdays, and weekend breaks over the years providing 
much needed recovery and refreshment.  
To my brother Michael. I want to thank you, not just for always listening to me bleat on about my thesis, 
but also for your insightful comments, and always calling me on it when I don’t make sense. You have 
always been a wonderful brother and best friend, and I am lucky to have you. I also want to take the 
opportunity to say that I am so incredibly proud of you, your resilience, and unwaveringly kind spirit.  
Finally, to my wife Dorris. We met on the first day that I started this PhD, and you have been by my 
side every step of the way. Thank you for putting up with the boring weekends and missed holidays 
whilst I completed this write up, for celebrating with me when things went well, and for picking me up 
when they didn’t. Your dedication, ambition, and intelligence have been a constant source of 
inspiration.   
v 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... ii 
Declaration of Originality ...................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................ iv 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................... v 
List of Tables ....................................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................ ix 
Preface: Overview of the Thesis ........................................................................................................... xii 
Chapter 1: Literature Overview .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Fluency .......................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.2.1 Perceptual Fluency ................................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.2 Conceptual Fluency................................................................................................................ 5 
1.2.3 Other Instantiations of Fluency .............................................................................................. 6 
1.2.4 Measuring Fluency ................................................................................................................. 7 
1.3 Judgement Domains ...................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3.1 Familiarity .............................................................................................................................. 7 
1.3.2 Truth ....................................................................................................................................... 8 
1.3.3 Confidence ............................................................................................................................. 9 
1.3.4 Liking ................................................................................................................................... 10 
1.4 How does Fluency Influence Judgement? .................................................................................. 12 
1.4.1 Nonspecific Activation ........................................................................................................ 13 
1.4.2 Perceptual Fluency/Attribution ............................................................................................ 14 
1.4.3 Naïve Theories ..................................................................................................................... 18 
1.5 Affect .......................................................................................................................................... 20 
1.5.1 Genuine Affective Responses to Fluency ............................................................................ 20 
1.5.2 Affect as a Cue for Judgement ............................................................................................. 22 
1.6 Affective responses to fluency .................................................................................................... 25 
1.6.1 Hedonic Marking ................................................................................................................. 25 
1.6.2 Fluency Amplification ......................................................................................................... 25 
1.6.3 Multi-Source Model ............................................................................................................. 27 
1.7 Summary of Thesis Chapters ...................................................................................................... 30 
Chapter 2: Meta-Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 31 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 31 
2.1.1 Why Meta-Analysis?............................................................................................................ 31 
2.1.2 Moderating variables............................................................................................................ 33 
vi 
 
2.2 Method ........................................................................................................................................ 38 
2.2.1 Sample Procedure ................................................................................................................ 38 
2.2.2 Meta-Analytic Procedure ..................................................................................................... 40 
2.3 Results ......................................................................................................................................... 42 
2.3.1 Differences between moderators .......................................................................................... 43 
2.4 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 56 
2.4.1 Valence of stimuli and measurement scales ......................................................................... 56 
2.4.2 Attribution, discounting, and discrepancy ........................................................................... 58 
Chapter 3: Experiments Measuring Bipolar Affective Responses to Coherence .................................. 61 
3.1 Experiment 1 ............................................................................................................................... 61 
3.1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 61 
3.1.2 Method ................................................................................................................................. 67 
3.1.3 Results .................................................................................................................................. 72 
3.1.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 75 
3.2 Experiment 2 ............................................................................................................................... 78 
3.2.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 78 
3.2.2 Method ................................................................................................................................. 80 
3.2.3 Results .................................................................................................................................. 82 
3.2.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 84 
3.3 Experiment 3 ............................................................................................................................... 86 
3.3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 86 
3.3.2 Method ................................................................................................................................. 89 
3.3.3 Results .................................................................................................................................. 90 
3.3.4 Discussion ............................................................................................................................ 92 
Chapter 4: Experiments Measuring Unipolar Affective Responses to Coherence ............................... 96 
4.1 Experiment 4 ............................................................................................................................... 96 
4.1.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 96 
4.1.2 Method ............................................................................................................................... 100 
4.1.3 Results ................................................................................................................................ 105 
4.1.4 Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 109 
4.2 Experiment 5 ............................................................................................................................. 113 
4.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 113 
4.2.2 Method ............................................................................................................................... 115 
4.2.3 Results ................................................................................................................................ 117 
4.2.4 Discussion .......................................................................................................................... 119 
Chapter 5: Facial Electromyographic Responses to Coherence ......................................................... 122 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 122 
vii 
 
5.2 Method ...................................................................................................................................... 125 
5.3 Results ....................................................................................................................................... 127 
5.4 Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 129 
Chapter 6: General Discussion ............................................................................................................ 132 
6.1 Hedonic Marking ...................................................................................................................... 132 
6.2 Fluency Amplification .............................................................................................................. 134 
6.3 Multi-source account ................................................................................................................ 136 
6.4 Methodological contribution ..................................................................................................... 138 
6.5. Judgements of Risk .................................................................................................................. 139 
6.6 Limitations and Direction of Research ..................................................................................... 140 
6.6.1 Ecological Validity ............................................................................................................ 140 
6.6.2 Mild Valence ...................................................................................................................... 141 
6.6.3 Valence-only Affect Measurement .................................................................................... 141 
6.6.4 Objective and Subjective Fluency ...................................................................................... 142 
6.6.5 Power ................................................................................................................................. 143 
6.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 144 
References ........................................................................................................................................... 145 
Appendices ............................................................................................................................................... I 
Appendix I – Business scenarios for Experiment 1 ............................................................................. I 
Appendix II – Business scenarios for Experiments 2-3 .................................................................... VI 
Appendix III – Business scenarios for Experiments 4-6 ................................................................... XI 
 
 
  
viii 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Meta-Analysis test of heterogeneity. ................................................................................... 42 
Table 2.2: Meta-Analysis effect size summary data. ............................................................................ 42 
Table 2.3: Meta-Analysis data by general fluency manipulation.......................................................... 43 
Table 2.4: Meta-Analysis data by affect measurement. ........................................................................ 44 
Table 2.5: Meta-Analysis data by affect type. ...................................................................................... 46 
Table 2.6: Meta-Analysis data by scale valence. .................................................................................. 48 
Table 2.7: Meta-Analysis data by stimuli valence. ............................................................................... 49 
Table 2.8: Meta-Analysis data by fluency comparison. ........................................................................ 50 
Table 2.9: Meta-Analysis data by additional ratings. ........................................................................... 51 
Table 2.10: Meta-Analysis data by additional instruction. ................................................................... 52 
Table 2.11: Meta-Analysis data by target duration. .............................................................................. 53 
Table 2.12: Meta-Analysis data by presentation frequency. ................................................................. 54 
Table 2.13: Meta-Analysis data by stimuli valence (negative scales only). ......................................... 55 
Table 3.1: Predictions for the hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source accounts. ... 65 
Table 3.2a: Background information and items for the nine businesses. ............................................. 69 
Table 3.2b: Background information and items for the nine businesses. ............................................. 70 
Table 3.3: The four conditions for the Travel business scenario. ......................................................... 81 
Table 4.1: Predictions (unipolar) for hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source. ....... 99 
Table 4.2a: Background information and items for the nine businesses. ........................................... 101 
Table 4.2b: Background information and items for the nine businesses. ........................................... 102 
Table 4.3: IAPS images used in Experiment 4. .................................................................................. 103 
Table 4.4: Coherent, Incoherent, and Early Incoherent scenarios for an Amusement Park business. 115 
  
ix 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1: Model summarising instantiations of fluency and judgement domains. ............................ 12 
Figure 1.2: Examples stimuli used in Cooper et al. (1992; Experiment 2). ......................................... 13 
Figure 1.3: Attribution effects adapted from Bornstein & D’Agostino (1994). ................................... 17 
Figure 1.4: A general, process model of fluency and judgement. ........................................................ 20 
Figure 1.5: Simplified fluency amplification predictions. .................................................................... 26 
Figure 1.6: Schematic model showing the combined contributions of the hedonic marking and 
fluency amplification mechanisms theorised by the multi-source model. ............................................ 28 
Figure 2.1: Self-Assessment Manikin scales for measuring Valence (top row), arousal (middle row), 
and Dominance (bottom row). Adapted from Bradly & Lang (1994) by Soares et al. (2013). ............ 35 
Figure 2.2: PRISMA flow diagram ...................................................................................................... 39 
Figure 2.3: Effect sizes for the six fluency manipulations. .................................................................. 43 
Figure 2.4: Effect sizes for eight different measurement types for affect. ........................................... 45 
Figure 2.5: Effect sizes for different affect types measure in the sample of studies. ........................... 47 
Figure 2.6: Effect sizes by negative scales. .......................................................................................... 48 
Figure 2.7: Effect sizes by stimuli valence. .......................................................................................... 49 
Figure 2.8: Effect sizes by fluency comparison.................................................................................... 50 
Figure 2.9: Effect sizes by additional ratings. ...................................................................................... 51 
Figure 2.10: Effect sizes by additional instructions.............................................................................. 52 
Figure 2.11: Effect sizes by target duration. ......................................................................................... 53 
Figure 2.12: Effect sizes by presentations frequency. .......................................................................... 54 
Figure 2.13: Effect sizes by stimuli valence (studies with negative scales only). ................................ 55 
Figure 3.1: Example of a business scenario used in the current study. ................................................ 63 
Figure 3.2: Visualising the affective responses over varying levels of risk, as predicted by the hedonic 
marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source models. ................................................................... 66 
Figure 3.3: Example of business scenario construction........................................................................ 68 
Figure 3.4: Self-Assessment Manikin scale. ........................................................................................ 68 
Figure 3.5: Procedure timeline for Experiment 1. ................................................................................ 72 
Figure 3.6: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. ....................................... 72 
Figure 3.7: Liking ratings for the business scenarios across four levels of riskiness. .......................... 74 
Figure 3.8: Risk ratings for the business scenarios across four levels of riskiness. ............................. 75 
Figure 3.9: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. ....................................... 82 
Figure 3.10: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ........................................................................................................................... 83 
x 
 
Figure 3.11: Risk ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ........................................................................................................................... 84 
Figure 3.12: Procedure timeline for Experiment 3. .............................................................................. 90 
Figure 3.13: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. ..................................... 90 
Figure 3.14: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ........................................................................................................................... 91 
Figure 3.15: Risk ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ........................................................................................................................... 92 
Figure 4.1: Unipolar SAM scales for Liking (a) and Disliking (b). ..................................................... 97 
Figure 4.2: Examples of a Coherent (top) and an Incoherent (bottom) combination of prime and target 
from Experiment 4. The images were used, with permission, from the IAPS database (Lang et al., 
2008) ................................................................................................................................................... 103 
Figure 4.3: Procedure timeline for Experiment 4’s business scenarios rating task. ........................... 104 
Figure 4.4: Procedure timeline for Experiment 4’s image rating task................................................ 105 
Figure 4.5: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. ..................................... 106 
Figure 4.6: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ......................................................................................................................... 106 
Figure 4.7: Disking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ......................................................................................................................... 107 
Figure 4.8: Response times to the positive and negative IAPS images, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ......................................................................................................................... 108 
Figure 4.9: Liking ratings for Positive and Negative IAPS images, comparing Fluent and Disfluent 
conditions. ........................................................................................................................................... 108 
Figure 4.10: Disliking ratings for Positive and Negative IAPS images, comparing Fluent and 
Disfluent conditions. ........................................................................................................................... 109 
Figure 4.11: Procedure timeline for Experiment 5. The rating task (labelled “Rating (SAM)” in the 
above) was either a liking or a disliking unipolar scale, depending on which condition the participants 
were assigned to. ................................................................................................................................. 116 
Figure 4.12: Response times (time for participants to complete the rating scales) for High and Low 
risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent, Incoherent, and Early Incoherent conditions. ............ 117 
Figure 4.13: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent, 
Incoherent, and Early Incoherent conditions. ..................................................................................... 118 
Figure 4.14: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. ......................................................................................................................... 119 
Figure 5.1: Sites of electrode placement. Adapted from Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986). .................. 126 
Figure 5.2: Procedure timeline for Experiment 6. .............................................................................. 126 
xi 
 
Figure 5.3: Zygomaticus activity in the test phase (1,501-3,000ms post stimulus onset) shown as a 
percentage change from pre-stimulus baseline. Comparing coherent and incoherent triads, for both 
high risk and low risk conditions. ....................................................................................................... 128 
Figure 5.4: Corrugator activity in the test phase (1,501-3,000ms post stimulus onset) shown as a 
percentage change from pre-stimulus baseline. Comparing coherent and incoherent triads, for both 
high risk and low risk conditions. ....................................................................................................... 129 
 
  
xii 
 
Preface: Overview of the Thesis 
 
Norbert Schwarz (2004, p. 332) wrote that “there is more to thinking than thought content”, meaning 
that when we make a judgement, decision, or choice, we are not only influenced by declarative 
information (e.g. knowledge, attributes, exemplars), but also by the metacognitive experience of 
processing or generating this information. One of the most influential of these metacognitive 
experiences is fluency – the relative ease of carrying out cognitive operations. Fluency can arise from 
a wide range of instantiations, for example, certain fonts are more fluently read than others, information 
printed on a high contrast background is more fluent that on a low contrast background, generating a 
short list of examples from memory is more fluent that generating a long list, viewing images that we 
have been exposed to previously is more fluent than novel images, and many others (rhyme, meter, 
prototypicality, coherence etc). In addition to the wide range of instantiations of fluency, there is a 
similar array of domains in which the experience of fluency has an influence. For example, fluency has 
been shown to influence judgements of truth, familiarity, liking, confidence, value, risk, and quality. 
Given this flexibility, fluency is an important cue for study.  
Of the numerous judgement domains influenced by fluency, affect (which includes liking) presents a 
particular interest. Firstly, this is because affect has been shown to be directly evoked by fluency, and 
secondly because affect can also act as a cue for other judgements. These points set affect apart from 
the other judgement domains, and highlight the importance of furthering our understanding of the 
fluency-affect relationship. Specifically, the primary research question of this thesis is: 
Q. What is the pattern of affective responses to fluency?  
The fluency literature suggests potential answers to this question. Firstly, the dominant hedonic marking 
hypothesis suggests that fluency is a positive experience by default, as fluency suggests familiarity and 
safety, or progress towards goals (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). The expected 
affective responses to fluency would therefore be: 
Hedonic marking: Increased fluency results in a positive affective response. 
Albrecht and Carbon (2014) proposed an extension to the hedonic marking hypothesis, noting that the 
majority of studies on fluency and affect had used stimuli of neutral or positive valence, leaving the 
affective response to negative-fluent stimuli largely unexplored. In contrast to the hedonic marking 
hypothesis, Albrecht and Carbon’s fluency amplification hypothesis suggested that the affective 
response to fluency was not always positive, but was instead dependent on the valence of stimuli being 
exposed to. Specifically: 
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Fluency amplification:  
1. For positive stimuli, increased fluency results in a positive affective response.  
2. For negative stimuli, increased fluency results in a negative affective response.  
As well as positioning fluency amplification as an extension of hedonic marking, the two models have 
also been used as competing accounts. However, there is still disagreement regarding the pattern of 
affective responses to fluency, with Forster, Fabi, and Leder (2015, p.2) noting that “conclusive 
evidence is still lacking”. This thesis suggests that a reason why the evidence is lacking, is not only due 
to the limited number of studies that have used negative stimuli (as per Albrecht & Carbon, 2014), but 
there is a lack of studies that have also separately measured positive and negative affective responses. 
This thesis also presents an alternate theoretical perspective, that hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification are not competing models, but may both contribute to the overall affective response to 
fluency. This approach has been termed the multi-source hypothesis, and predicts: 
Multi-source: 
1. For positive and negative stimuli, increased fluency results in a positive affective response. 
2. For negative stimuli, increased fluency also results in a negative affective response.  
To answer the research question, and to test the hypotheses presented by the above models, the 
following work has been completed.  
Chapter 1 – Literature Overview  
The first chapter explores the literature regarding fluency as a flexible metacognitive cue for judgement. 
Popular experimental instantiations of fluency are discussed, as well as the more prevalent judgement 
domains. The review then focusses on affective responses to fluency, arguing that this is a judgement 
domain of particular interest. The various mechanisms by which fluency may influence judgement are 
discussed, including mere exposure, nonspecific activation, perceptual/fluency attribution, naïve 
theory, hedonic marking, and fluency amplification. Finally, the predictions of the newly proposed 
multi-source model are laid out.  
Chapter 2 – Meta-Analysis  
A Meta-Analysis was conducted to assess affective responses to fluency. 591 effect size observations 
were gathered from a final sample of 108 papers. Results indicated a positive affective response to 
fluency (d = 0.563, 95% CI = 0.516 – 0.610, Z = 23.458, p < .001), which was the case over a range of 
fluency manipulations, the majority of affect measurement methods, and the majority of affective 
responses measured, as well as other methodological variations. Findings supported the hedonic 
marking hypothesis, demonstrating a robust positive response to fluency, however it was also noted that 
there was a lack of observations (k = 3) that had both manipulated stimuli valence and separately 
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measured positive and negative affect, meaning that the full pattern of affective responses may not have 
been fully investigated. This gap was targeted in the experimental work in the following chapters.  
Chapter 3 – Experiments Measuring Bipolar Affective Responses to Coherence 
Chapter 3 included Experiments 1-3. Participants were presented with novel business scenarios, created 
for this thesis. Each scenario contained a piece of background information, followed by three additional 
items of information, which were presented sequentially. The items of information could either be 
strengths of the target business or risks that the business faces. Fluency was manipulated using 
Coherence (more detail below) and valence was manipulated using Risk. Response times were recorded 
alongside liking and risk ratings, which were measured on bipolar self-report scales.  
Experiment 11 
The first experiment aimed to validate the business scenarios, as well as provide an initial test of theory. 
Business scenarios were arranged across four levels depending on the ratio of strengths to risks in each 
scenario. Coherent scenarios (those that presented a consistent picture of risk) were processed faster 
than Incoherent scenarios (those that presented a consistent picture of risk). The four levels of scenario 
were rated for risk in a linear fashion, in line with a tallying process. However, when rated for liking, 
the four levels formed a step-like pattern.  
On the surface, the step pattern resembled the fluency amplification account. However, it was also noted 
that the magnitude of affective response to fluency in the High risk (negative valence) scenarios was 
less than in the Low risk (positive valence) scenarios. One possibility was that fluency had evoked 
positive and negative affect in the High risk scenarios, and that their opposing directions had diluted 
the overall affective response. A limitation of this experiment was that coherence and risk were 
confounded – it was not possible to alter coherence without also altering the level of risk. This was 
addressed in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 21 
The design was altered so that Coherence was varied by whether or not the scenarios were consistent 
with typical schemas that people hold, rather than by level of risk. This disentangled the variables, 
allowing for coherence to be manipulated independently from risk. Coherent scenarios were processed 
faster than Incoherent scenarios, and liked more than Incoherent scenarios in the Low risk condition. In 
 
1 Experiments 1, 2, 5 & 6 were published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 28th 
June 2019 as part of the following manuscript: Gamblin, D. M., Banks, A. P., & Dean, P. J. A. 
(2019). Affective responses to coherence in high and low risk scenarios. Cognition and Emotion. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1640663 
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the High risk condition, there was no difference between Coherent and Incoherent scenarios for liking. 
There was no difference between Coherent and Incoherent scenarios in terms of risk ratings.  
It was argued that the lack of difference in liking between Coherent and Incoherent scenarios in the 
High risk condition once again indicated the presence of a multi-source response. Specifically, it was 
suggested that fluency had evoked both positive and negative affect, which cancelled each other out 
when participants made their overall affective responses on the bipolar scale. In order to test this 
prediction, it was necessary for later experiments (Experiments 4-6) to separately measure liking and 
disliking using a unipolar approach.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 aimed to increase the affective responses to fluency by adding time pressure to the 
procedure, a manipulation which has been shown to increase the use of more heuristic reasoning. 
Therefore, the design was the same as Experiment 2, but with the addition of a time limit for participants 
to input their self-report ratings. Coherent scenarios were processed faster than Incoherent scenarios, 
however there was no difference between the scenarios in terms of liking ratings. Coherent scenarios 
were judged as less risky than Incoherent scenarios in the Low risk condition, however there was no 
difference is risk ratings between the scenarios in the High risk condition.   
The experiment failed to increase affective responses, and it was argued that the addition of time 
pressure changed the way participants interpreted fluency, and attributed it onto the risk rating scale. 
Given the research question is regarding affective responses to fluency, time pressure was removed for 
the remaining experiments.   
Chapter 4 – Experiments Measuring Unipolar Affective Responses to Coherence 
The experiments in Chapter 4 updated the design so that separate unipolar liking and disliking scales 
were used to capture separate positive and negative affective responses.  
Experiment 4 
The experiment contained two parts: a business scenario task and an image rating task. The procedure 
for the business scenario task was the same as for Experiment 2, except for the replacement of the 
bipolar scales with separate liking and disliking unipolar scales. The unipolar scales were completed in 
a repeated measures design, sequentially within-trial. Coherent scenarios were liked more than 
Incoherent scenarios in the Low risk condition (no difference in liking in the High risk condition). 
Coherent scenarios were disliked more than Incoherent scenarios in the High risk condition (no 
difference in disliking in the Low risk condition). Overall the results supported a fluency amplification 
pattern. However, it was argued that the predictions of the multi-source hypothesis had not emerged as 
participants may have found it too difficult to complete the unipolar scales sequentially.  
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For the image rating task, positive and negative images from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) were presented to participants. The target images were 
contour primed with either a matching (coherent) or mis-matching (incoherent) prime. Participants 
made unipolar affective responses, in a repeated measures design, however for this part of the 
experiment the scales were separated across blocks. Coherent images were liked more than Incoherent 
images, regardless of image valence. For negative images, Coherent images were also disliked more 
than Incoherent images (no difference in disliking for positive images). This pattern of results matched 
the predictions of the multi-source account, with the separation of the unipolar scales across 
experimental blocks appearing to help participants separately report their affective responses.  
Experiment 51 
Experiment 5 increased the separation of the unipolar scales further by adopting a between groups 
design for the business scenarios, with participants either reporting liking or disliking ratings. Coherent 
scenarios were processed faster and liked more than Incoherent scenarios, for both the Low and High 
risk conditions. For the High risk condition, the Coherent scenarios were also disliked more than 
Incoherent scenarios. The pattern matched the predictions of the multi-source account.  
Experiment 5 also introduced a new scenario type: Early Incoherent. These scenarios had the same 
content as Incoherent scenarios, but were ordered to remain fluent. Early Incoherent scenarios behaved 
in the same way as Coherent scenarios, suggesting that differences had emerged due to fluency, rather 
than content.  
Chapter 5 – Facial Electromyographic Responses to Coherence 
Experiment 6 replaced the self-report scales with facial Electromyography, to separately and 
simultaneously measure zygomaticus major (indicating positive affective responses) and corrugator 
supercilii (indicating negative affective responses) muscle activity.  
Experiment 61 
Coherent scenarios were associated with a greater increase in zygomaticus activity from baseline 
compared to Incoherent scenarios. This was the case for both Low and High risk conditions. Coherent 
scenarios were also associated with a greater increase in corrugator activity from baseline in the High 
risk condition. Results supported the multi-source account.  
Chapter 6 – Discussion 
The general discussion draws the above findings together, arguing that neither the hedonic marking, 
nor the fluency amplification hypotheses can account for the full pattern of results obtained. Instead, 
findings support a multi-source account, with fluency having the potential to evoke both a positive and 
negative affective response when stimuli are negative. Limitations and directions for future study are 
discussed.   
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Chapter 1: Literature Overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As we make judgements about the world around us, we engage in cognitive thought processes. 
However, our ultimate judgements are not only based on the content of these thoughts, they are also 
influenced by the metacognitive experiences involved in generating and processing them (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). These experiences provide us with cues and are said to operate on the fringes of 
consciousness (Reber, Fazendeiro, & Winkielman, 2002; Reber & Schwarz, 2001; Topolinski & Strack, 
2009b).  
For example, when we form an impression of a person, we might use deliberative reasoning about their 
appearance, but we are also influenced by automatic associations (Skowronski, Carlston, & Isham, 
1993; Sweklej, Balas, Pochwatko, & Godlewska, 2014) and whether certain features may be familiar 
(Zajonc, 1968), prototypical (Winkielman, Halberstadt, Fazendeiro, & Catty, 2006; Zitek & Tiedens, 
2012), or representative (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). When we assess the quality of a lecture, we 
evaluate the robustness of the content, but if the lecturer’s accent makes the information harder to 
process, then our assessment may be affected (Dragojevic & Giles, 2016; Sanchez & Khan, 2016). 
When judging an applicant’s CV, we take into account their career history, using their past experiences 
to predict future performance. However, if the CV is difficult to read (such as if an unclear font is 
chosen), the predicted future career trajectory may be impacted (Huang, Song, & Bargh, 2011). If we 
were to make a self-evaluation, such as how assertive we are, we could list examples of times when we 
have behaved assertively. However, it is the ease in which that list in constructed, rather than the number 
of examples retrieved, that appears particularly influential when making our judgement (Schwarz et al., 
1991).  
The above examples all demonstrate instances where an individual is making a judgement, whether it 
is judging the attributes of another person, the quality of a product, or elements of one’s own personality. 
Normative approaches would suggest that such judgements are made in a declarative fashion, by 
retrieving held information, processing new relevant information, and weighting the contents of these 
operations. However, “there is more to thinking than thought content” (Schwarz, 2004, p. 332), as the 
ease, or difficulty, that these operations are carried out is also influential on judgement. This ease is a 
metacognitive experience, known as fluency, which has been shown to influence a wide range of 
judgements, including familiarity, truth, confidence, and liking (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).  
Amongst these judgement domains, the influence of fluency on liking, a dimension of affect, is 
potentially the most important. One reason for this is that affect itself can act as a cue for further 
judgements. For example, if a technology or activity is liked, then people judge it as having greater 
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benefits and lower risks; if the technology or activity is disliked, then its benefits are judged to be lower 
and the perceived risk of hazard increases (Alhakami & Slovic, 1994; Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic & 
Johnson, 2000).  
This fluency-affect relationship is also important due to its potential applications. One commonly 
associated area is advertising and persuasion, where marketers could use fluency to their advantage. For 
example, when promoting a product (Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997) or a political figure 
(Haddock, 2002), marketers should ask people to think of a small list of positive attributes in regard to 
the chosen target as this is easy and more fluent, whereas asking people to generate a long list may 
result in more positive attributes overall, but the relative difficulty and disfluency in accomplishing this 
task would undermine the overall attitude to the target. Given the flexibility of fluency as a cue, the 
applications to advertising are not limited to retrieval ease, but could also influence the decision of 
which font type (Velasco, Woods, Hyndman, & Spence, 2015) or font size (Trent, Lavelock, & King, 
2013) to use, which direction a product should face its advert (Leonhardt, Catlin, & Pirouz, 2015), the 
conceptual flow of a television commercial (Lee & Labroo, 2004), the arrangement of in-store products 
(Orth & Wirtz, 2014), and more.  
Whilst the above demonstrates opportunities for taking advantage of the fluency-affect relationship, 
there are also times when it would be useful to protect ourselves against the affective response to 
fluency. One area which has received attention is in memory and decision, with some authors suggesting 
that presenting information disfluently can reduce errors in a cognitive reflection task (CRT; Alter, 
Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Kahneman, 2011), and improve performance on memory tasks 
(Diemand-Yauman, Oppenheimer, & Vaughan, 2011). Knowledge of the affective response to fluency 
may also help to protect ourselves from bias, such as the possibility that people with a fluent name have 
an advantage in terms of career progression (Laham, Koval, & Alter, 2012), that students with more 
fluent handwriting may receive higher grades (Greifeneder et al., 2010), or that accented speakers may 
receive lower evaluations than those speaking more fluently (Sanchez & Kahn, 2016). In such instances, 
educating audiences about processing fluency may help to reduce the bias (Greifeneder et al., 2010).  
Despite the importance of the fluency-affect relationship, there is currently disagreement regarding the 
pattern of affective responses to fluency. The dominant hypothesis is that of hedonic marking 
(Winkielman et al., 2003), which suggests that processing fluency is fundamentally positive, and 
therefore increasing the fluency for which a stimulus is processed should result in a positive affective 
response. However, Albrecht and Carbon (2014) noted that the majority of research examining a 
fluency-affect relationship had used neutral stimuli. These authors demonstrated that increasing the 
fluency for negative stimuli can result in increased negative affective responses, and therefore propose 
a fluency amplification account, suggesting that the affective response to fluency is dependent on 
stimulus valence. Whilst originally proposed as an extension of hedonic marking, fluency amplification 
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has since been used as a competing explanation, due to the diverging predictions of these two models 
when it comes to negative stimuli.  
As well as fluency amplification being proposed as an extension of hedonic marking, or a competing 
account, there is a third alternative: that the two models are separate mechanisms, both contributing to 
the affective response to fluency. This third possibility – termed here the multi-source account – has yet 
to be explored in the literature, as there is a significant lack of studies which have both manipulated 
stimuli valence and separately measured positive and negative affect. Without doing so, the separate 
contributions of hedonic marking and fluency amplification cannot be determined. This thesis 
investigates the research gap, to answer the research question: 
Q. What is the pattern of affective responses to fluency?  
This chapter will first explore the background of fluency, its association with some of the wider 
researched judgement domains, including truth, confidence, familiarity, and liking, and discuss the 
models that explain how fluency influences these judgements. The chapter will then focus on affect, 
with liking being a dimension of this, and argue that this judgement domain is unique and therefore 
worthy of attention in this thesis. Having established the importance of affect, the chapter will then 
discus the predictions of two of the most influential models established to explain patterns of affective 
responses to fluency – hedonic marking and fluency amplification – as well as the novel multi-source 
model. Finally, an overview of the thesis chapters will be provided.  
1.2 Fluency 
Observations such as, “there is more to thinking than thought content” (Schwarz, 2004, p. 332), and 
“Human judgment reflects not only the content of our thoughts but also the metacognitive experience 
of processing those thoughts” (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009, p. 219) highlight the difference between 
cognitive operations and metacognition. Fluency is one such metacognitive experience, and refers to 
the relative ease at which information is processed and cognitive operations are carried out, typified by 
mental processes that are fast and low effort. Whilst cognitive operations include assessing objective 
external information or consulting memory, fluency is the relative ease that we experience whilst 
carrying out the operations. Whilst fluency may not be a “cognitive operation in and of itself” 
(Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 237), it nonetheless has an influential role in judgement, choice, cue selection, 
and strategy.  
An illustration of the difference between cognitive operation and metacognition, as well as fluency’s 
influence on judgement, can be found from Schwarz et al. (1991). In this study, participants were asked 
to complete a task in one of two different conditions: In the easy condition, participants were asked to 
generate six examples of times when they had exhibited assertive behaviour. In the difficult task 
condition, participants generated twelve examples. After generating their lists, participants then rated 
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themselves for assertiveness. Results showed that participants rated themselves as more assertive 
following the easy version of the task compared to the difficult version.  
The listing of assertiveness examples represents the cognitive operations. If the participants were 
making their assertiveness judgements purely based on these operations, it would have been expected 
that they would judge themselves as more assertive in the difficult condition, as this is the condition 
where they generate more data in support of the judgement. In other words, someone with a list of 
twelve assertiveness examples would surely feel that they were more assertive than someone who only 
had six examples. Fluency on the other hand is the ease in which the lists were generated, and generating 
six examples is much easier than generating twelve examples. The fact that the participants judged 
themselves to be more assertive in the easy condition therefore suggests that they were relying on the 
metacognitive cue of fluency rather than basing their judgement on the number of examples recalled. 
The above example demonstrates just one type of fluency: retrieval ease. This kind of fluency has been 
reliably manipulated, with the generation of shorter lists being easy and fluent compared to longer lists. 
Researchers have applied this to different domains, with participants being asked to generate easy or 
difficult lists for positive self behaviours (as above), less desirable self behaviours (unassertive 
behaviours; Schwarz et al., 1991), reasons to buy a product (Wänke et al., 1997), or to vote for a political 
figure (Haddock, 2002). However, as fluency is not a “cognitive operation in and of itself” 
(Oppenheimer, 2008, p. 237), it means that it can be evoked from a wide range of processes. To capture 
this range, fluency instantiations are often conceptualised under two broad categories: perceptual 
fluency and conceptual fluency (Winkielman et al., 2003).  
1.2.1 Perceptual Fluency 
Perceptual fluency refers to the ease of processing low level or surface attributes, and manipulations 
involving this level of fluency are regarded as a “staple among fluency researchers” (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009, p. 222). The ease in which stimuli are processed perceptually has been manipulated 
in a variety of ways. For example, perceptual fluency can be reduced by printing words in fonts which 
are difficult to read (Alter et al., 2007; Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007). This was 
demonstrated by Carr, Rotteveel, and Winkielman (2016) who presented participants with a series of 
pseudowords that were either written in a fluent font (e.g. “spaiffs”) or a non-fluent font (e.g. “spaiffs”). 
Participants were required to read the pseudowords and classify them (good word or bad word; word 
represents something living or non-living) by making a motor response on an approach-avoidance 
apparatus. Results indicated that participants were able to respond faster to words written in fluent fonts 
compared to the non-fluent fonts. Perceptual fluency has been similarly increased by manipulating the 
size and colour of stimuli, with participants reporting large colour photographs to be easier to process 
than small black and white photographs (Forgas, 2015), as well as by increasing the figure ground 
contrast (Reber & Schwarz, 2001). Research has also demonstrated that symmetry can influence 
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processing fluency, with reflected, and rotated dot patterns being responded to faster than random dot 
patterns, and reflected dot patterns being responded to faster than transformed dot patterns (Makin, 
Pecchinenda, & Bertamini, 2012a, 2012b). 
Perceptual fluency manipulations have also been used at critical points, with key theories (discussed 
later in this chapter) being founded on perceptual manipulations, such as the perceptual 
fluency/attribution hypothesis (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), the hedonic marking hypothesis 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003), and fluency 
amplification (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014). 
1.2.2 Conceptual Fluency 
Whilst perceptual fluency relates to lower level or surface operations, the second broad category of 
fluency – conceptual fluency – is concerned with the ease of conducting higher level operations. 
Common methods for manipulating conceptual fluency are based on the spreading activation of 
semantic concepts (Collins & Loftus, 1975), and include semantic priming and semantic coherence. 
Under a semantic priming mechanism, the processing ease of one concept can be facilitated by priming 
people with a related concept. For example, participants felt that they could answer a question such as 
“What term in golf refers to a score of I under par on a particular hole?” faster if they had been primed 
by related words such as “golf” and “par” in a priming phase (Reder, 1987). Furthermore, this 
facilitation varies depending on the strength or closeness of the related concepts: the concept “bird” is 
afforded greater accessibility by the concept “robin” than by “chicken” (Collins & Loftus, 1975), and 
the concept “doctor” would weakly prime various professions, but would strongly prime the concept 
“nurse” (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). In a similar vein, conceptual fluency has been achieved by 
priming participants semantically with story (Leavitt & Christenfeld, 2011) or joke (Topolinski, 2014) 
spoilers.  
Related to this mechanism is that of semantic coherence, whereby the conceptual fluency of a target is 
facilitated if it is preceded by primes that share a related concept. This is best illustrated using the 
Remote Associate Task design (RAT; Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bowers, Regeher, Balthazard, & Parker, 
1990; Mednick, 1962). In RAT designs, participants are presented with a triad of words which can either 
be semantically coherent (e.g. SALT, DEEP, FOAM), and therefore sharing a common semantic 
associate (e.g. SEA), or incoherent (e.g. DREAM, BALL, BOOK). As participants read the coherent 
triad, word by word, the common sematic associate is activated, which primes related concepts. 
Therefore, once participants reach the final word in the triad, it has already been partially activated via 
this common associate, facilitating its processing. Topolinski and Strack (2009c) have provided 
evidence for this effect by demonstrating that participants’ response times to coherent triads were 
shorter than to incoherent triads.  
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Both semantic priming and semantic coherence can result in the building of expectations through the 
activation of related concepts. Whittlesea (1993) demonstrated this process by presenting participants 
with sentences with varying degrees of predictability. Results indicated that words presented in more 
predictive sentences such as “The stormy seas tossed the BOAT” were processed faster than when 
presented in those that were not predictive, such as “She saved money and bought a BOAT”. This has 
implications for marketing, where researchers have demonstrated increased fluency for adverts that 
follow a closely related conceptual flow. For example, a target product of ketchup is easier to process 
when the preceding storyboard advert showed a person cooking hamburgers vs a person in a 
supermarket; a target product of beer is easier to process when the preceding storyboard features a man 
in a bar vs a woman in a supermarket (Lee & Labroo, 2004).  
1.2.3 Other Instantiations of Fluency 
In addition to these broad categories, more fine-grained categories exist, including familiarity, duration, 
typicality, and linguistic fluency. Familiarity is the concept that stimuli become easier to process on 
repeated exposure (e.g. Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994, Seamon, McKenna, & Binder, 1998; 
Westerman, Lanska, & Olds, 2015), duration explains that temporal fluency is increased when stimuli 
exposure time is increased (e.g. Forster, Leder, & Ansorge, 2013, 2016; Reber, Winkielman, & 
Schwarz, 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), typicality suggests that stimuli are more fluent when 
they closely resemble a prototype (Forster & Denzler, 2012; Winkielman et al., 2006; Zitek & Tiedens, 
2012), whilst linguistic fluency itself can be further broken down into even more specific subcategories 
(Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009).  
For example, Alter and Oppenheimer (2006) have demonstrated that certain combinations of letters and 
syllables are easier to process or pronounce than others, using fictional company names (fluent: 
Barnings, Undersill; non-fluent: Aegeadux, Fyndwyck) and real stock ticker codes (fluent: KAR; non-
fluent: RDO), which is an example of phonological fluency. Other variations of linguistic fluency 
include lexical fluency: complex words are harder to process than simple words of the same meaning 
(Oppenheimer, 2006); rhyming: phrases that rhyme (e.g. Woes unite foes) are easier to process than 
non-rhyming alternatives (e.g. Woes unite enemies; McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000); orthographic: 
the use of symbols can create disfluent versions (e.g.  G@dget$) of words (e.g. Gadgets; Alter et al., 
2007).   
Further examples include false feedback designs (Forster, Fabi, & Leder, 2015) and numerical ease 
(King & Janiszewski, 2011), as well as sensorimotor and action fluency (Cannon, Hayes, & Tipper, 
2010; Carr et al., 2016) which are receiving more attention. The range of instantiations demonstrates 
the variety in the fluency literature, as well as the potential prevalence with which we encounter fluency 
in daily life.  
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1.2.4 Measuring Fluency 
Fluency is the relative ease of processing, typified by cognitive operations that are fast and low effort, 
and can therefore be measured using approaches that capture speed and/or difficulty. A common method 
is to record the response time to stimuli. For example, Albrecht and Carbon (2014) showed participants 
a series of images, some of which had been made fluent by priming them beforehand with the brief 
exposure of a degraded image with matching contours. Participants were required to quickly judge 
whether the image was upside-down or correctly oriented by pressing a key on the keyboard, with the 
time to make this judgement recorded as an indicator for fluency. In a similar fashion, the response time 
to recognise stimuli (Reber, et al., 1998) or to input a liking rating (Vrana & Van den Bergh, 1995) have 
been used as measurements of fluency. Response time to stimuli has not been limited to keyboard 
inputs, with fluency also being measured as the speed to make a physical movement on an approach or 
avoidance apparatus (Carr et al., 2016), or to read a stimulus name (Lee, 2015) or word (Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981). 
In addition to response time, various self-report scales have been used to gauge fluency, such as 
measuring self-reported difficulty (Gomez & Torelli, 2015; Rubin, Paolini, & Crisp, 2013), complexity 
(Westerman, Klin, & Lanska, 2015), ease (Dragojevic & Giles, 2016), or the feeling of fluency itself 
(Forster, et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). Fluency has also been measured using fMRI: Bohrn, Altmann, 
Lubrich, Menninghaus, and Jacobs (2012) presented participants with familiar and unfamiliar proverbs 
whilst recording brain region activity. Results indicated that the unfamiliar proverbs were associated 
with higher levels of activity in regions related to sentence reading (left superior and middle temporal 
lobe, right middle temporal gyrus/superior frontal gyrus, bilateral occipital cortex, and cerebellum), 
indicating increased effort compared to the familiar proverb’s default pathway.  
1.3 Judgement Domains 
As the examples above have demonstrated, there is a wide range of ways in which fluency may arise, 
whether that is from the processing of external stimuli, the retrieval of held internal information, or a 
combination of both. Just as there is variety in the way in which fluency arises, there are numerous 
domains in which fluency influences judgement. In their analysis, Alter and Oppenheimer (2009) 
suggested that four of the largest domains of judgement are: familiarity, truth, confidence, and liking, 
which are introduced in the following subsections. 
1.3.1 Familiarity 
Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981, Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby, Lindsay, & Toth, 1992) 
have demonstrated that brief presentations of stimuli result in the formation of memory representations. 
For example, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) showed that target words that had been previously presented in 
a study phase were perceptually recognised more effectively in a test phase, compared to novel words 
that had not been previously presented. As a perceptual recognition “hit” required the participants to 
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report the target word following only brief presentation (~45ms), improvements in hit rate indicated 
facilitation of perceptual features, with this facilitation known as perceptual fluency (Jacoby & Kelley, 
1987; Jacoby et al., 1992). If objects become fluent upon repeated exposure, fluency would be a useful 
cue to familiarity (Oppenheimer, 2008). Jacoby and Dallas (1981) examined this relationship by 
drawing comparisons between perceptual recognition and recognition memory. 
Over a number of experiments, evidence for parallels and dissociations between perceptual recognition 
and recognition memory performance were observed. For example, certain experimental manipulations 
which improved recognition memory, such as encouraging elaborative processing, had no effect on 
perceptual recognition. However, experimental manipulations which were designed to improve 
perceptual recognition, such as increasing the number of repetitions during the study phase, also 
improved recognition memory. The pattern of results led the authors to suggest that increases in 
perceptual fluency could be used as a cue for recognition memory. Similar to the availability heuristic 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1973) – where events that come to mind easily tend to be judged as occurring 
more frequently – the argument proposes fluency as an indicator of familiarity. The authors (Jacoby & 
Dallas, 1981) clarify that it is relative, rather than objective, fluency that serves as this indicator: words 
that appear in language at low frequency benefit more from prior presentation in the study phase than 
high frequency words, which was the case for both perceptual recognition and recognition memory 
performance.  
Evidence for the relationship between fluency and familiarity has been found in several studies utilising 
a similar study-test recall methodology, with Jacoby and colleagues demonstrating a consistent link 
between fluency and familiarity (Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Johnston, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985; 
Kelley, Jacoby, & Hollingshead, 1989). Further direct evidence was obtained by Whittlesea, Jacoby, & 
Girard (1990) who demonstrated that fluent words (e.g. those presented with a light vs heavy mask) 
were more likely to be judged as repeated. Importantly, this fluency effect was present for both repeated 
words (those that had been presented in a study phase) and novel words. Whittlesea (1993) further 
extended this line of research by demonstrating that repetition judgements can also be influenced by 
conceptual fluency: novel words presented in predictive sentences (“The stormy seas tossed the 
BOAT”) were named faster, and were more likely to be judged as recognised, than those presented in 
less predictive sentences (“She saved money and bought a LAMP”). 
1.3.2 Truth 
As people navigate their daily lives, an important skill is ascertaining the truth of various sources of 
information, whether that comes from the innocent sources such as family members, friends, and 
colleagues, or from sources which may try to deceive or manipulate them such as rivals, marketers, or 
the media. A rational approach to making these judgements would be to compare the information to our 
own memory. However, as Schwarz et al.’s (1991) study on retrieval ease, our truth judgements may 
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be influenced by the metacognitive ease in generating examples, rather than the content of those 
examples themselves.  
Begg, Anas, and Farinacci (1992) demonstrated how retrieval ease can influence truth judgements by 
providing participants with a series of statements (e.g. “Gail Logan says that house mice can run an 
average of 4 miles per hour") and informing them that the source was either lying or telling the truth. 
At a subsequent test phase, participants were then presented with a list containing both old (those that 
had been presented previously) and novel statements, and instructed to decide whether each statement 
was true of false. Results indicated that whilst old true statements tended to be (correctly) judged as 
true more frequently than the old false statements, old statements also tended to be judged as true more 
frequently than new statements, irrespective of the actual true or false status of the statement. Alter and 
Oppenheimer suggested that “easily retrieved stimuli were imbued with a sense of truthfulness” (p. 
227). The authors (Begg et al., 1992) also suggested that there is a dissociation whereby there is 
recognition of the statement in absence of recognition of the source. This means that truth judgements 
can be based on familiarity, despite this familiarity not necessarily being diagnostic of truthfulness. In 
support, Kelley and Lindsay (1993) demonstrated that participants showed favour for answers which 
had been primed beforehand. Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, and Jasechko (1989) noted a similar mechanism 
in the false-fame effect, whereby people may make fame judgements based on familiarity, even though 
that familiarity only arises due to the experimental procedure, rather than being a real basis for fame.  
However, there are times when we do not have any memory to compare to such statements, and we 
have to gauge the truth of novel information in absence of explicit knowledge. Further research has 
demonstrated that fluency can also influence these judgements. For example, perceptual fluency can be 
increased by presenting statements against a high contrast background, in turn increasing the likelihood 
that they would be judged as true (Reber & Schwarz, 1999). Truth judgements have also been shown 
to be influenced by linguistic fluency. For example, McGlone and Tofighbakhsh (2000) demonstrated 
that aphorisms, which by their nature are designed to convey truth, were more likely to be deemed as 
accurate when they rhymed (“Woes unite foes”), and therefore had increased phonological fluency, 
compared to non-rhyming alternatives (“Woes unite enemies”). This particular effect has relevance to 
real life situations involving persuasion, such as the infamous defence in the O. J. Simpson trial: “If the 
gloves don’t fit, you must acquit” (p. 427). Overall, truth has been shown to be affected by retrieval 
ease, perceptual fluency, conceptual fluency, and linguistic fluency, indicating the flexibility and 
persuasiveness of fluency as a cue for judgement.   
1.3.3 Confidence 
In a similar fashion to judgements of truth, peoples’ confidence in the tasks that they are completing 
can also be influenced by a range of fluency manipulations. In the above, Kelley and Lindsay (1993) 
demonstrated that performance on a general knowledge test was reduced when participants were primed 
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beforehand with answers that were related to the correct answer, despite being ultimately incorrect. This 
was interpreted as incorrect answers feeling more true due to the conceptual fluency experienced when 
recalling them from the previous priming phase. The authors also demonstrated that prior exposure 
resulted in greater judgements of confidence, and that confidence was significantly negatively 
correlated with response times to the test questions. In fact, responding quickly to questions was 
associated with greater feelings of confidence, even when responding incorrectly. Similarly, Gill, 
Swann, and Silvera (1998) found that participants primed with ambition as a concept then rated a target 
person on an ambition scale more fluently than on an intelligence scale, with the more fluent judgements 
being associated with greater levels of confidence. Also vice versa, participants primed with intelligence 
as a concept then rated the target on the intelligence scale more fluently than on the ambition scale, with 
the fluent judgements also being judged with greater confidence.   
Confidence has also been influenced by perceptual and linguistic fluency. For example, Alter et al. 
(2007) have used both font and orthographic manipulations to increase fluency, which in turn appeared 
to increase participants’ confidence in their intuitive judgements for consumer reviews and syllogisms.  
In the above examples, confidence has been used in relation to a person’s confidence in their own 
judgements, such as confidence in their ability to answer general knowledge questions, to solve logic 
problems, or to asses consumer reports. However, this judgement domain can also relate to confidence 
in other people or organisations. One example from such third party confidence comes from Alter and 
Oppenheimer’s (2006) study in the financial domain. In one experiment, the authors showed that 
participants expected pronounceable, and therefore phonologically fluent, stocks to outperform 
unpronounceable stocks. This appeared to have a real world effect too, with stocks with low complexity 
names outperforming those with complex names after one day, and one week of trading, suggesting that 
investors had used fluency as a cue for confidence.  
1.3.4 Liking  
One of the earliest applications of a processing fluency model was to explain the mere exposure effect 
(Zajonc, 1968), the phenomenon where novel stimuli become more liked on repeated exposure. In an 
influential monograph, Zajonc (1968) found an association between the favourability of a word and the 
frequency with which it appears in language (measured using the Thorndike-Lorge L-Count, 1944). 
This was demonstrated in a choice task – given the choice between two words, participants indicated a 
preference for the more frequent in the pair – as well as in a correlation – participants provided higher 
favourability ratings for words with a higher frequency count. These findings were also supported 
experimentally, where results showed that participants provided higher “goodness” ratings for stimuli 
that were presented more frequently during an exposure phase. The pattern was consistent for a variety 
of word categories (countries, cities, trees, fruits, vegetables, flowers), as well as across a range of 
different in stimuli including Chinese characters, nonsense words, and photographs. This range is in 
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addition to similar observations by Maslow (1937), where preference was identified for more frequent 
artwork, names, attire, and seat locations, as well as Meyer (1903) who showed preference for musical 
tones that participants were more familiar with.  
Under the mere exposure effect, participants show increased liking for the repeated stimuli even without 
recognising them as being previously presented. For example, Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980) were 
able to impair recognition performance of shapes to chance level by reducing exposure time and 
illumination. Even though participants did not recognise the shapes, they were still able to discriminate 
between the old and new ones in terms of affect – with old stimuli liked more than new stimuli. This 
affective discrimination in absence of recognition led Zajonc to argue that “affect and cognition are 
separate and partially independent systems” (Zajonc, 1980, p. 151) and that there is a priority of affect 
over cognition and recognition, known as affective primacy. Seamon et al. (1998) have compiled 
evidence for this dissociation from patient case studies. Firstly, patients with prosopagnosia who have 
difficulty identifying faces, but were able to identify facial emotion. Similar dissociation was found 
with prosopon-affective agnosia patients, who were able to identify faces, but had difficulty identifying 
emotional expression.  
Later explanations for this effect made the argument that fluency was the underlying mechanism in the 
mere exposure effect, by drawing parallels with studies on implicit memory. For example, Cooper, 
Schacter, Ballesteros, and Moore (1992) demonstrated that participants’ performance on an explicit 
memory recall task could be degraded by interfering with the target stimuli (such as altering the size or 
reflecting the image) between the learning and test phases. In contrast, performance on an implicit 
memory task, which required participants to quickly judge whether the target image contained contours 
that could exist in the real world, was unaffected by these interferences. Consistent with this pattern, 
Seamon et al. (1995) found a similar dissociation between explicit recognition and liking, with results 
indicating that transforming (again by size or reflection) three-dimensional figures between test and 
retest impaired recognition judgements, but not those regarding liking. In other words, the preference 
for targets over distractors remained consistent, regardless of whether the target had been transformed 
or not (Seamon et al., 1997). The authors (Seamon et al., 1995) extended their findings from repetition 
to stimuli duration as the manipulation of fluency. Here they found that at a 6ms exposure duration, 
participants were able to distinguish the target (previously exposed) and distractor (novel) stimuli in 
terms of preference and recognition. However, at a 4ms exposure duration, participants were able to 
distinguish between targets and distractors in terms of preference only.  
Alongside this research, Bornstein and D’Agostino have supported a fluency account for the mere 
exposure effect (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), gathering consistent evidence 
for the increased liking for repeated stimuli in absence of recognition (Bornstein, 1989). However, the 
effect of fluency on liking judgements is not limited to repetition based manipulations, and just as 
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Seamon et al. (1995) extended research into duration instantiations, researchers have found a fluency-
liking relationship for a wide range of fluency manipulations. This range includes increased liking for 
word triads that are fluent due to semantic coherence (Topolinski, Likowski, Weyers, & Strack, 2009; 
Topolinski & Strack, 2009c), art works that are fluent due to their typicality (Belke, Leder, & Carbon, 
2015), pseudowords which are presented in easier to read fonts (Carr et al., 2016), essays which are 
written in easy to read handwriting (Greifender et al., 2010), motor actions that are easier to perform 
(Hayes, Paul, Beuger, & Tipper, 2008), speakers that are easier to understand due to lack of accent 
(Sanchez & Khan, 2016), and products that are presented in colour schemes which are easier to process 
due to cultural compatibility (Chattaraman, Rudd, & Lennon, 2010).  
1.4 How does Fluency Influence Judgement? 
Not only has fluency been shown to arise from a wide range of instantiations, but evidence has also 
shown that it influences a wide range of judgement domains. Whilst the more researched domains 
include familiarity, truth, confidence, and liking, fluency is by no means limited to these judgements. 
Research has also found fluency to influence judgements of fame, size, value, earnings, contrast, and 
more (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). This presents a vast number of potential combinations of 
instantiation x judgement domain, presenting fluency as an incredibly flexible cue. However, given the 
number of meanings and interpretations, how do we know which one to use?  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Model summarising instantiations of fluency and judgement domains. 
The “?” indicates the missing link between the two, with potential explanations discussed in this section. 
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1.4.1 Nonspecific Activation 
Early explanations for how fluency is used as a cue for judgement derives from the work on implicit 
memory. Seamon and colleagues (Seamon, Brody, & Kauff, 1983; Seamon et al., 1998) explained that 
brief exposure to a stimulus causes a memory representation to be formed (Mandler, Nakamura, & Van 
Zandt, 1987). On encountering the stimulus in the future, the memory representation is activated, 
facilitating its encoding. The explanation predicts that when a participant is presented with a choice 
between two stimuli – one previously encountered (target) stimulus, which therefore holds a mental 
representation, and a second novel (distractor) stimulus – the participant will be biased towards the 
target as its encoding is more fluent. 
Evidence for the creation of memory representations can be found from the work of Jacoby and 
colleagues (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981, Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby et al., 1992), which was presented 
earlier in this chapter. These researchers demonstrated that a prior exposure of a stimulus could facilitate 
its subsequent perceptual recognition, even in conditions where explicit memory performance was only 
at chance level. This therefore suggests that it is an implicit memory representation which leads to 
facilitation, or perceptual fluency.  
Consistent with this, Cooper et al. (1992) presented participants with possible and impossible three-
dimensional objects, half of which had been previously presented in a study phase. Possible objects 
were those that could exist in the real world, whilst impossible objects could not, due to violations in 
their surfaces or edges. Explicit memory was measured with a recognition test, and implicit memory 
was measured with an object decision task: participants had to judge (based on 100ms presentation) 
whether or not the test object was possible or impossible. Results showed that accuracy of object 
decisions was facilitated for studied vs unstudied objects. Furthermore, although explicit memory 
recognition was impaired by transforming (altering the size, reflecting the image) the stimulus between 
encoding and test trials, implicit memory performance was unaffected. This supports the theory that 
brief exposure to a stimulus helps to form an implicit memory representation which is available for 
future presentations.  
 
Figure 1.2: Examples stimuli used in Cooper et al. (1992; Experiment 2). 
The figure shows possible (top row) and impossible (bottom row) objects, before (left column) and after 
(right column) the reflection transformation. 
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Mandler et al. (1987) suggested that these memory representations lack contextual reference (Seamon, 
et al., 1998). Therefore, whilst the above examples demonstrate that memory representations can be 
used in recognition-type judgements, this theory suggests that the fluency arising from memory 
representations could bias any potential judgement or choice, which the authors termed nonspecific 
activation (Mandler et al., 1987). To demonstrate this, the authors presented participants with irregular 
shapes at very brief durations (2ms) in an exposure phase. In the test phase, participants were given a 
choice between pairs of stimuli, one of the pair was the target (previously presented in the exposure 
phase) and the other was a novel distractor stimulus. Participants were required to choose, depending 
on the condition, the stimulus in each pair that they liked more, disliked more, thought was brighter, or 
thought was darker. Results indicated that, despite the prior exposure being too short to aid explicit 
recognition, the target stimuli were picked at greater than chance level as being liked more than the 
distractors, and therefore supported the hypothesised preference for fluent stimuli. Testing the 
nonspecific nature of this fluency, results also indicated that participants picked the target stimuli over 
the distractors as being the brighter of the pair, as well as being the darker of the pair. The observation 
that a target stimulus could be deemed both brighter and darker than a distractor supports the nonspecific 
activation theory, leading the authors to conclude that the nonspecific activation of memory 
representations could bias participants to select the fluent stimulus in a pair on any relevant dimension.  
However, despite some promising findings, it is important to note that participants did not pick the 
target stimuli as being disliked more than the distractors at a level greater than chance. For the results 
to fully support nonspecific activation, the target stimuli should have been both liked more and disliked 
more than the distractors. In addition, although the results on the brighter/darker dimensions followed 
the predicted nonspecific activation pattern, this was based on small samples sizes (n = 12 in each 
group). Finally, the results have not been replicated; in a similar set of experiments (although not an 
exact replication) Seamon, et al. (1998) found that participants did not select the target stimuli as being 
brighter or darker than the distractors at a level above chance. Participants did continue to like the 
targets more than the distractors at a greater than chance level, however they also disliked the target 
less than the distractors, differing from Mandler et al.’s (1987) findings.  
1.4.2 Perceptual Fluency/Attribution 
Bornstein and D’Agostino’s (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) perceptual 
fluency/attribution model shares similarities with nonspecific activation, in that both of these models 
were based on Jacoby’s work on memory representation (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981, Jacoby & Kelley, 
1987; Jacoby et al., 1992), both were originally applied to repetition manipulations of fluency, both 
consider fluency to be affectively neutral, and both can also be considered as “two-step” accounts for 
fluency and judgement (Winkielman et al., 2003). Consistent with nonspecific activation, perceptual 
fluency/attribution predicts that fluency could influence a range of scales that are reasonably connected 
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with the stimulus. Specifically, Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992, 1994) suggested that when a person 
experiences fluency, they interpret it using contextual cues available to them – such as the judgement 
scales provided to them by an experimenter – and form “the most parsimonious” (Bornstein & 
D’Agostino, 1994, p. 106) explanation for the experience.  
Perceptual fluency/attribution makes additional clarifications, the first of which is in regards to 
misattribution. Bornstein and D’Agostino (1992) suggest that fluency is attributed to a reasonable 
explanation for that fluency, for example, prior exposure to a stimulus increases its processing on 
subsequent presentation. In absence of explicit recognition, a reasonable explanation for the fluency is 
liking, leading to fluent stimuli being liked more than non-fluent stimuli (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 
1994). However, this predicts that if participants are presented with a more reasonable explanation, 
fluency could be reattributed to that source instead. Schwarz et al. (1991) demonstrated this by asking 
participants to retrieve either a difficult number (12) or easy number (6) of examples of their own 
assertive behaviour, whilst listening to background music. As discussed previously in this review, 
participants in the easy condition tended to rate themselves as more assertive than those in the difficult 
condition, suggesting that fluency had been attributed to the assertiveness judgement task. In certain 
conditions, participants were told that the background music would facilitate memory recall, thus 
presenting an alternative explanation for experienced fluency (and rending fluency undiagnostic). In 
this group, results indicated that participants no longer found fluency to be an informative, and 
participants in the difficult condition rated themselves as more assertive. Similar manipulations have 
also demonstrated that fluency can be reattributed onto an irrelevant source instead of being used as a 
cue for recognition (Fazendeiro, Winkielman, Luo, & Lorah, 2005; Weisbuch, Mackie, & Garcia-
Marques, 2003).  
A second crucial aspect of the perceptual fluency/attribution account is the related concept of 
discounting. This suggests that fluency is used as a cue for judgement most notably when the source of 
fluency is unknown. This relates to the real-life experience where a stranger may feel familiar if they 
share certain visual characteristics of a person we are familiar with, yet that same feeling of familiarity 
does not emerge when we encounter a friend. As Whittlesea and Williams (1998) explain, when we 
encounter a person, we process their features. If this person is a close friend, we will have done this 
many times before, and the processing would be fluent. However, as this person is familiar to us, the 
ease of processing would be expected, and therefore that fluency is not experienced. If we encounter a 
stranger who shares similar features, the processing would be similarly fluent. However, this time the 
ease of processing would be unexpected, and with no explanation regarding the source of fluency, we 
may experience it as a sense of familiarity.  
The discounting effect can also be illustrated in an experimental domain. For example, in a typical mere 
exposure design, although the target stimuli have been previously presented in an exposure phase (and 
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therefore fluent), the presentation time is so brief (subliminal) that the stimuli remain unrecognised in 
a subsequent test phase. In absence of recognition, the participant therefore looks for contextual cues to 
interpret the experience of processing fluency. In the case of a mere exposure experiment, the contextual 
cue would be the liking scale provider by the experimenter, leading to participants liking fluent stimuli 
more than non-fluent stimuli. In contrast, if a stimulus is presented supraliminally, the participant is 
able to detect it during the exposure phase, and can therefore recognise it during subsequent presentation 
later in the experiment. With this recognition, the participant would now have an appropriate 
explanation for the increase in processing fluency when encountering the familiar stimuli, and would 
no longer interpret the fluency as liking. Bornstein’s (1989) Meta-Analysis has provided evidence for 
this pattern. Alongside finding consistent evidence for increased liking for repeated stimuli in absence 
of recognition (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994), results indicated that this effect was 
more consistent and larger in magnitude in response to subliminally presented stimuli, compared to 
those that were recognised at better than chance accuracy, noting that “the subliminal mere exposure 
(SME) effect is typically about twice as great as the magnitude of the mere exposure effect produced 
by clearly-recognised stimuli” (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994).  
Bornstein and D’Agostino (1994) further demonstrated this discounting of fluency by providing 
participants with information regarding the status of presented stimuli. In a typical subliminal mere 
exposure design, participants completed an exposure phase followed by a test phase. During exposure, 
participants were presented black and white photographs, with each photograph appearing individually 
and under very brief durations (5ms, followed by a 100ms mask). For the test phase, participants were 
presented with a booklet of photographs, and were asked to provide liking judgements. Half of the 
photographs in the booklet were familiar, having been previously shown in the exposure phase, whilst 
the other half were unfamiliar, appearing for the first time. Two groups of participants were provided 
with additional information: one was told that all of the photographs in the test phase booklet were old 
and had been shown in the exposure phase, the other was told that all of the photographs were new. A 
third, ‘standard’, group received no additional information. Results followed the consistent mere 
exposure pattern, whereby familiar words were liked more than unfamiliar words. Furthermore, results 
also indicated a main effect of information group. Notably, when participants were led to believe that 
the words in the test phase were all old, liking ratings were reduced, regardless of the true status of the 
stimuli (old vs new).  
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Figure 1.3: Attribution effects adapted from Bornstein & D’Agostino (1994). 
The graph compares the liking ratings for familiar and unfamiliar stimuli. Different lines show scores for 
participants in the different instruction conditions. The dotted line indicates baseline ratings provided by a 
control group. 
The overall findings demonstrate that fluency is attributed to the most appropriate available explanation, 
such as a familiarity or liking judgement, with this attribution being guided by the context provided by 
the experimenter (i.e. the instructions). Similarly, processing fluency can be discounted when making 
judgements if a more suitable explanation is provided. Perceptual fluency/attribution made additional 
significant contributions to the understanding of fluency and judgement by extending that understanding 
for subliminal and supraliminal stimuli (Szpunar, Schellenberg, & Pliner, 2004). Updating the simple 
model in Figure 1.1 one could now add attribution and/or discounting in place of the “?” placeholder. 
However, similar with the nonspecific activation hypothesis, perceptual fluency/attribution suggests 
that fluency is affectively neutral, and as a two-step model it predicts that fluency may be attributed “to 
any variety stimulus properties that the subject is asked to rate” (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994, p. 
107). Winkielman et al. (2003) commented that two-step models therefore suggest that fluency could 
be used as a cue for judgement on potentially opposing scales, such as Mandler et al. (1987) predicting 
that fluent stimuli could be judged as both darker and lighter than non-fluent stimuli, as well as fluent 
stimuli being judged as both liked and disliked more. As discussed previously, evidence has not reliably 
supported this prediction, with researchers noting that fluency appears to increase liking but not 
disliking (Mandler, et al., 1987; Seamon et al., 1998), as well as not consistently influencing brightness 
or darkness judgements (Seamon et al., 1998).   
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1.4.3 Naïve Theories  
Winkielman et al. (2003) noted that two-step accounts, such as the aforementioned nonspecific 
activation and perceptual fluency/attribution models, make similar prediction regarding judgement. As 
these models are essentially “cold”, in that fluency is thought to be affectively neutral, they predict that 
fluency could potentially be attributed on to any judgement scale that could reasonably explain the 
source of fluency. For example, fluency could be interpreted as liking as well as disliking, or for both 
brightness and darkness, depending on the scale provided to them by the experimenter. Mandler, et al.  
(1987) provided some support for this prediction for brightness and darkness judgements. However, 
research has also contradicted this finding, with Seamon et al. (1998) finding that participants did not 
select fluent stimuli over non-fluent at a greater than chance level, for either brightness or darkness. 
Furthermore, whilst both of these research teams (Mandler et al., 1987; Seamon et al., 1998) found that 
fluent stimuli were liked more than non-fluent stimuli, Mandler et al. (1987) did not find that fluent 
stimuli were chosen as being disliked more than non-fluent stimuli at a greater than chance level, whilst 
Seamon et al. (1998) found that fluent stimuli were disliked less than non-fluent stimuli. An explanation 
for why fluency appeared to have been used selectively for some judgements but not others is that 
people have naïve theories to help guide their interpretation (Oppenheimer, 2008). This suggests that 
whilst often people’s “default attribution will be towards the domain of judgement” (p. 238), they also 
develop naïve theories based on their experiences with fluency and understanding of the world around 
them.  
For example, when evaluating everyday products, people appear to have a naïve theory that fluency 
experienced during evaluation indicates familiarity or dependability, and is therefore interpreted as 
positive. However, other products, such as wine or expensive chocolates, are only consumed on special 
occasions. For special occasion products, familiarity or dependability are not as desirable traits 
compared to rarity, uniqueness, or distinctiveness. Therefore, when judging special occasion products 
fluency may be interpreted as negative. Pocheptsova, Labroo, and Dhar (2010) demonstrated this naïve 
theory by altering the readability of adverts of everyday and gourmet cheeses using a font manipulation. 
Participants were asked to read the one of these adverts (between-groups design) and indicate their 
likelihood to buy. Results indicated that for the everyday product, the easy to read (fluent) advert was 
associated with a greater likelihood to buy. However, for the gourmet product, it was the difficult to 
read (disfluent) product that was associated with greater likelihood to buy ratings. This reversal of 
preferences was consistent when the authors used a conceptual fluency (retrieving an easy vs difficult 
number of examples) manipulation in place of the perceptual (font) manipulation. Similarly, instead of 
comparing two different products (e.g. everyday vs special occasion), another experiment used the same 
product but primed the participants with “everyday” or “special” concepts using a word jumble task. 
Similar to the previous experiments, participants primed with the everyday concept showed a preference 
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for the fluent product, whilst those primed with the special concept showed a preference for the disfluent 
product.  
These findings were consistent with Mantonakis, Galiffi, Aysan, and Beckett (2013) who demonstrated 
that for utilitarian products, such as orange juice, those that were presented with an easy to read label 
(perceptually fluent) were associated with higher ratings for the ability to quench thirst. However, for 
hedonic products such as wine, participants provided higher liking and willingness to buy ratings for 
products with a difficult to pronounce (linguistically disfluent) brand name. The authors also 
demonstrated that whilst linguistic disfluency was seen as positive when applied to the brand name of 
the wine (i.e. a difficult to pronounce brand name), disfluency was negative when applied to the 
ingredients of the wine (i.e. a difficult to pronounce grape varietal). This relates to another naïve theory, 
that fluency indicates safety. For ingredients, uncertainty reduction and safety are important, making 
fluency beneficial (Labroo & Pocheptsova, 2016). Therefore, a disfluent ingredient might have 
indicated risk. This naïve theory has also been applied to the judgement of risk for food additives, with 
difficult to pronounce substances being judged as more hazardous than those that were easy to 
pronounce (Song & Schwarz, 2009). Just as in the previous examples, the naïve theory that fluency is 
associated with safety (and disfluency with risk) means that fluency is interpreted as positive in some 
domains, such as for ingredients and additives, but not for others where an element of risk is more 
sought after. For example, Song and Schwarz (2009) demonstrated that rollercoasters with difficult to 
pronounce names (disfluent) were perceived to be more adventurous and less dull than those with fluent, 
easy to pronounce names.  
Whilst the above examples have demonstrated how naïve theories can guide the interpretation of 
fluency differently depending on the domain (everyday vs special occasion; utilitarian vs hedonic; 
health vs entertainment), they have also been shown to guide interpretation depending on experimenter 
instruction. Briñol, Petty, and Tormala (2006) demonstrated this by asking participants to generate 
either an easy (2) or difficult (10) number of arguments in favour of a new policy. Prior to the task, 
participants were either told that ease of generating arguments was positive (e.g. intelligent people 
experience ease when thinking as they have more neuronal connections; unintelligent people experience 
feelings of difficulty when thinking as they have fewer neuronal connections) or that it was negative 
(e.g. intelligent people experience feelings of difficulty when thinking as their thoughts are more 
complex; unintelligent people experience feelings of ease when thinking as their thoughts are more 
simple). When led to believe that fluency was positive, participants reported a more favourable attitude 
towards the policy after completing the easy task, consistent with traditional ease of retrieval 
experiments (e.g. Schwarz et al., 1991). However, when led to believe that fluency was negative, 
participants reported a more favourable attitude after completing the difficult task.  
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Unkelbach and Greifender (2013) noted that, in order for fluency to be used as a cue for judgement, 
“People  must  have  a  feeling  of  fluency  or  ease  (i.e.,  experiencing  fluency), they must identify 
the proper cause for the feeling (i.e., attributing fluency), and they must infer what the feeling means in 
the given context (i.e., interpreting fluency). With these stages, the authors designed a general, process 
model to visualise the journey from fluency instantiation to judgement (Figure 1.4). The model therefore 
brought together the discussed strands of research into fluency, attribution, and naïve theories.  
 
 
Figure 1.4: A general, process model of fluency and judgement.  
Adapted from Unkelbach and Greifender (2013). 
1.5 Affect 
Whilst fluency has been shown to be an incredibly flexible cue for a range of judgements, the judgement 
domain of affect provokes particular interest. It is argued here that this is because 1) affect may be 
genuinely evoked from processing fluency (rather than merely attributed or interpreted), and 2) affect 
can serve as a cue for other judgements; with both of these arguments differentiating affective responses 
from other judgement domains. 
1.5.1 Genuine Affective Responses to Fluency  
The two-step models discussed previously, such as nonspecific activation (Mandler et al., 1987) and 
perceptual fluency/attribution (Bornstein, 1992; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994), as well as 
Unkelbach and Greifender’s (2013) general model, describe fluency as affectively neutral: people 
experience fluency and then look for the most reasonable explanation for that experience, using naïve 
theories such as cues presented by the experimenter. The models have advantages in their versatility, 
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and have been able to explain how various sources of fluency can influence a such a wide range of 
judgements. However, these accounts are essentially “cold”, which has implications when the 
judgement domain is affect or liking; predicting that any increase in liking ratings resulting from 
increased processing fluency is not genuine affect, but merely an artefact of the attribution process.  
In contrast to this, Winkelman et al. (2003) suggested that fluency is hedonically marked, and therefore 
associated with positive affect. This hedonic marking model is therefore a “hot” account and explains 
why fluency has been shown to selectively increase positive affective judgements such as liking, but 
not increase negative affective judgement such as disliking (Mandler et al., 1987; Reber, et al., 1998; 
Seamon et al., 1998). Winkielman et al. (2003) made several arguments for why fluency might be 
associated with positive affect. Firstly, this could be due to the relationship between fluency and 
familiarity. As noted earlier, familiar stimuli are processed more fluently than unfamiliar stimuli 
(Jacoby & Dallas, 1981, Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby, et al., 1992; Whittlesea 1993). Fluency could 
therefore be seen as a cue for safety, whilst disfluency could indicate threat in a “fear the unknown” 
reaction. Secondly, fluency’s positive status could be derived from its relationship with symmetry and 
prototypicality. Several studies have demonstrated that simple characters (Förster & Denzler, 2012), 
patterns (Winkielman, et al., 2006), and diagrams (Zitek & Tiedens, 2012) are easier to process the less 
they deviate from a prototype, whilst symmetrical patterns have been shown to be judged as less 
complex (Makin et al., 2012a, 2012b; Palmer, 1991). Fluency may therefore be interpreted as positive 
as it could indicate better mate quality, with animals showing a preference for averageness (i.e. 
prototypicality) and symmetry. Evidence for this has been found for this in humans, where preference 
has been recorded for prototypical and symmetrical faces (Langlois & Roggman, 1990; Rhodes & 
Tremewan, 1996), leading to a beauty in averageness hypothesis (e.g. Reber, Schwarz, & Winkielman, 
2004). Finally, as fluency increases with repeated exposure and duration, and is associated with low 
effort operations, it can therefore be interpreted as a cue for cognitive progress. This experience would 
suggest that fluency is deemed positive as it is indicative of progress towards one’s goals.  
In addition to arguing that fluency is associated with positive affect, rather than being affectively 
neutral, the hedonic marking hypothesis also challenges the “two-step” nature of previous judgement 
models, and suggests instead that fluency has a direct link to affective response. Two-step accounts 
predict that increased positive affect to fluency only occurs when participants are provided with an 
appropriate rating scale (e.g. self-reported liking), as this acts as a contextual cue on which to attribute 
fluency. In contrast, hedonic marking predicts that there is a genuine affective response to fluency, and 
that this should therefore be detectable in absence of rating scales, such as by measuring 
psychophysiological reactions of the affective system directly. One method of doing this is facial 
electromyography (fEMG), which uses electrodes to record activity of the smiling (zygomaticus major) 
and frowning (corrugator supercilii) muscles, which indicate positive and negative affect respectively 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986).  
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Winkielman and Cacioppo (2001) used fEMG to measure affective responses to neutral images that had 
been primed with contours that either matched or mismatched the image, a method which has been 
shown to effect processing fluency (e.g. Albrecht & Carbon, 2014; Reber, et al., 1998). Results 
indicated that there was a positive affective response to fluent primes (matching primes), as illustrated 
by a greater increase in activity from the zygomaticus muscle compared to baseline readings. Topolinski 
et al. (2009) found supporting evidence for a genuine affective response to fluency using a conceptual 
manipulation. Their results similarly indicated that word triads that shared a common semantic associate 
(and therefore had enhanced ease of processing; Topolinski & Strack, 2009c) were associated with a 
greater increase in zygomaticus activity, compared to word triads that did not share a semantic associate.  
Overall, these findings suggest that fluency selectively increases positive (but not negative) affective 
responses, and that this fluency-affect relationship is a direct link, rather than a cold, two-step process. 
This separates affective responses to fluency from other judgement domains as this outcome appears to 
be genuine elicitation.  
1.5.2 Affect as a Cue for Judgement 
In addition to affect being genuinely evoked by fluency, the domain of affect is further differentiated 
from other judgement domains as it has also been shown to act as a cue for other judgements. Although 
judgement, decision making, and choice have roots in cognition, this role of affect has been increasingly 
acknowledged. This includes Zajonc (1980) who argued that rarely do we see an image that is free from 
affect, and Damasio (1994) who argued that the images that we hold in our thoughts are marked with 
positive or negative affect. In other words, we do not just see a house or read an article; we see a 
handsome (or ugly) house, we read an important (or trivial) article (Finucane et al., 2000; Zajonc, 1980). 
Similarly, this affect is argued to influence our decisions: whilst it is possible to weigh up pros and cons, 
and operate in a rational manner, often people simply select the option that they like the most (Zajonc, 
1980). This is consistent with Kahneman’s (2011) notion of substitution, as it is often easier to answer 
difficult questions (e.g. Which university should I choose? What career should I go into?) by replacing 
them with a simpler one (e.g. Which do I like the most? How does it make me feel?).  
Finucane et al. (2000) built on the above to propose the affect heuristic, arguing that affect plays an 
essential role in judgement and decision making. Specifically, the theory suggests that “all of the images 
in people’s minds are tagged or marked to varying degrees with affect” (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & 
MacGregor, 2004, p. 314) and that this affective information contributes to each person’s “affect pool”. 
When making judgements, people then “consult or “sense” the affect pool” (p. 314), which leads to 
affect acting as an important cue.   
Evidence for the affect heuristic has been gathered from the domain of risk judgement. It has been noted 
that, in reality, there is a positive correlation between the risks and benefits of activities, as people would 
not be tolerant of activities which were high in risks but low in benefits (Finucane et al., 2000; Fischhoff, 
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Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; Slovic et al., 2004). This positive correlation has been 
supported by Starr (1969) who examined the “revealed preference” for risk illustrated by real life 
behaviour (risk = statistical expectation of fatality; benefit = money spent on activity). However, despite 
evidence for a positive correlation in the environment, when participants are asked to judge the risks 
and benefits of a series of activities and technologies, they appear to be negatively correlated (Alhakami 
& Slovic, 1994; Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic, Kraus, Lappe, & Major, 1991). This suggests that risk 
and benefit are confounded in people’s minds, rather than being addressed as separate constructs. The 
authors therefore argued that people used the affect heuristic when making their judgements – their 
assessment of risk had been cued by the extent to which they felt positive or negative about each activity 
or technology.  
Supporting this conclusion, Finucane et al. (2000) manipulated affect prior to gathering participant 
judgements by informing them of risks or benefits associated with a series of technologies. Results 
indicated that informing participants about the risk of a technology not only influenced their judgement 
of risk, but also their judgement of benefit (and vice versa). For example, telling participants that nuclear 
power was a low risk technology resulted in an increase in participant judgements regarding the benefit 
of nuclear power. As with the correlational studies, these findings suggested that people confound risk 
and benefit: they do not judge these aspects separately, as predicted by purely cognitive approaches, 
but consult their pool of affect. Evidence of the affect heuristic has also been found in the financial 
domain, where the risk and reward of stocks have been shown to be confounded in people’s minds in a 
similar fashion to the above (Ganzach, 2000).  
Whilst the affect heuristic has demonstrated that affect can influence judgement, Topolinski 
(Topolinski, 2011; Topolinski & Strack, 2008, 2009d) made the link between fluency, affect, and 
judgement explicit. In their fluency affect intuition model (FAIM), the authors proposed that fluency 
triggers an affective response (consistent with the hedonic marking hypothesis), which emerges as a 
feeling that can be used as a cue for judgement. Evidence for FAIM has been provided at each transition 
in the process. Firstly, results have indicated that coherent words triads (RAT; Bolte & Goschke, 2005; 
Bowers et al., 1990; Mednick, 1962) which share a common semantic associate are processed more 
fluently and liked more than incoherent triads (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c). Secondly, results showed 
that participants were also able to quickly and accurately judge whether the triads were coherent or 
incoherent, even when they were unable to directly retrieve the semantic associate (Topolinski & Strack, 
2009d). The importance of fluency in this process was demonstrated by further increasing the fluency 
of word triads by increasing the number of exposures or enhancing their contrast; both of which 
increased the likelihood for participants to judge the triads as coherent, regardless of the true status of 
the word triad.  
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However, it was affect that was argued to be the cue for coherence judgements. Prior research has 
demonstrated an embodied link between affect and facial muscles. For example, verbal stimuli that 
relate to emotional expression (e.g. to smile, to frown) have been shown to activate congruent facial 
muscles (Foroni & Semin, 2009), whilst mechanical manipulation of facial muscles has been shown to 
elicit a congruent affective response (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988). Utilising this embodied link, 
Topolinski & Strack (2009d) induced affect whilst participants were solving the word triads using a 
facial manipulation: asking participants to hold a pen between their teeth caused them to contract the 
zygomaticus major (smiling) muscle, triggering positive affect, whilst attaching golf tees to the 
participants’ eyebrows and asking them to bring the tips together caused them to contract the corrugator 
supercilii (frowning) muscle, triggering negative affect (Niedenthal, 2007). Results suggested that 
participants used affect as a cue for coherence: increasing positive affect (through zygomaticus 
manipulation) appeared to increase the likelihood for a coherence judgement, whilst increasing negative 
affect (through corrugator manipulation) appeared to decrease the likelihood. 
A potential issue with these findings was whether it can be concluded that affect was the cue for 
judgement rather than fluency. It could have been the case that contraction of the zygomaticus muscle 
also increased fluency, whilst contraction of corrugator may have induced disfluency due to its 
association with mental effort. Indeed, results indicated that participants solved more triads under 
zygomaticus manipulation, and even though these solved triads were discarded prior to the above 
analysis, it does present the possibility that zygomaticus manipulation facilitated processing and 
semantic activation. However, the authors (Topolinski & Strack, 2009d) argued that if zygomaticus 
manipulation was enhancing semantic spread, then it would be expected that participants would only 
increase coherence judgements for coherent word triads i.e. it was helping them to converge on the 
semantic associate. In contrast, coherence judgements should not increase for incoherent triads, as there 
is no semantic associate to converge on. The results did not support this alternative explanation as 
zygomaticus manipulation increased coherence judgement for both coherent and incoherent triads. 
Furthermore, in separate experiments Topolinski and Strack (2009d) also infused affect into the process 
using subliminal facial primes and by altering the valence of word triads. In both cases the pattern of 
judgements was consistent with the facial manipulation experiment: infusing participants with positive 
affect appeared to increase the likelihood that a triad would be judged as coherent, regardless of whether 
the triad was in fact coherent or incoherent. In these additional experiments, the coherence judgements 
increased without positive affect increasing the number of solved triads. Taking this evidence together, 
support has been gained for the theory that affect was the crucial cue for influencing coherence 
judgements, rather than fluency.   
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1.6 Affective responses to fluency 
Despite the argued importance of affect as a domain of judgement, the pattern of affective response to 
increased fluency is still debated. One account detailing the fluency-affect link is the hedonic marking 
model, which suggests that fluency is an inherently positive experience and is therefore associated with 
increased positive affect. In contrast, a more recently proposed fluency amplification model has 
suggested that the affective response to fluency is dependent on the valence of the stimuli from which 
the fluency arises.  
1.6.1 Hedonic Marking  
The hedonic marking hypothesis has perhaps been the dominant explanation of the direct effects of 
fluency (Claypool, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques, 2015). As discussed earlier in this chapter, hedonic 
marking suggests that the default reaction to increased fluency is in the positive direction. Due to this 
default positivity, increased fluency has been associated with increased judgements of familiarity (e.g. 
Whittlesea, 1993), truth (e.g. Reber & Schwarz, 1999), confidence (e.g. Alter et al., 2007), value (e.g. 
Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009), and importantly, affect (e.g. Winkielman et al., 2003). Furthermore, the 
positive affective response to fluency had been shown to be a direct and genuine reaction (e.g. 
Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001).  
Therefore, increasing fluency should be met with a positive affective response (Topolinski et al., 2009; 
Reber et al., 1998). Support for this prediction has been gathered from a diverse range of fluency 
manipulations, including perceptual, conceptual, linguistic, and embodied cognition (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009). Compelling evidence has also been gained using fEMG.  This method has 
demonstrated higher levels of activity in the zygomaticus major muscle – indicating positive affect 
(Cacioppo, et al., 1986) – for fluent stimuli compared to non-fluent stimuli. Such increased activity has 
been found reliably, using perceptual manipulations such as contour priming and stimuli duration 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), and familiarisation (Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001), as well as using 
conceptual manipulations such as semantic coherence (Topolinski et al., 2009). The use of fEMG as 
method of measure affect reduces unintentional cueing that may arise from self-report scales, and 
therefore further supports a direct link between fluency and positive affect. 
1.6.2 Fluency Amplification 
Despite extensive support for the hedonic marking of processing fluency, Albrecht and Carbon (2014) 
noted that the vast majority of studies examining affective responses tended to use neutral stimuli. 
Furthermore, although some studies had used positive stimuli, the valence had not been manipulated as 
an independent variable. Finally, the research on affective responses to negative stimuli was limited. 
Responding to this literature gap, the authors presented participants with a series of images that were 
primed with contours that either matched (fluent; Reber, et al., 1998) or mismatched (non-fluent) the 
target image. The target images were taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; 
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Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), which provides a bank of images that have been normatively rated 
for valence. The images chosen for the experiment were grouped into four conditions: very positive, 
mildly positive, mildly negative, and very negative. Therefore, both fluency and valence were 
manipulated.  
 
 
Figure 1.5: Simplified fluency amplification predictions.  
Adapted from Albrecht & Carbon (2014). 
Results indicated that, consistent with hedonic marking, positive stimuli were liked more in the high 
processing fluency condition. However, for “very negative” stimuli, stimuli were disliked more in the 
high processing fluency condition. This evidence suggests that processing fluency emphasises affective 
responses, leading to “more intense” evaluations rather than strictly positive evaluations. Whilst there 
is less research into this relationship compared to using neutral or positive stimuli, support can be found 
from a retrospective survey of the literature. For example, from mere exposure studies, negatively 
valenced words were judged to be significantly more negative on repeated exposure (Grush, 1976), and 
increasing the number of exposures of initially disliked paintings resulted in a decrease in affective 
rating (Brickman, Redfield, Harrison, & Crandall, 1972). Although not classified as such at the time, 
these findings support fluency amplification. The same pattern has also been found in marketing 
research, where increasing the retrieval ease of a target product can lead to increased negative 
evaluations when primed by a conceptually related, but negative product (Lee & Labroo, 2004). 
Furthermore, when participants are asked to retrieve examples for a positive characteristic (e.g. 
assertiveness: Schwarz et al., 1991; reasons to like someone: Haddock, 2002), the fluent condition 
results in more positive ratings (e.g. of assertiveness; liking). In contrast, when asked to retrieve 
examples for a negative characteristic (unassertive behaviour; reasons to dislike someone), the fluent 
condition results in more negative ratings.  
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1.6.3 Multi-Source Model  
The fluency amplification account was originally proposed as an extension of the hedonic marking 
model, expanding the predictions of hedonic marking to account for stimuli of negative valence. The 
two models therefore make consistent predictions for positive stimuli – increasing processing fluency 
results in a positive affective response – but differ in regards to negative stimuli, as well as for neutral 
stimuli.  
Hedonic marking does not differentiate for stimuli valence, and therefore for neutral stimuli, hedonic 
marking would still predict that fluent stimuli are liked more than non-fluent stimuli. However, fluency 
amplification predicts that the affective response to fluency is an amplification of the stimulus’ valence. 
If the stimulus is neutral, then there is no valence to amplify. Therefore, the model would predict no 
difference in liking between fluent and non-fluent neutral stimuli. This contrast places doubt over the 
acceptability of fluency amplification as an extension of hedonic marking. Furthermore, there is a large 
amount of research supporting a positive affective response to fluency when stimuli are neutral, such 
as for neutral patterns (Reber, et al., 1998), shapes (Reber & Schwarz, 2001) and drawings (Winkielman 
& Cacioppo, 2001), for neutral symbols, words (Topolinski & Strack, 2009a), and pseudowords (Carr 
et al., 2016), and for neutral household objects (Hayes et al., 2008) and products (Labroo, Dhar, & 
Schwarz, 2008). Considering these differing predictions, the fluency amplification model does not 
appear to be compatible with the hedonic marking model as an extension.  
More significantly, the two models deviate in their predictions for negative stimuli. Again, hedonic 
marking does not differentiate for stimuli valence, and therefore would expect that negative stimuli 
would be liked more when fluent than non-fluent. In contrast, fluency amplification would predict that 
negative stimuli would be disliked more when fluent than non-fluent, as fluency causes amplification 
of the stimuli’s valence. Due to these differing predictions, the two accounts have been offered as 
competing or alternative explanations for affective responses to fluency (Cheetham, Pascal, & Jancke, 
2014; Chetverikov & Kristjánsson, 2016; Gerger, Forster, & Leder, 2016; Muth, Hesslinger, & Carbon, 
2015). For example, Forster et al. (2015) noted that “How the feeling [of fluency] influences our 
evaluations is not yet fully understood” (p. 10), before presenting hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification as possible explanations. The authors concluded that, “Though most evidence is in favor 
of the hedonic marking of felt fluency…, conclusive evidence is still lacking” (p. 10).  
Perhaps one reason for the lack of conclusive evidence is down to the positioning of hedonic marking 
and fluency amplification as competing accounts. Instead it is proposed here that the two models are 
separable mechanisms that serve different functions. As discussed previously, the hedonic marking 
mechanism may serve as an indicator that information has been processed fluently, with its associated 
positivity suggesting progress towards cognitive goals (Claypool et al., 2015), familiarity and safety 
(Winkielman et al., 2003), or the use of non-analytic thinking (Alter, et al., 2007). The purpose of a 
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fluency amplification response has not been investigated as comprehensively. However, a mechanism 
of emphasising a stimulus’ valence appears useful for indicating unambiguity (Albrecht, Raab, & 
Carbon, 2014), for making choices without deliberation (Novemsky et al., 2007), or forming more 
definitive opinions, particularly in a social context (Haddock, 2002; Tormala, Falces, Briñol, & Petty, 
2007). A similar pattern occurs in affective forecasting due to impact bias (e.g. Wilson & Gilbert, 2005), 
where similar polarisation may help motivate us to seek out good scenarios, whilst motivating us to 
avoid bad ones.  
Given this separate utility, co-existence of hedonic marking and fluency amplification mechanisms is 
plausible. In a similar vein, researchers have demonstrated that we have a number of heuristics in our 
adaptive toolboxes (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 1999), a repertoire of strategies 
(Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008), and a range of naïve theories (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2009).  
Therefore, the multi-source model predicts that both hedonic marking and fluency amplification 
contribute to the affective response to fluency. As shown in Figure 1.6, when stimuli are positive, both 
models predict that there is a positive affective response to fluency; the multi-source account therefore 
makes the same prediction. When stimuli are neutral, hedonic marking predicts a positive affective 
response to fluency, whilst fluency amplification predicts that there is no affective response. Overall, 
the multi-source model suggests that this would result in a positive affective response to fluency, which 
is consistent with the range of evidence presented earlier from the use of neutral stimuli (neutral 
patterns: Reber et al., 1998; neutral shapes: Reber & Schwarz, 2001; neutral drawings: Winkielman & 
Cacioppo, 2001).  
 
 
Figure 1.6: Schematic model showing the combined contributions of the hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification mechanisms theorised by the multi-source model.  
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The proposed multi-source model makes an interesting prediction for circumstances where fluency is 
increased for negative stimuli. As shown in Figure 1.6, increased fluency for negative stimuli would 
result in an increase in positive affect (via hedonic marking) and an increase in negative affect (via 
fluency amplification), consistent with Oppenheimer’s (2008) notion that fluency can produce 
“competing forces” (p. 240). The presence of both positive and negative affect is also consistent with 
the conceptualisation that positive and negative affective responses are separable (Winkielman & 
Cacioppo, 2001), independent (Bettman, Luce, & Payne, 2008), and better understood on a two-
dimensional Bivariate Evaluative Plane than a traditional bipolar continuum (Cacioppo & Berntson, 
1994). For example, a neutral response on a bipolar scale may reflect low activation of positive and 
negative responses (true neutrality) or high activation of positive and negative responses (“maximal 
conflict”; Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994, p.402), and therefore distinguishing between attitudes such as 
ambivalence or conflict is only possible if the space is extended from bipolar to bivariate.  
Evidence of separable systems has been found in research on racial attitudes (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, 
& Eisenstadt, 1991), where participants have shown reciprocity (rating a racial group as high on a 
positive scale and low on a negative scale (and vice-versa)) as well as coactivity (rating a racial group 
as high (or low) on both the positive and negative scale). Norris and Larsen (2019) have also found 
coactivity in response to the status quo of neither winning nor losing a game. Whilst bipolar 
explanations would expect that the disappointment of failing to win and the relief of avoiding a loss to 
neutralise each other, the authors recorded mixed feelings, leading them to describe the status quo as a 
“bittersweet nothing” (p. 1). Alongside this feeling, the separability and coactivity of positive and 
negative affect makes conceptual sense, helping to explain phenomena such as love-to-hate 
relationships, guilty pleasures, and the popularity of on-screen villains.  
However, the predicted elicitation of both positive and negative affect in response to increase fluency 
of negative stimuli has not been detected in previous studies. Such detection would not only require the 
manipulation of stimuli valence alongside fluency (a method which Albrecht & Carbon have already 
noted has been rarely adopted), but also the separate measurement of positive and negative affect. Such 
controlled manipulation of these variables has yet to be fully implemented.  
For example, in Winkielman & Cacioppo’s (2001) paper supporting hedonic marking, positive and 
negative affect were measured separately, with fEMG used to record zygomaticus major associated 
with positive affect) and corrugator supercilii (associated negative affect) muscle activity. However, the 
stimuli used in the study were drawings of neutral objects, meaning the affective response to negative 
stimuli would not have been examined. Additionally, a fluency amplification mechanism would not 
contribute any affective response when the stimuli are neutral. As neutral valence cannot be amplified 
in a positive or negative direction, only the contributions from hedonic marking would be measurable. 
30 
 
On the other hand, Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) study supporting fluency amplification measured 
affective responses over a range of stimuli valence, from very negative to very positive. However, as 
responses were recorded using a bipolar self-report scale, it meant that positive and negative affect were 
not measured separately. Furthermore, as the affective response from hedonic marking is only brief, 
subtle (Topolinski & Strack, 2009d), and mild (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001), any contribution from 
this mechanism may have been eclipsed in the more intensely positive and negative conditions, to the 
point of being separately undetectable. 
1.7 Summary of Thesis Chapters 
Whilst researchers are in agreement that increasing processing fluency of positive stimuli increases 
liking responses, there is debate regarding negative stimuli: the hedonic marking model predicts that 
increasing processing for negative stimuli would increase liking, the fluency amplification model 
predicts that this would increase disliking, whilst the author of this thesis proposes that increasing the 
processing fluency would produce both liking and disliking. In order to answer the research question – 
what is the pattern of affective responses to fluency? – the current thesis explores approaches. In Chapter 
2, a Meta-Analytic approach was adopted to systematically review the current research and 
understanding regarding the affective response to fluency, as well as highlighting the gap in the 
literature for studies that have manipulated valence and separately measured positive and negative 
affect. Chapter 3 discusses Experiments 1-3, which introduced a new set of materials based around 
business scenarios. The aim of the research in this chapter was to validate these materials, whilst using 
them to measure affective responses to fluency. Chapter 4 discusses Experiments 4 and 5. In these 
experiments, the materials validated in the previous chapter were used to addresses the literature gap 
identified in the Meta-Analysis by manipulating the valence of stimuli whilst also separately measuring 
positive and negative affective responses using self-reported liking and disliking ratings. In Chapter 5, 
the behavioural findings of the previous chapter were built on by implementing fEMG to capture 
positive and negative affective responses directly, and in absence of self-report scales. Finally, Chapter 
6 provides the general discussion of research findings, their theoretical contributions, limitations, and 
suggestions for future study.  
 
 
  
31 
 
Chapter 2: Meta-Analysis 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The research on fluency is diverse. Even when this has been narrowed to focus on affective responses, 
the nature of fluency as a flexible cue means that there is still a wide range of manipulations, such as 
the ease of perceiving physical features (font: Alter et al., 2007; Novemsky et al., 2007; size: Forgas, 
2015; contrast: Reber & Schwarz, 2001), processing semantic context (Reder, 1987; Topolinski & 
Strack, 2009c; Whittlesea, 1993; Lee & Labroo, 2004), interpreting language (Alter & Oppenheimer, 
2006; Alter et al., 2007; McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000), and retrieving examples (Haddock, 2002; 
Schwarz et al., 1991; Wänke et al., 1997). There is similar variety in the types of stimuli used, valence 
of conditions, methodological procedure, and the form of affect measured. The aim of this Meta-
Analysis is to therefore extract a systematic understanding of the current research on affective responses 
to fluency, and to analyse any potential variation in responses arising from the range of moderators 
within the literature.  
2.1.1 Why Meta-Analysis? 
Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, and Rothstein (2009) describe Meta-Analysis as “the statistical synthesis 
of results from a series of studies” (p. xxii). Meta-Analysis differs from a narrative review, in that 
narrative reviews are typically concerned with the significance (p-values) of a, potentially incomplete, 
set of studies, or the discussion sections of those studies which have been based on the p-values. In 
contrast, Meta-Analysis involves the systematic collection of relevant studies, and is concerned with 
the effect sizes and sample sizes. This presents a number of advantages of Meta-Analysis over narrative 
reviews in terms of transparency, objectivity, and completeness, as well as the ability to handle larger 
and more complex samples of studies.  
Although Meta-Analysis can refer to the synthesis of any data set, it is only meaningful when this set 
is compiled systematically, such as through a systematic review or stringent search criteria. This 
highlights the first benefit over narrative review in that it is more transparent. A narrative review 
typically relies on a subject matter expert compiling a sample of relevant studies, summarising the 
findings, and synthesising these to reach a conclusion. Whilst this may involve keyword searches of 
databases, the keywords are rarely disclosed. Often a narrative review will be reliant on the reviewer’s 
subject knowledge regarding the key articles to source, as well as some snowballing from the tracing 
of cited works. However, in doing so there is no audit trail for a reader to follow. On the other hand, a 
systematically conducted Meta-Analysis provides details regarding keywords and databases searched 
in order to populate the sample of studies. Furthermore, any studies that are discarded (for example due 
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to lack of control, potential bias, or missing statistics) are also detailed (see Figure 2.1 for the flow 
diagram used in the current Meta-Analysis).  
A related advantage of Meta-Analysis is that it reduces subjectivity. As Borenstein et al. (2009) note, 
different reviewers preparing a narrative review “might use different criteria for deciding which studies 
to include” (p. xxii) and collate varying sizes of evidence base. Even if reviewers collected the same 
sample of studies, there is still the possibility that different reviewers will reach differing conclusions 
or assign different weights to different studies. This is of particular concern amidst criticisms regarding 
replication in psychological research (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), where a particularly 
interesting result might be included in a narrative review in preference to its failed replication. In 
comparison, Meta-Analysis uses mathematical criteria, and assigns weights based on each study’s 
precision. Whilst narrative reviews may differ from reviewer to reviewer, the transparency of study 
selection and greater objectivity in weighting makes Meta-Analysis a more replicable method overall.  
The aforementioned inter-reviewer differences in producing a narrative review may be negligible for 
smaller scale reviews with a limited sample of studies. However, this issue amplifies as the sample 
increases and becomes more complex, as weighting and synthesising data becomes more challenging. 
As a result, narrative reviews may become “less useful as more information becomes available” 
(Borenstein et al., 2009, p. xxii). This is a concern for topics such as fluency, which as well as containing 
a large population of studies, also includes a wide array of approaches. Meta-Analysis is better equipped 
for this kind of synthesis, as not only are effect sizes and weightings taken into account, but the coding 
of specific moderators allows for the control and comparison across levels of variables (discussed in 
the following section). 
A final advantage of Meta-Analysis is the avoidance of vote counting. In a typical narrative review, 
studies are separated into those with a statistically significant result and those without, and the numbers 
in each category are compared (sometimes formally) to determine whether there is a significant finding 
overall. However, each study is treated as a discrete piece of information and there is “no statistical 
mechanism for synthesizing these values” (Borenstein et al., 2009, p. 251). This process is known as 
vote counting, and although this can appear appropriate technique on the surface, it exposes reviews to 
the risk of drawing incorrect conclusions. This is because vote counting makes the assumption that if a 
study has produced a nonsignificant finding, then no true effect was present. This may not always be 
the case. For example, a study may find a substantial effect, but without an adequate sample size, the 
p-value is likely fall beneath significance. Rather than treating individual studies as pieces of discrete 
information, Meta-Analysis combines them, which can provide greater power than the individual 
studies and a more valid test of the null hypothesis. 
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2.1.2 Moderating variables 
2.1.2.1 Fluency category 
Fluency is typically split into two broad categories (Winkielman, et al., 2003): perceptual fluency, 
which refers to the ease of processing low level or surface attributes, such as physical features, and 
conceptual fluency, which refers to the ease of conducting higher level operations to do with meaning 
and semantic associations. Despite these two broad categories being concerned with different levels of 
operation, it has been argued that both perceptual and conceptual fluency can be generalised together 
as fluency. This is firstly because both have been shown to have similar effects on judgment (Alter & 
Oppenheimer, 2009; Winkielman et al., 2003). For example, statements have been shown to be judged 
as true at a greater likelihood when presented in high contrast (perceptual fluency; Reber & Schwarz, 
1999) and when presenting in a rhyming format (conceptual fluency; McGlone & Tofighbakhsh, 2000), 
leading Schwarz (2004, p. 339) to note that “theoretically, any… variable that increases processing 
fluency should have the same effect”.  
Furthermore, Winkielman et al. (2003) noted that a fluency manipulation at one level of operation can 
influence judgements associated with the other level, such as judgements of truth (conceptual) being 
influenced by contrast (perceptual; Reber & Schwarz, 1999), and judgements of visual clarity 
(perceptual) being influenced by semantic priming (conceptual; Masson & Caldwell, 1998).  
Such arguments support the assumption that if one fluency manipulation can increase liking, then “any 
variable that facilitates fluent processing similarly results in increased liking” (Schwarz, 2004, p. 340). 
However, different variables having the same direction or pattern of effect is not necessarily the same 
as having the same effect size. Furthermore, tallying studies that have found significant effects, for 
example via a narrative review, is akin to vote-counting (Borenstein et al., 2009) and leaves conclusions 
vulnerable to power variances amongst the sampled studies.  
The current Meta-Analysis therefore aims to investigate the claim that any variable that increases 
fluency would have the same effect on affective responses, by categorising and comparing the fluency 
manipulations in the sample of studies. Specifically, the hypothesis suggested by Schwartz’s (2004) 
reasoning would be: 
1. There are no significant differences in effect sizes between the different instantiations of 
fluency.  
2.1.2.2 Affect measurement and Affect type 
Researchers in the main have suggested that high fluency leads to positive affective responses. Those 
supporting a hedonic marking hypothesis have proposed that this is a direct relationship, with high 
fluency eliciting (Winkielman et al., 2003) or triggering (Topolinski & Strack, 2009d) positive affect, 
and that fluency itself is affectively positive (Reber, et al., 1998). Other researchers have claimed that 
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fluency is affectively neutral, but nonetheless have demonstrated that high fluency leads to increased 
affective ratings such as liking (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Mandler et al., 1987). 
However, what specifically is this affective response to fluency? The hedonic marking model suggests 
that fluency selectively increases positive evaluations, but not negative evaluations. In general, this 
means that fluent stimuli should be liked more than non-fluent stimuli, but not disliked more; they 
should be rated as more pleasant, but not more unpleasant, prettier but not uglier. Although hedonic 
marking does not specify the contents of the affective response to fluency, by coding for the type of 
affect measured, it is possible to detect whether effect sizes for these different affective outputs are 
comparable, or whether fluency appears to evoke a particularly strong response for some scales but not 
others.  
Furthermore, the evaluations mentioned above could be said to originate from only one dimension of 
affect: valence. Valence refers to subjective evaluation along a positive-negative axis. For example, in 
emotional terms, happiness would be said to exist in the positive space, whilst sadness, anger, and fear 
would exist in the negative space. However, these emotions are clearly different to each other, 
highlighting the need for affect to be categorised using arousal and motivation dimensions (Harmon-
Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Gable, 2011). Arousal can be thought of as the level of activity 
emerging in response to stimuli, often at a physiological level. This allows for more accurate 
categorisation of emotions; for example whilst sadness and anger would both be of a negative valence, 
sadness is considered to be less arousing than anger (Harmon-Jones et al., 2011; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1990). Motivation is related to arousal, but differentiates by focussing on the direction of the 
arousal response, which is typically thought of in terms of approach and avoidance. For example, anger 
and fear are emotions which occupy the same space when measured on a valence x arousal axis. 
However, fear typically results in feelings of avoidance, whilst anger results in approach (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2011). 
The potential complexity of affective response can be seen when examining measures designed for 
capturing affect. For example, various iterations of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS: 
Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; PANAS-X: Watson & Clark, 1999), positive affect can be measured 
on subscales relating to feelings such as interest, excitement, strength, enthusiasm, and pride, 
demonstrating the variability of emotions that constitute affect. Therefore, whilst the traditional view 
of fluency is that it is associated with increased liking, if fluency evokes an affective response, it may 
also be felt as determination, inspiration, or activity. In addition to analysing valenced responses to 
fluency, this Meta-Analysis will also examine the extent to which other dimensions of affect have been 
studied, and whether these dimensions differ in their sensitivity to fluency manipulations. 
Related to the type of affect that is captured, is the method used to record responses. Influential papers 
on affective responses to fluency have used self-report scales (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014; Reber & 
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Schwarz, 2001; Topolinski & Strack, 2009a) or forced choice decisions (Seamon et al., 1998; 
Westerman, Lanska, & Olds, 2015). Although such scales lend themselves to valence evaluations, such 
as like-dislike, positive-negative, good-bad Likert ratings, self-report can also be used to measure other 
dimensions of affect. For example, the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scale for affective response 
(Bradley & Lang, 1994) has separate versions for measuring valence and arousal, as well as dominance 
(see Figure 2.1).  
 
Figure 2.1: Self-Assessment Manikin scales for measuring Valence (top row), arousal (middle row), and 
Dominance (bottom row). Adapted from Bradly & Lang (1994) by Soares et al. (2013). 
However, given the association between arousal and physiological response, and between motivation 
and behavioural intention, it is the interest of this Meta-Analysis to investigate whether methods 
alternative to self-report have been used to capture other dimensions of affective response to fluency. 
One method that has been used in place of self-report measures is fEMG. Winkelman and colleagues 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman et al., 2003) have supported the use of this method as it 
allows for the measurement of affective responses without the need for presenting participants with 
rating scales, which may inadvertently cue to the respond in a particular way. For example, fluency may 
not evoke liking, but if all that a participant is presented with is a liking scale, then they may use that to 
interpret the experience of fluency (Bornstein 1992; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). fEMG 
addresses this alternative explanation by recording affective responses in absence of such contextual 
cues, and due to this advantage, it has been used as an equivalent measure of affect. However, as noted 
earlier, there may still be differences in effect size between these measures. Therefore, this Meta-
Analysis will provide evidence towards the appropriateness of such arguments of equivalence. The 
hypothesis for such equivalence would be: 
2. There are no significant differences in effect size between the different affective responses 
being measured.  
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2.1.2.3 Scale valence and Stimuli valence 
Seen as the current dominant explanation for affective responses to fluency (Claypool et al., 2015), the 
hedonic marking hypothesis claims that fluency is fundamentally positive (Winkielman et al., 2003). 
This suggests that the affective response to fluency is in the positive direction regardless of the valence 
of the stimuli undergoing the fluency manipulation. In contrast, the fluency amplification hypothesis 
suggests that the response is dependent on stimuli valence. Specifically, whilst positive stimuli become 
more positive when fluent, negative stimuli become more negative. Furthermore, fluency amplification 
predicts that when stimuli are neutral, increasing their fluency does not produce an affective response. 
As stimuli valence is a key differentiator between these models, it is important to code it as a moderator 
in this Meta-Analysis. In doing so, it is possible to compare observations that have utilised different 
valences of stimuli, the direction of their effects, and their effect sizes to produce a systematic 
assessment of the evidence towards the aforementioned hypotheses.  
In addition to these established models, the current thesis proposes a multi-source account. Whilst the 
hedonic marking and fluency amplification models predict that the affective response to fluency for 
negative stimuli is either positive or negative, the multi-source account suggests that the affective 
response could be both positive and negative. This dual affective response is difficult to detect; for 
example, if a participant was asked to record their affective response on a bipolar scale (e.g. like-
dislike), they would be unable to make separate ratings for positive and negative affect, and be forced 
to enter an amalgamation of the two. This could result in the two responses cancelling each other out, 
and thereby appearing as though there had been a neutral response. Therefore, in order to detect a multi-
source pattern, it is necessary to separately manipulate stimuli valence, as well as separately recording 
positive and negative affective responses.  This makes the valence of rating scale used a critical factor 
for fully examining the possible range of affective responses to fluency, and as such is coded as a 
moderator. The specific hypotheses for the hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source 
accounts are: 
3. For positive stimuli, the effect size comparing fluent and non-fluent conditions is in the positive 
direction. 
4. For neutral stimuli: 
a. Hedonic marking and multi-source: the effect size comparing fluent and non-fluent 
conditions is in the positive direction 
b. Fluency amplification: the effect size comparing fluent and non-fluent conditions is not 
significantly different from 0. 
5. For negative stimuli: 
a. Hedonic marking: the effect size comparing fluent and non-fluent conditions is in the 
positive direction. 
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b. Fluency amplification: the effect size comparing fluent and non-fluent conditions is in 
the negative direction. 
c. Multi-source: the effect size comparing fluent and non-fluent conditions is in the 
positive direction when measured using a positive scale AND is in the negative 
direction when measured using a negative scale. 
2.1.2.4 Additional ratings and Instructions  
Two-step accounts suggest that when people encounter fluent stimuli, they search for the “the most 
parsimonious” (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1994, p. 106) explanation for the experience of fluency. The 
authors explained that this process is commonly guided by contextual cues provided by the 
experimenter. For example, if the participants were to be presented with a lightness scale, they may 
interpret fluency as a cue for brightness; if the participants were instead presented with a liking scale, 
they may interpret the fluency as liking (e.g. Mandler et al, 1987). Given the guiding ability of rating 
scales, one might therefore expect affective responses to fluency to be greatest when participants are 
only asked to provide a single affective rating. In comparison, the addition of a second scale – such as 
asking participants to make a recognition (Westerman, Klin, & Lanska, 2015; Westerman, Lanska, & 
Olds, 2015), confidence (Topolinski & Strack, 2009b), or difficulty (O’Brien, 2013) judgement – may 
provide a more parsimonious explanation, thereby interfering with the affective rating, or misattributing 
it altogether. This Meta-Analysis codes the presence of additional rating scales as a moderator with the 
aim of assessing the impact of these contextual cues.  
In addition to rating scales, participant instructions can also act as a contextual cue. An example of this 
has been provided by Greifender et al. (2010) who demonstrated that the provision of additional 
information could eliminate fluency effects. Results of their experiment indicated that handwritten 
essays were evaluated to be better when the writing was more (vs less) legible, even when the overall 
quality of essay was controlled. However, this effect disappeared in an experimental condition where 
the fluency heuristic was explained to participants prior to completing the evaluation task, such that 
highly legible essays were no longer judged to be better quality than less legible essays. This suggested 
that the addition of instructions led to the discounting of fluency as a cue for judgement.  
Furthermore, Briñol et al. (2006) have also demonstrated that instructions can reverse the way in which 
fluency is interpreted. In a classic retrieval ease experiment, participants had to generate an easy or 
difficult number of arguments in favour of a policy, having been previously informed that fluency was 
either a positive or negative experience. Results suggested that participants were more in favour of the 
policy following the easy (vs difficult) task if led to believe that fluency was positive, but more in favour 
of the policy following the difficult (vs easy) task when led to believe that fluency was negative. Given 
the potential for experimenter instructions to influence the fluency-affect relationship, this Meta-
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Analysis will also code the presence of additional instructions as a moderator, with the above evidence 
predicting that: 
6. The effect size between fluent and non-fluent conditions is smaller when participants are given 
additional instructions or scales to complete.  
2.1.2.5 Dynamic properties 
As discussed above, there are numerous ways in which fluency can be instantiated. One such category 
of instantiation relates to the dynamic properties of the stimuli being processed, which includes the 
number of repetitions and the duration time that a participant is exposed to (Forster et al., 2015). 
Dynamic properties suggest that there are varying degrees of fluency. For example, Forster et al. (2013) 
found a significant main effect of duration time on participants’ self-reported felt fluency ratings when 
interacting with images of everyday objects, with felt fluency ratings rising as duration times increased 
from 100ms to 200ms, and from 200ms to 300ms. This in turn has led researchers to argue that increased 
fluency afforded by longer durations results in greater liking (Reber et al., 1998). Similar patterns have 
been suggested in response to increased presentations (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) and enhanced 
figure-ground contrast (Reber & Schwarz, 2001). To account for variations in affective response to 
varying levels of fluency, this Meta-Analysis will code for the number of presentations and presentation 
duration for stimuli used in the sample. Furthermore, the comparison group will also be entered as a 
moderator, coding for whether the fluent conditions were compared to a control group or a disfluent 
group, in order to account for possible varying levels of fluency. The evidence on dynamic properties 
therefore suggests that: 
7. The effect size between fluent and non-fluent conditions is greater for longer stimuli duration 
times and increased presentation frequencies.  
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Sample Procedure 
2.2.1.1 Literature search 
Published articles were retrieved through a keyword search of the following databases: PsychArticles, 
PsychInfo, and Psychology and Behavioural Science Collection. In the search, papers needed to have 
one keyword from the following: Fluency, Hedonic marking, or Ease of processing, plus one keyword 
from: Liking, Affect(ive). The cut-off date was 31st December 2016, inclusive. The resulting search 
returned 1,037 hits, which was reduced to 507 unique papers once duplicates had been removed.  
2.2.1.2 Inclusion criteria 
The abstracts for the 507 papers were scanned for any that may be deemed off-topic with regards to the 
current Meta-Analysis. For example, the keyword fluency would return papers relating to language 
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ability, whilst the keyword affect(ive) returned papers relating to affective disorders. 278 off-topic 
papers were removed, leaving a sample of 229 papers.  
A check was also done on the variables by scanning the results sections of the remaining 229 papers. 
For inclusion, papers needed to have a processing fluency manipulation as the independent variable as 
well some form of affect measurement as the dependent variable. 26 papers had neither of these, 54 had 
a fluency manipulation but no affect measure, and 21 measured affect but did not manipulate fluency. 
The result of the variable check was the removal of 101 papers, leaving a sample of 128 papers to be 
reviewed in depth. During the full review, a further 20 papers were removed due to lack of compatible 
statistics. 
2.2.1.3 Sample characteristics 
The final sample of papers was 108, with publication dates ranging from 1989 to 2016. Within these 
108 papers, 221 experiments were found that met the inclusion criteria. Furthermore, many experiments 
had multiple comparisons: for example, an experiment might compare a fluent group with both a 
disfluent group and a control group. Coding the different comparisons resulted in a sample of 591 effect 
size observations.  
 
Figure 2.2: PRISMA flow diagram 
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2.2.1.4 Coding moderators 
The moderators that were coded for, and the rationale for their inclusion, are discussed in more detail 
in the introduction. To summarise, these were: manipulation type, affect measurement, affect type, 
negative scales, stimuli valence, additional ratings, participant instructions, target duration, and number 
of presentations. 
There were several categorical levels to each moderator, which was a natural fit for many moderators. 
For example, a study that used a perceptual fluency manipulation was coded as 1 for the manipulation 
type moderator; a study that used a conceptual fluency manipulation was coded as 2, sensorimotor 
fluency as 3, and so on. For other moderators, such as target duration or number of exposures, the data 
was originally continuous. To perform Meta-Analysis, rather than Meta-Regression, such continuous 
data were grouped into bins and given a categorical code. For example, a target duration of 250ms was 
put in a bin for 0-500ms and coded as 2, whilst a target duration of 600ms was put in the 501-1,000ms 
bin and coded as 3. Whilst this may lack the sensitivity of Meta-Regression, the coding into categorical 
bins was deemed appropriate as a) this allowed for the analysis of a wide range of moderators in one 
place, b) if needed, one could filter the studies by certain categories, c) the continuous moderators were 
of secondary interest with regards to the thesis’ research question, and d) the coding required additional 
work, meaning if results indicated interesting findings, it would be more simple to return in the future 
to perform a Meta-Regression with the original continuous data. 
2.2.2 Meta-Analytic Procedure 
2.2.2.1 Effect size calculation 
Effect sizes were calculated for each of the 591 observations in the sample using the software 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA). The standardised difference in means was used, providing a 
scale-free measure of the difference between fluent and non-fluent groups. When calculating the 
average effect sizes, the weight given to a particular observation was determined by the inverse of its 
variance. This method ensures that studies with lower variance, and more precise measurement, 
received a greater weighting when calculating the average. Similarly, this reduces the amount that a 
single, high variance study (e.g. a study with a small sample) can distort the average effect size. 
Related to this, in order to gain a full picture of affective responses to fluency and the impact of 
moderators, it was often necessary to extract multiple effect sizes from a single sample. For example, 
in Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) experiment 1, the authors compared fluent and non-fluent conditions 
whilst varying stimuli valence. In order to code stimuli valence as a moderator, this sample was entered 
as five rows in CMA, one for each level of valence (very positive, mildly positive, neutral, mildly 
negative, and very negative stimuli). In order to avoid giving additional weight to studies where multiple 
effect sizes were extracted, the sample size was divided by the number of effect sizes being extracted.  
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The direction of the effect size was input into CMA so that a positive effect size meant that the fluent 
condition was received more positively than the non-fluent condition. Due to the different rating scales 
used across the sample of studies, a positive effect size therefore indicated that the fluent conditions 
were liked more, or disliked less, than the non-fluent condition. 
The CMA software allows for the effect sizes to be calculated from a variety of reported statistics. The 
flexibility of the software allowed for the sample to include studies using between groups and paired 
groups designs. The design is inputted into CMA for each observation, allowing the design to be taken 
into account when computing the effect sizes.   
2.2.2.2 Fixed effects vs random effects 
The fixed effects model assumes that, over a series of observations, there is a true effect size which 
remains constant. Therefore, any difference in observed effect size is thought of as sampling error. In 
contrast, the random effects model assumes that there is no true effect size. The difference in assumption 
means the fixed effects model is more powerful for detecting effects, but also makes it more liberal and 
vulnerable to false positives.  
The current study used the random effects model. The rationale for this was that the mix of moderators 
and variety in approaches, made for a complex sample. It was therefore deemed unlikely that there was 
a true effect size shared by all of the observations, which may differ in potentially significant ways, 
such as using positive or negative scales, relatively short or long exposure times, the presence of absence 
of additional material or tasks.  
2.2.2.3 Heterogeneity and moderation 
The 591 observations were tested for within-class heterogeneity. The null hypothesis for this test is that 
the variation amongst the observed effect sizes is not significant. This in turn would suggest that there 
is a true effect size shared by the studies in the sample, and that any differences in observations is due 
to sampling error. On the other hand, failure to reject the null hypothesis, as indicated by a significant 
Qwithin statistic, suggests heterogeneity. Heterogeneity suggests that there is not a single true effect size 
shared by the studies in the sample; instead the variance is due to the presence of different effect sizes. 
Furthermore, heterogeneity is an indicator of the presence of moderators.  
The heterogeneity test is also performed between-class, to test whether there are differences between 
groups of observations, such as those grouped by category of a particular moderator. When groups are 
compared, the significant Qbetween statistic now indicates that there are significant differences between 
groups, which is greater than predicted by sampling error alone. Failure to reject the null hypothesis 
indicates homogeneity, and that differences between groups are due to sampling error. 
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2.3 Results 
Prior to running the analysis, the data was checked for publication bias. Inspection of the funnel plot 
was difficult due to the high volume of observations (k = 591). Nonetheless, visual inspection did reveal 
that there were studies that fell to the right of the mean effect size. However, these studies were of low 
Standard Error, reducing the risk that these studies were available due to publication bias. Visual 
inspection is subjective, so the Rosenthal Fail-safe N (Rosenthal, 1979) test was run for confirmation. 
Results of the test revealed that it would have taken an additional 333,845 observations with an effect 
size of 0 to bring the Z value below significance. Therefore, even if a file drawer effect had occurred, it 
would have required a vast number of studies to be hidden to bring the mean effect size observed in this 
Meta-Analysis down to 0. 
The decision to adopt a random effects approach appeared to be supported by the significant test for 
heterogeneity. As shown in Table 2.1, there was a rejection of the null hypothesis that there is a true 
effect shared by the studies (Q(590) = 2,927.427, p < .001). Instead, the results suggest that the level of 
dispersion is greater than could be attributed to sampling error. Furthermore, almost 80% (I2 = 79.854) 
of the dispersion was caused by real dispersion of the true effect sizes, suggesting the presence of 
moderator variables, rather than dispersion due to sampling error.  
Table 2.1: Meta-Analysis test of heterogeneity. 
Heterogeneity 
Q value  df p value I2 
2,927.427 590 < .001 79.846 
 
Across 591 observations, a standard difference in means of 0.563 was found, with 95% confidence 
intervals indicating a range from 0.516 to 0.610. As summarised in Table 2.2, this point estimate 
appeared to be significantly different from zero (there was a rejection of the null hypothesis that the 
point estimate was not significantly different from 0). As a positive point estimate indicates that the 
fluent groups were rated more positively than the non-fluent groups, this test suggests that overall, 
increased fluency is associated with an increased positive response. Put simply, people liked fluent 
stimuli more than non-fluent stimuli.  
Table 2.2: Meta-Analysis effect size summary data. 
 Effect size and 95% 
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Model Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Random 591 0.563 0.516 0.610 23.458 < .001 
Fixed 591 0.422 0.402 0.441 42.475 < .001 
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2.3.1 Differences between moderators 
2.3.1.1 Fluency category 
There were six different general fluency manipulations (Table 2.3). The most common manipulation 
type was Perceptual fluency (k = 374 observations), followed by Conceptual fluency (k = 111). Other 
studies used Processing type (k = 53), Sensorimotor (k = 24), Subjective fluency (k = 9), or Linguistic 
(k = 8) manipulations. Additional studies used a Combination (k = 20) of fluency manipulations.  
As shown on Table 2.3, the null hypothesis that the point estimates were not significantly different from 
0, was rejected for all six manipulations. This suggests that in the sample of studies, fluent conditions 
were preferred to non-fluent conditions, regardless of the way in which fluency was manipulated.  
Table 2.3: Meta-Analysis data by general fluency manipulation.  
 Effect size and 95% 
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Manipulation Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Perceptual 374 0.533 0.475 0.592 17.822 < .001 
Conceptual 111 0.542 0.443 0.642 10.671 < .001 
Processing 53 0.655 0.532 0.779 10.381 < .001 
Sensorimotor 24 0.374 0.221 0.527 4.779 < .001 
Combination 20 1.140 0.730 1.551 5.441 < .001 
Subjective 9 0.940 0.428 1.452 3.597 < .001 
 
Results indicated that there was a significant between groups difference in the effect sizes (Q(5) = 18.338, 
p = .003), with the pattern summarised in Figure 2.3. Results also suggested that significant 
heterogeneity within each manipulation type (all p’s < .001). The difference may therefore be due to 
different proportions of other moderators amongst each manipulation type. This is likely to influence 
the smaller sub samples (Subjective, Combination, Sensorimotor), whilst for the larger sub samples 
(Perceptual, Conceptual) this is more likely to even out. Some evidence for this can be seen by only 
comparing the manipulation types with large numbers of studies. For example, when only Perceptual 
and Conceptual studies are included, the between groups effect is no longer significant (Q(1) = 0.023, p 
= .879). Similarly when only Perceptual, Conceptual, and Processing studies are included, the between 
groups difference falls below significance (Q(2) = 3.103, p = .212).  
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Model -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Perceptual      
Conceptual      
Sensorimotor      
Combination      
Subjective      
Processing      
Overall      
Figure 2.3: Effect sizes for the six fluency manipulations.  
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2.3.1.2 Affect measurement 
There were 8 different methods of recording affect used across the sample of studies. The most common 
by far were self-report scales (k = 509 observations), followed by forced choice (k = 33), and fEMG (k 
= 24). The remaining measurement types were used in only few studies (Implicit Association: k = 7; 
Affective Priming: k = 6; Qualitative: k = 6; Approach-Avoidance: k = 5; Ordering/Ranking: k = 1).  
As summarised in Table 2.4, all but one of these measurement types produced effect sizes that were 
found to be significantly different from 0 (p ≤ .005). The exception was for the Affective Priming 
method, for which the effect size approached significance (p = .085) when compared to 0. Examining 
the affective priming studies, it was clear that there was a complex combination of moderators: two of 
the observations used a disliking response scale and another observation used negative stimuli. It would 
therefore not be appropriate to conclude that affective priming does not detect differences between 
fluent and non-fluent conditions. For interest, if these aforementioned negative focussed studies are 
removed, the affective priming sub sample shows an effect size significantly different from 0 (p = .033), 
based on the remaining 3 observations.  
Table 2.4: Meta-Analysis data by affect measurement.  
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Measurement Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Self-report 509 0.579 0.527 0.631 21.697 < .001 
Forced choice 33 0.318 0.188 0.448 4.786 < .001 
fEMG 24 0.470 0.334 0.607 6.756 < .001 
IAT 7 0.825 0.532 1.119 5.511 < .001 
Affective Priming 6 0.391 -0.053 0.835 1.725 .085 
Qualitative 6 0.596 0.363 0.828 5.021 < .001 
Approach-Avoidance 5 0.343 0.104 0.582 2.809 .005 
Ranking 1 1.646 1.412 1.881 13.780 < .001 
 
Results (Figure 2.4) indicated a significant between groups difference in the effect sizes (Q(7) = 104.743, 
p < .001), however for several measurement types (Self-report, Affective priming, Implicit Association, 
Forced choice), results indicated significant heterogeneity (p < .05). fEMG has been used in studies as 
a way of measuring affect, but without priming the participants, or providing a contextual cue that 
would occur under self-report. These two methods were therefore compared, with results suggesting 
that the effect sizes between studies using self-report and those using fEMG did not differ significantly 
(Q(1) 2.132, p = .144).  
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 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Model -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Self-report      
Affective priming      
fEMG      
IAT      
Approach/Avoidance      
Forced Choice      
Qualitative      
Ranking      
Overall      
Figure 2.4: Effect sizes for eight different measurement types for affect. 
 
2.3.1.3 Affect type 
There was a total of 24 different types of affect measured across the sample of studies. These are 
summarised in Table 2.5, along with the effect sizes. The most common type of affect that was measured 
was liking (k = 315 observations), whilst other measurements such as product evaluation (e.g. good/bad 
judgements; k = 31), beauty/aesthetic (k = 19), or preference (k = 20) were much less frequent. 
As summarised in Table 2.5, the majority of the affect types produced effect sizes that were significantly 
different from 0 at the p < .001 level. Affect types that had effect sizes that were not significantly 
different from 0 were: Arousal (p = .405), Positive Mood (p = .267), Negative Mood (p = .374), 
Funniness (p = .528), Ugliness (p = .143), Disliking (p = .078), and the Negative side of PANAS (p = 
.254).  
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Table 2.5: Meta-Analysis data by affect type.  
  Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Affect type Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Liking 315 0.531 0.470 0.591 17.918 < .001 
Compound / Composite 67 0.615 0.495 0.734 10.110 < .001 
(Product) Evaluation  31 0.522 0.341 0.703 5.654 < .001 
Valence (e.g. SAMS) 27 1.282 0.857 1.707 5.913 < .001 
Pleasantness 23 0.990 0.599 1.381 4.966 < .001 
Choice / preference 20 0.355 0.181 0.529 4.005 < .001 
Choice - disliked 2 1.233 0.651 1.815 4.155 < .001 
Beauty / aesthetic 19 0.617 0.405 0.829 5.707 < .001 
Ugliness 1 1.118 -0.379 2.615 1.464 .143 
Zygomaticus 17 0.464 0.289 0.638 5.214 < .001 
Corrugator 7 0.497 0.264 0.730 4.185 < .001 
Disliking  8 0.153 -0.017 0.324 1.762 .078 
Mood / emotion (+ve only) 11 0.294 -0.225 0.814 1.110 .267 
Mood / emotion (-ve only) 5 -0.566 -1.814 0.681 -0.890 .374 
Mood (bipolar / general) 1 0.631 0.085 1.178 2.264 .024 
PANAS 5 0.520 0.364 0.675 6.553 < .001 
PANAS (+ve only) 10 0.651 0.367 0.936 4.486 < .001 
PANAS (-ve only) 8 0.159 -0.114 0.431 1.141 .254 
Funniness 6 0.148 -0.312 0.608 0.631 .528 
Satisfaction / enjoyment 2 0.610 0.225 0.996 3.104 < .001 
Self 2 0.261 0.104 0.419 3.248 < .001 
Arousal 2 0.925 -1.253 3.104 0.832 .405 
Intensity 1 1.385 0.048 2.721 2.030 .042 
3rd party 1 0.475 0.001 0.949 1.965 .049 
 
Results indicated a significant between groups difference (Q(23) = 74.265, p < .001), but also that for 
half of the above groups there was significant within groups heterogeneity (p < .05). As can be seen in 
Figure 2.5, several of the affect types displayed large variance.  
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 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Affect type -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Liking      
Valence (e.g. SAMS)      
Arousal      
Intensity      
Pleasantness      
Choice / preference      
Choice - disliked      
Mood / emotion (+ve only)      
Mood / emotion (-ve only)      
Funniness      
Self      
Disliking      
3rd party      
Ugliness      
Mood (bipolar / general)      
Zygomaticus      
Corrugator      
Beauty / aesthetic      
(Product) Evaluation       
Compound / Composite      
PANAS      
PANAS (+ve only)      
PANAS (-ve only)      
Satisfaction / enjoyment      
Overall      
Figure 2.5: Effect sizes for different affect types measure in the sample of studies. 
 
2.3.1.4 Scale valence 
A minority of studies (k = 31) used a negatively focussed diagnostic for measuring affective responses, 
such as a disliking scale, the negative dimensions of the PANAS, or the measurement of corrugator 
supercilia muscle activity with fEMG. These observations were compared against the remaining sample 
to determine whether there was a difference when participants were only measured for negative affect. 
As shown in Table 2.6, observations using Negative scales displayed an overall effect size that was 
significantly greater than 0 (p = .008), but was also significantly lower than the remaining 560 studies 
which did not focus solely on negative affect (Q(1) = 9.572, p = .002). Results also indicated significant 
heterogeneity within each measurement type (p < .001).  
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Table 2.6: Meta-Analysis data by scale valence.  
 Effect size and 95% 
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Negative scale Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Negative scales 31 0.264 0.070 0.458 2.672 .008 
All others 560 0.579 0.531 0.627 23.450 < .001 
 
The fact that both sets of studies found significant differences from 0, suggests that fluent conditions 
are not only felt to be more positive than non-fluent groups, but they are also felt to be less negative. 
The difference in effect sizes between the studies using negative scales and the remaining sample (as 
shown in Figure 2.6) could be interpreted in different ways. One interpretation would be that the amount 
of positive affect evoked by fluent processing is greater than the amount which it reduces negative 
affect. On a similar note, this suggests that negative affective responses such as disliking may not simply 
be the reverse of positive affective responses, such as liking. Another interpretation could be that 
participants simply find negative scales harder to conceptualise and use compared to more positive 
worded scales. 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Negative scale -1.00 0.00 1.00 
Negative scales    
All others    
Overall    
Figure 2.6: Effect sizes by negative scales. 
 
2.3.1.5 Stimuli valence 
The studies were coded for the valence of the stimuli used. By far the most common was for studies to 
use neutral stimuli (k = 445 observations), however there were instances where positive (k = 87), 
negative (k = 30), or mixed (k = 29) stimuli were used.  
As summarised in Table 2.7, effect sizes were significantly different from 0 (p < .001) for studies using 
stimuli with neutral, positive, or mixed valence. However, for studies using negative stimuli, the effect 
size did not appear significantly different from 0 (p = .841). Interestingly, this neither supports the 
hedonic marking hypothesis (which would an effect size significantly different from 0 in the positive 
direction), nor fluency amplification (which would predict an effect size significantly different from 0 
in the negative direction).  
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Table 2.7: Meta-Analysis data by stimuli valence.  
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Stimuli Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Neutral 445 0.600 0.550 0.651 23.403 < .001 
Positive 87 0.622 0.482 0.763 8.688 < .001 
Negative 30 -0.043 -0.467 0.381 -0.200 .841 
Mixed 29 0.355 0.192 0.518 4.265 < .001 
 
Results (Figure 2.7) also indicated significant between groups difference in the effect sizes (Q(3) = 
16.559, p = .001), as well as significant within groups heterogeneity (all p’s < .001). There was no 
significant difference in the effect sizes between studies using positive and neutral stimuli (Q(1) = 0.082, 
p = .775), and both of these produced larger effect sizes than the studies using negative stimuli 
(compared to positive stimuli: Q(1) = 8.525, p = .004; compared to neutral stimuli: Q(1) = 8.727, p = 
.003).  
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Stimuli -1.00 0.00 1.00 
Positive    
Negative    
Neutral    
Mixed    
Overall    
Figure 2.7: Effect sizes by stimuli valence. 
 
2.3.1.6 Fluent vs 
Of the 591 studies, the most common design was to compare a fluent group with either a disfluent group 
(k = 259 observations) or a control group (k = 238). However, other designs were noted, such as 
comparing a fluent group with a less fluent group (50) or comparing a fluent group with a disrupted-
fluent group (k = 20). Less frequent designs were to compare a disrupted-fluent group against a disfluent 
group (k = 22) and to compare a control group was compared against a disfluent group (k = 2). 
As summarised in Table 2.8, results indicated that all of the design types produced effect sizes 
significantly different from 0. For six of these design types, this was highly significant (p < .001), but 
less so for the disrupted-fluent vs disfluent design (p = .040). The pattern of effect sizes is as expected, 
with fluent vs disfluent showing a larger effect size than vs control and vs less fluent comparison groups.  
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Table 2.8: Meta-Analysis data by fluency comparison.  
 Effect size and 95% confidence 
interval 
Test of null 
Design Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Fluent vs  
   disfluent 
 
259 
 
0.676 
 
0.602 
 
0.750 
 
17.840 
 
< .001 
   control 238 0.489 0.415 0.562 13.047 < .001 
   less fluent 50 0.388 0.276 0.499 6.790 < .001 
   disrupted-fluent 20 0.682 0.411 0.953 4.925 < .001 
Disrupted-fluent vs disfluent 22 0.180 0.009 0.351 2.058 .040 
Control vs disfluent 2 0.851 0.400 1.302 3.695 < .001 
 
Results (Figure 2.8) indicated a significant between groups difference in effect sizes (Q(5) = 41.417, p 
< .001), and also significant heterogeneity for each of the design types (p < .001). As above, the 
proportion of other moderators amongst each design type may have an effect, particularly on the smaller 
sub samples. However, when only the two largest sub samples were compared (fluent vs disfluent and 
fluent vs control), results indicated a between groups difference (Q(1) = 12.361, p < .001). This indicates 
that fluent conditions are liked more than non-fluent conditions, and this is more pronounced when the 
non-fluent condition is disfluent, rather than control.  The effect size was also larger for fluent vs 
disfluent compared to fluent vs less fluent (Q(1) = 17.703, p < .001), but there was no significant between 
groups difference in effect size when comparing fluent vs control and fluent vs less fluent (Q(1) = 2.188, 
p = .139). 
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Model -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Fluent vs      
   control      
   less fluent      
   disfluent      
   Disrupted-fluent      
Disrupted-fluent vs disfluent      
Control vs disfluent      
Overall      
 
Figure 2.8: Effect sizes by fluency comparison.  
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2.3.1.7 Other ratings made 
Studies were compared based on whether the participants had been required to complete any other rating 
scales, in addition to the affect measure. In 231 observations, participants only had to provide an affect 
rating, whilst in 360 observations the participant completed an additional measure. The additional 
measure could come before the affect measure (k = 56), after the affect measure (k = 208), or it could 
appear in a random (k = 31) or blocked position (k = 2). Finally, 63 observations asked participants to 
complete an additional measure both before and after the affect measure.  
Table 2.9: Meta-Analysis data by additional ratings. 
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Additional measure Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Affect only 231 0.530 0.454 0.606 13.672 < .001 
After affect 208 0.612 0.541 0.683 16.890 < .001 
Before affect 56 0.661 0.469 0.852 6.769 < .001 
Both 63 0.402 0.260 0.545 5.538 < .001 
Random 31 0.540 0.318 0.761 4.768 < .001 
Blocked 2 0.572 0.289 0.855 3.966 < .001 
 
As shown in Table 2.9 and Figure 2.9, for every instruction category, the effect size was significantly 
greater than 0 (p < .001). Results also indicated that there was not a significant difference between the 
study categories (Q(5) = 8.475, p = .132). Furthermore, the effect size did not appear to significantly 
differ when studies included an additional measure (No additional instruction vs additional instruction 
before affect measure: Q(1) = 1.538, p = .215 ; vs additional instruction after affect measure: Q(1) = 2.371, 
p = .124), and there was no significant difference in the effects sizes between studies placing the 
additional measure before or after the affect measure (Q(1) = 0.217, p = .641). 
However, the effect size for studies including additional measures both before and after the affect 
measure appeared to be significantly smaller than for studies only one scale, either before (Q(1) = 4.512, 
p = .034) or after (Q(1) = 6.689, p = .010) the affect measure.  
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Additional -1.00 0.00 1.00 
Before    
After    
Both    
Random    
Blocked    
Affect only    
Overall    
Figure 2.9: Effect sizes by additional ratings. 
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2.3.1.8 Participant instructions  
Studies were compared based on whether the participants were provided with any specific instructions, 
other than the basic task information. For example, additional instructions would include those that told 
the participant to think in a certain way (e.g. analytic vs intuitive), or if the participant had been told 
something about the stimuli (e.g. all the stimuli in the test phase are old/familiar). Overall, 340 
observations did not include addition instructions, and 251 did include specific instructions. As shown 
in Table 2.10, both categories resulted in effect sizes significantly greater than 0 (p < .001).  
Table 2.10: Meta-Analysis data by additional instruction. 
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Instructions given Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
No 340 0.618 0.552 0.685 18.303 < .001 
Yes 251 0.480 0.416 0.543 14.765 < .001 
 
Results (Figure 2.10) also indicated significant differences between the two categories, with studies that 
provided no additional instructions returning a larger effect size than those that did provide additional 
instructions (Q(1) = 8.741, p = .003).  
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Instructions -1.00 0.00 1.00 
No    
Yes    
Overall    
Figure 2.10: Effect sizes by additional instructions. 
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2.3.1.9 Target duration  
The length of time which the target stimuli were displayed varied across studies. The durations were 
grouped into seven difference categories, with the corresponding counts displayed in Table 2.11. For 
266 observations, the target duration as self-paced, and for 98 of the observations in the sample, the 
target durations were not obtained. 
Table 2.11: Meta-Analysis data by target duration. 
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Additional measure Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Self-paced 266 0.486 0.425 0.547 15.602 < .001 
0-500ms 47 0.596 0.453 0.739 8.153 < .001 
501-1,000ms 25 0.633 0.382 0.884 4.942 < .001 
1,001-3,000ms 90 0.557 0.438 0.676 9.153 < .001 
3,001-10,000ms 49 0.931 0.627 1.236 5.996 < .001 
> 10,000ms 16 0.466 0.263 0.669 4.506 < .001 
Unknown 98 0.596 0.473 0.720 9.480 < .001 
 
As shown in Table 2.11, the effect sizes were all significantly greater than 0 (p <.001), for every target 
duration category. Results also indicted that the between groups difference approached significance 
(Q(6) = 11.801, p = .067). As the target duration was not known for some studies in the sample, the 
unknown category was removed, and the analysis repeated. Removing the unknown group, the Q value 
increased, however the between groups difference remained at the approaching significance level (Q(5) 
= 10.673, p = .058). 
Although the between groups difference fell just short of significance (at alpha .05), results (Figure 
2.11) did indicate that the effect size was larger for the 3,001-10,000ms category. This category had a 
larger effect size than the shorter 1,001-3,000ms duration category (Q(1) = 5.039, p = .025), as well as 
the longer > 10,000ms category (Q(1) = 6.212, p = .013). 
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Model -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 
Self-paced      
0-500ms      
501-11000ms      
1,001-3,000ms      
3,001-10,000ms      
> 10,000ms      
Unknown      
Overall      
Figure 2.11: Effect sizes by target duration. 
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2.3.1.10 Number of presentations  
Some studies in the sample, used a procedure which included a priming phase, with the target stimuli 
presented with varying frequencies. In total, 259 observations included a priming or learning phase. In 
many studies, the target was presented a single time during priming/learning (k = 73), whist the 
remainder included multiple presentations. These were grouped into the following categories: 2-5 
presentations (k = 74), 6-10 presentations (k = 52), 11-20 presentations (k = 19), and >20 presentations 
(k = 41).   
Table 2.12: Meta-Analysis data by presentation frequency. 
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Presentations Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
1 73 0.566 0.453 0.678 9.866 < .001 
2-5 74 0.421 0.331 0.511 9.185 < .001 
6-10 52 0.775 0.567 0.982 7.312 < .001 
11-20 19 0.632 0.326 0.938 4.050 < .001 
>20 41 0.558 0.323 0.793 4.661 < .001 
 
Results (Table 2.12) indicated that for every presentation category, the effect size was significantly 
greater than 0 (p = .001), suggesting that even a single prior presentation is enough to cause an affective 
response with an effect size greater than 0. Results also indicated a significant between groups 
difference in effect size when comparing the categories (Q(4) = 11.642, p = .020).  
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Duration -1.00 0.00 1.00 
1    
2-5    
6-10    
11-20    
>20    
Overall    
Figure 2.12: Effect sizes by presentations frequency. 
 
Results (Figure 2.12) indicated that the effect size was significantly larger for 6-10 presentations 
compared to 2-5 presentations (Q(1) = 9.364, p = .002), suggesting a possible increase in affect response 
in line with the increased number of presentations. Comparing the 6-10 presentation category with the 
>20 category, the trend hints at an overexposure effect, however this was not found to be significant 
(Q(1) = 1.838, p = .175). 
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2.3.1.11 Stimuli & scale valence  
In the comparisons above (Table 2.7 & Figure 2.7), results showed that when stimuli were negative, the 
effect size was not significantly different from 0 when comparing fluent and non-fluent groups. In other 
words, fluent negative stimuli were neither liked nor disliked more than non-fluent negative stimuli. 
One reason for this may be that only the minority of studies used a negative scale, making it potentially 
more difficult to detect disliking. The sample was therefore filtered to only include studies that used a 
negative rating scale, and then compared studies using stimuli of the four different valences (Positive, 
Negative, Neutral, Mixed).  
Table 2.13: Meta-Analysis data by stimuli valence (negative scales only).  
 Effect size and 95%  
confidence interval 
Test of null 
Stimuli Number of 
observations 
Std. difference 
in means 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Z value p value 
Neutral 23 0.326 0.159 0.493 3.817 < .001 
Positive 2 0.865 0.516 1.214 4.858 < .001 
Negative 3 -1.608 -2.864 -0.351 -2.507 .012 
Mixed 3 0.350 0.095 0.604 2.694 .007 
 
Filtering the studies in this way, the sample was reduced to 31 observations (as in Table 2.13 & Figure 
2.13). The majority of studies used neutral stimuli (k = 23 observations), with only a small number 
using stimuli with positive (k = 2), negative (k = 3), or mixed valence (k = 3). Results suggested that 
studies using studies using Positive (p < .001), Neutral (p < .001), or Mixed (p = .007) stimuli produced 
overall effect sizes that were significantly greater than 0. However, the few observations that used both 
a negative scale and negative stimuli produced an overall effect size that was significantly less than 0 
(p = .012). These differences were typified by the significant between groups differences (Q(3) = 17.475, 
p = .001).  
 
 Std diff in means and 95% CI 
Duration -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 
Positive      
Negative      
Neutral      
Mixed      
Overall      
Figure 2.13: Effect sizes by stimuli valence (studies with negative scales only). 
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2.4 Discussion 
The review and Meta-Analysis of the literature regarding affective responses to processing fluency 
demonstrated that this is a wide and diverse subject area. Studies retrieved from the systematic search 
ranged from the relatively popular designs such as those incorporating a perceptual fluency 
manipulation, using self-report scales, measuring liking as the affective outcome, and using neutral 
stimuli, to the less common designs, such as those manipulating fluency with using subjective fluency, 
recording affect using approach-avoidance apparatus, and those deploying stimuli of a negative valence. 
At the top level of analysis, results indicated a positive effect size (d = 0.563, 95% CI = 0.516 – 0.610) 
that was significantly different from 0 (p < .001). Whilst this suggests that fluent conditions are liked 
more than non-fluent conditions, the results also identified significant heterogeneity, and therefore the 
likely presence of moderators.  
2.4.1 Valence of stimuli and measurement scales 
Of primary interest is the direction of affective response to processing fluency, and how this direction 
may change depending on the valence of the stimuli used, and the valence of affect being measured, 
both of which appeared to moderate affective responses to fluency (stimuli valence:  Q(3) = 16.559, p = 
.001; scale valence: Q(1) = 9.572, p = .002). Comparing the observations based on these moderators 
allows for the investigation of competing hypotheses: hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and non-
specific activation. Furthermore, understanding the pattern of affective responses allows potential 
reconciliation of accounts into the propose multi-source model.  
2.4.1.1 Neutral stimuli 
The majority of the studies in the sample used neutral stimuli (k = 445). When the sample was filtered 
to only include neutral stimuli, it is unsurprising that the affective responses for fluent conditions 
remained more positive than for non-fluent conditions (d = 0.600). This finding is consistent with the 
hedonic marking hypothesis, which proposes that processing fluency is inherently positive. However, 
this fact that fluent neutral stimuli are liked more than non-fluent neutral stimuli is inconsistent with the 
fluency amplification model. Under fluency amplification, processing fluency should amplify the 
valence of the stimuli itself. Therefore, if the stimuli are neutral, there is nothing to amplify, and one 
would expect the fluent and non-fluent conditions to be the same.  
2.4.1.2 Positive stimuli 
The Meta-Analysis captured 87 observations that used stimuli of a positive valence. As with neutral 
stimuli, the affective response was more positive for fluent conditions than for non-fluent conditions (d 
= 0.622). This finding is consistent with both hedonic marking and fluency amplification.  
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2.4.1.3 Negative stimuli 
When only studies using negative stimuli (k = 30) were isolated, results indicated that the effect size of 
affective response was not significantly different from 0 (p = .841). In other words, for negative stimuli, 
fluent conditions were neither liked more, nor disliked more, than non-fluent conditions. This finding 
is inconsistent with both hedonic marking and fluency amplification. Hedonic marking would predict 
that the fluent condition was liked more than the non-fluent condition, regardless of the stimuli valence. 
A defence of this would be that because affective responses to fluency tend to be “brief, mild” 
(Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001, p. 989) and “subtle” (Topolinski, 2011, p. 280), they become 
undetectable when the stimuli are negative. On the other hand, fluency amplification would predict 
amplification of the stimuli valence. Therefore, fluent negative stimuli should be disliked more than 
non-fluent negative stimuli.  
However, it may be possible to reconcile both accounts with the findings from the Meta-Analysis. Under 
a multi-source account, it is suggested that positive affect from hedonic marking is evoked alongside 
the amplified negative affective response from fluency amplification. The two opposing affective 
responses would then cancel each other out, resulting in the observed no significant difference between 
fluent and non-fluent conditions when exposed to negative stimuli. If this is the case, then if positive 
affective responses are removed, one should be left with just negative responses. This was achieved by 
focussing only on studies using negative scales. 
2.4.1.4 Negative scales 
When the sample was filtered to only include studies using negative scales (k = 31), such as those 
measuring disliking on a unipolar self-report, or by measuring corrugator supercilii muscle activity 
using fEMG, the Meta-Analysis found an effect size significantly different from 0 (d = 0.264, p = .008), 
and in the positive direction. This suggests that, not only are fluent conditions liked more than non-
fluent conditions, they are also disliked less. This finding is consistent with the hedonic marking 
hypotheses, as this suggests that processing fluency is inherently positive. However, this is inconsistent 
with the nonspecific activation hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that fluency is attributed to 
judgement domains in a nonspecific fashion, as demonstrated by Mandler et al. (1987) where the same 
fluent stimuli could be judged as being brighter or darker than non-fluent stimuli, depending on the task 
question. Extrapolating this, one might expect fluent stimuli to be liked more, and also disliked more, 
than non-fluent stimuli, depending on the scale used. This was not the case, consistent with other studies 
contesting nonspecific activation patterns (e.g. Seamon et al., 1998; Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001).  
The current research also investigated the affective response on negative scales for only negative 
stimuli. As noted earlier, studies using negative stimuli resulted in an effect size that was not 
significantly different from 0 (p = .841). This could be interpreted in three ways 1) that there is 
genuinely no affective response to processing fluency when the stimuli are negative in valence, 2) that 
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there is a positive affective response to processing fluency when the stimuli are negative, but as this is 
only brief and subtle, it becomes unidentifiable when up against the negative affect generated by the 
stimuli themselves, and 3) that both positive and negative affect are evoked, and these cancel each other 
out. The current research therefore investigated a sample that had been filtered to only include studies 
using negative scales and negative stimuli. If explanations 1 and 2 are correct, then one would continue 
to expect that there is no significant difference between fluent and non-fluent groups. However, if 
explanation 3 is correct, filtering the sample in this way would remove studies which are evoking 
positive effect. Therefore, the remaining observations in the sample would be evoking negative affect, 
resulting in an effect size significantly different from 0, and in the negative direction.  
Results indicated that fluent negative stimuli were disliked more than non-fluent negative stimuli (d = 
-1.608, p = .012). On its own, this finding is consistent with the fluency amplification model, as the 
negative stimuli appear to result in amplified negative affect when made fluent. It is also inconsistent 
with hedonic marking, which would predict the fluent stimuli to be rated as more positive, irrespective 
of the fact that the stimuli were negative.  
Taking all of the above evidence into account, we find a pattern of affective responses that are not 
predicted by hedonic marking or fluency amplification on their own. Fluent neutral stimuli were more 
positive than non-fluent neutral stimuli, which was inconsistent with fluency amplification; Fluent 
negative stimuli were not significantly different from non-fluent negative stimuli, which was 
inconsistent with both hedonic marking and fluency amplification; finally, looking at negative rating 
scales only, fluent negative stimuli were disliked more than non-fluent negative stimuli, which was 
inconsistent with the hedonic marking hypothesis. Whilst individually, neither of these models can 
predict the pattern of results, they do become consistent when combined per the multi-source account.  
Whilst the above appears as promising evidence for the multi-source account, it must be taken 
tentatively, as only three observations, originating from a single study (Holman, 2013) had used 
negative stimuli and isolated the negative affective response from overall affect. This is therefore 
evidence for a gap in the literature, and future studies should endeavour to investigate the separate 
contributions of positive and negative affect whilst processing stimuli of varying valence. Without such 
an approach, true diagnostic comparison of hedonic marking and fluency amplification is not possible. 
2.4.2 Attribution, discounting, and discrepancy 
An important finding from Bornstein’s (1989) Meta-Analysis on the mere exposure effect was that the 
effect size for subliminally presented stimuli was typically twice as large as that for clearly recognised 
stimuli. This led to the conclusion that feelings of fluency (such as when encountering a familiar image) 
are discounted as a cue when making liking judgements if the participant is aware of the true source of 
the fluency (such as when they are told that the image is old). This is consistent with the discrepancy-
attribution hypothesis (Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2000) which suggests that fluency effects such as 
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familiarity, are greater when the fluency is unexpected. Similarly, Jacoby and Dallas (1981) noted that 
relative fluency was crucial to achieving fluency effects, rather than objective fluency.  
The current research investigated the potential discounting of expected fluency by coding for 
moderators such as the presence of participant instructions that might reveal the true source of fluency 
or prompt them to ignore fluency as a cue altogether. Results indicated that participants liked fluent 
conditions more than non-fluent conditions, regardless of whether the study included additional 
instructions or not; the effect size was significantly greater than 0 in both cases (p < .001).  However, 
results also indicated that the affective response to fluency was moderated by participant instructions. 
Comparison of the two groups (instructions vs no instructions) suggested that the effect size was greater 
for the studies without additional instructions (Q(1) = 8.741, p = .003). These findings suggest that, 
additional instructions appear to reduce the affective response to processing fluency, but they do not 
eliminate it altogether.  
Of course, this may be down to the specific instructions used. For example, Gillebaart, Förster, and 
Rotteveel (2012) found a preference for fluent stimuli amongst participants who had been primed to 
focus on safety, prevention, and security. In contrast, when primed to think in terms of promotion and 
growth, participants preferred the non-fluent stimuli. Complicating matters, participants instructions 
may not be limited to the cueing and attribution of fluency, but may also directly influence processing 
fluency itself. For example, studies have demonstrated that stimuli are processed with greater ease when 
there in congruence between the instructions’ framing and focus (e.g. Lee & Aaker, 2004), or between 
the instructions and stimuli type (e.g. Chae & Hogg, 2013). Further research should be conducted on 
the types of instructions used in order to identify those that are effective at eliminating any fluency 
effects, as these could potentially be used as debiasing tools for domains vulnerable to fluency heuristic 
errors, such as employee selection and assessment.  
The research also coded for the use of additional rating scales, as these may serve as conflicting cues 
for the attribution of fluency. Overall, additional scales did not moderate the affective responses to 
processing fluency (Q(5) = 8.475, p = .132), and fluent conditions resulted in more positive affect than 
non-fluent conditions, regardless of whether additional scales were absent or present, or whether the 
scales appeared before, after or on either side of the affect rating measure (all p’s < .001). The robustness 
of the positive affective response, regardless of other rating scales, appears to support the hedonic 
marking hypothesis.  
There was no significant difference in effect sizes between studies only using an affect measure 
compared to those with a measure before (Q(1) =  1.538, p = .215), after (Q(1) =  2.371, p = .124), or both 
before and after (Q(1) = 2.382, p = .123) the affect measure. However, studies using additional measure 
both before and after the affect measure resulted in a smaller affect size than those using a single 
additional measure, either before (Q(1) = 4.512, p = .034) or after (Q(1) = 6.761, p = .009) the affect 
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measure. This does appear to support some attribution of fluency or affect which occurs when extra 
measures are deployed, however this does not explain why the studies using additional measure both 
before and after the affect measure did not significantly differ from those that only used an affect 
measure. 
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Chapter 3: Experiments Measuring Bipolar Affective Responses to Coherence 
 
3.1 Experiment 12  
3.1.1 Introduction 
Overall, the results of the Meta-Analysis presented in the previous chapter provided substantial 
evidence for the hedonic marking of processing fluency (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001; Winkielman 
et al., 2003). Overall, the effect size was significantly greater than zero (standard difference in means = 
0.563, p < .001), indicating a positive response to increased fluency. The effect appeared robust in terms 
of the type of fluency manipulation used (perceptual, conceptual, subjective) and variety of affect 
measured (liking, beauty, valence). However, confirming Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) observation, 
only a minority of studies utilised negative stimuli (k = 30 observations) compared to those using neutral 
(k = 445) or positive (k = 87) stimuli. In addition, the Meta-Analysis revealed that studies measuring 
negative affective responses to be similarly limited (k = 31). The combination of these two sub-samples 
meant that only three observations were found where a study had used negative stimuli and measured 
the affective response using a negative scale, with all three of these observations originating from a 
single study (Holman, 2013).  
This gap is theoretically important for the predictions of a multi-source account, which suggests that 
hedonic marking and fluency amplification both make separate contributions to the affective response 
to fluency.  The co-occurrence of these two models predicts that both positive and negative affect are 
evoked when fluency is increased for negative stimuli. In order to accurately capture the range of 
affective responses to fluency, it is therefore important to separately measure positive and negative 
affect, rather than relying on bipolar scales, as well as manipulate the stimuli valance. The experiments 
presented in the coming chapters of this thesis target this gap, using a novel set of business scenarios as 
stimuli. Given this novelty, the aim of Experiment 1 was to validate the new materials, whilst also 
providing an initial test of theory.  
 
 
2 This experiment was published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 28th June 
2019 as part of the following manuscript: Gamblin, D. M., Banks, A. P., & Dean, P. J. A. (2019). 
Affective responses to coherence in high and low risk scenarios. Cognition and Emotion. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1640663 
This experiment is the pre-study in the above publication. 
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3.1.1.1 The current study 
The decision to develop a novel set of business scenarios as stimuli was made for several reasons. Firstly, 
this was to add ecological validity to the body of research on fluency, with ecological stimuli, and 
conceptual fluency manipulations in general, being under-represented. This is supported by the Meta-
Analysis findings which illustrated that conceptual fluency manipulations (k = 111) were in the minority 
compared to the more prevalent perceptual fluency manipulations (k = 374).  
For example, studies have examined affective responses to fluency using random patterns (e.g. 
Winkielman et al., 2006), isolated shapes (e.g. Reber & Schwarz, 2001), pseudowords (e.g. Carr et al., 
2016), and unfamiliar symbols (e.g. Jones, Young, & Claypool, 2011). Whilst these studies are 
important for measuring participant responses in absence of any pre-existing feelings towards the 
stimuli, the materials are not those that are routinely encountered in everyday life. In order to generalise 
the effects of fluency, it is also important to observe metacognition in context (Schwarz, 2010).  
Although there are examples of manipulations which have utilised ecological stimuli, these have tended 
to involve a passive response to fluency, such as in the domain of art appreciation (e.g. Belke, Leder, 
Strobach, & Carbon, 2010; Belke et al., 2015), or potentially low-consequence contexts such as 
advertising and evaluations of products such as furniture (Chae & Hoegg, 2013), apparel (Chattaraman 
et al., 2010; Labroo et al., 2008), food (Gomez & Torelli, 2015; Labroo et al., 2008), and holidays 
(O’Brien, 2013). In contrast, decisions regarding organisations have potentially significant implications, 
such as where someone invests their money, what pension plan to select, or where to go to university. 
The current set of studies therefore expands on the literature on fluency by examining whether its 
phenomenon generalises to occupational settings.  
The second reason for using business scenarios was that it provided the opportunity to manipulate the 
valence of the stimuli in an indirect way. The use of a more covert manipulation for valence was 
important considering fluency effects have been shown to be most notable when the source is unknown 
(e.g. Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; Whittlesea & Williams, 1998). Therefore, 
rather than using overtly positive or negative stimuli for the studies in this thesis, valence was 
determined by the riskiness of the scenario, with risks being associated with negative affect, and benefits 
being associated with positive affect (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004).  
In addition, it was predicted that business scenarios would present a level of valence optimal for testing 
the multi-source model. The level of valence is particularly important as the multi-source model predicts 
that fluency could evoke both positive and negative affect for negative stimuli. It was therefore essential 
to construct stimuli that were negative enough to evoke a negative affective response, but not so negative 
that any “brief” (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2011, p. 989), “subtle” (Topolinski, 2011, p. 280) affective 
responses to fluency became undetectable. This is not to say that affective responses to fluency are not 
evoked when stimuli are extremely negative, but that the use of mildly negative stimuli provides the 
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best chance for detecting competing affective responses, and thereby disentangling the hedonic marking 
and fluency amplification models. For example, Albrecht and Carbon (2014) found a fluency 
amplification effect of their very negative stimuli, such that the fluent negative stimuli were disliked 
more than the non-fluent negative stimuli. However, for their mildly negative stimuli, the authors did 
not find fluency amplification, with no significant difference being found between the fluent and non-
fluent stimuli. As hypothesised by the multi-source account, perhaps the lack of difference was due to 
the elicitation of both positive and negative affect, which cancelled each other out when measured on a 
bipolar scale. Similarly, Holman (2013) was able to detect a positive affective response from mildly 
negative stimuli, but not from the highly negative stimuli. It is expected that business scenarios would 
be regarded as mildly positive or negative as the subject matter is not of an emotive nature or sensitive 
topic. Furthermore, the materials are constructed from industry reports, documents which are not 
intended to elicit strong feelings, in comparison to databases such as the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS; Lang et al., 2008).  
Finally, in addition to manipulating valence (via riskiness), the business scenarios were also used to 
manipulate fluency. This was done by taking inspiration from remote associate tasks (RAT; Mednick, 
1962). In RAT designs (Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bowers et al., 1990), participants are presented with a 
triad of words, and they are asked to quickly decide whether or not the triad shares a common sematic 
associate. For instance, a coherent triad such as SALT, DEEP, FOAM, share the common sematic 
associate SEA. On the other hand, incoherent triads such as DREAM, BALL, BOOK do not share a 
word in common. When a person reads a coherent triad, by the time they reach the final word, it has 
already been partially activated through the common semantic associate. This facilitation results in 
coherent word triads being processed faster than incoherent triads (Topolinski & Strack, 2009c).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Example of a business scenario used in the current study.  
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The experiments in this thesis adapted the RAT design for the use with business scenarios. For each 
scenario in the current set of studies, participants were presented with a piece of background information 
(including the type of business being discussed) followed by a triad of items (see Figure 3.1 for an 
example scenario). These items could either be a strength of the business (positive valence) or a risk that 
the business faces (negative valence). If three strengths or three risks are presented in the triad, then 
processing should be facilitated by sharing the same level of risk – in other words, the level of risk acts 
as the shared associate between the items. In contrast, scenarios which are constructed to feature a 
combination of strengths and risks would not have a level of risk in common, and therefore their 
processing would not be facilitated.  
In the preceding paragraphs, there are a number of assumptions regarding how the business scenarios 
will behave as experimental stimuli. In summary, in order for these scenarios to be appropriate, it is 
integral that they are able to manipulate risk, valence, and fluency, and to evoke a detectable fluency-
affect reaction. It is therefore the first aim of Experiment 1 to validate the materials and their associated 
predictions. Specifically, these are as follows: 
1. High risk scenarios (those constructed with more risk items) will be judged as more risky than 
Low risk scenarios (those constructed with more strengths), confirming that the scenarios are 
able to manipulate perceived level of risk. 
2. Low risk scenarios will be liked more than the High risk scenarios, confirming that valence can 
be manipulated by altering risk.  
3. Coherent triads are processed faster than Incoherent triads, confirming the facilitation via the 
semantic association of risk level. 
4. Coherent scenarios will generate an affective response, confirming that the stimuli are not too 
intense so that fluency-evoked affect is undetectable. 
Provided these predictions are correct, this study will be able to address its second aim: to provide an 
initial test of theory regarding the pattern of affective response to fluency. In line with the predictions 
presented in Table 3.1, regardless of whether the business scenarios are positive (Low risk) or negative 
(High risk), the hedonic marking hypothesis predicts that the fluent (Coherent) scenarios would be met 
with an increase in positive affect. In contrast, the fluency amplification model predicts that the affective 
response to fluency is dependent on the valence of stimuli. Therefore, fluency amplification makes the 
same prediction as hedonic marking for positive scenarios, but for negative scenarios the model predicts 
that fluency would be met with an increase in negative affect. Finally, the multi-source account predicts 
that hedonic marking and fluency amplification make joint contributions to the affective response to 
fluency. The multi-source model therefore makes consistent predictions for positive scenarios, with 
fluency expected to evoke positive affect. For negative scenarios, the multi-source model would predict 
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that fluency would evoke positive affect due to the hedonic marking of processing fluency, as well as 
negative affect due to the amplification of stimuli valence.  
Table 3.1: Predictions for the hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source accounts. 
Hypothesis 
Increased processing fluency (coherent vs incoherent) for… 
Positively Valenced Stimuli  
(Low Risk) 
Negatively Valenced Stimuli  
(High Risk) 
Hedonic 
Marking  
Increases positive affect Increases positive affect 
Fluency 
Amplification 
Increases positive affect Increases negative affect 
Multi-source 
account 
Increases positive affect 
Increases positive affect 
& 
Increases negative affect 
 
Visualising these three predictions, one would expect that when valence is plotted over four levels (very 
negative/high risk, slightly negative/high risk, slightly positive/low risk, very positive/low risk) the 
models would diverge for negative stimuli. As shown in Figure 3.2, a dashed line indicates no affective 
response to fluency, with corresponding liking ratings simply reflecting the valence of the scenario in a 
pattern consistent with a tallying procedure (Dawes, 1979). The fluency amplification model would 
predict a step-like function (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014), with the negative scenarios being disliked more 
than predicted by tallying/no affective response. In comparison, the hedonic marking model would 
predict that the negative scenarios would be liked more than as predicted by tallying. Finally, the multi-
source model would suggest that the co-existence of a positive and negative affective response to 
fluency would result in some cancelling out for the overall liking rating. As a result, the multi-source 
model would predict liking ratings somewhere in between that of the hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification models. If perfect cancellation occurs, this may appear in line with the tallying predictor 
line.  
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Figure 3.2: Visualising the affective responses over varying levels of risk, as predicted by the hedonic 
marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source models. 
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3.1.2 Method 
3.1.2.1 Participants 
Thirty (fourteen female) students were recruited, the majority of whom were postgraduates (27 
postgraduate students). The results from one participant were discarded due to the length of time they 
spent completing the task (z-score > 3.29), resulting in a final sample of twenty-nine (thirteen female) 
students (26 postgraduates) with a mean age of 26.30 years old (SE ± 1.10 years). Compensation was 
provided in the form of a cash prize draw. Power analysis suggested that a sample of this size was 
appropriate to provide > 80% power for large effect sizes and alpha levels of 5%.  
3.1.2.2 Materials 
The stimuli used in the study were business scenarios. Each scenario consisted of a short description of 
the business for background information, followed by three items of information relevant to the 
business. Each item of information was either a risk that the particular business faces, or a relative 
strength that it benefits from (see Table 3.1a-b for list of items used). For realism, the items were 
obtained from Datamonitor and Mintel industry reports. There were nine business types used in the 
experiment, and for each type three risks and three strengths were extracted from the industry reports. 
This allowed for the creation of four different levels of risk for each business: Level 1 = 3 strengths, 0 
risks reported in the triad of information; Level 2 = 2 strengths, 1 risk; Level 3 = 1 strength, 2 risks; 
Level 4 = 0 strengths, 3 risks. Constructing the scenarios in this fashion meant that two of the scenarios 
were Coherent (i.e. all strengths (Level 1) or all risks (Level 4)) and two of the scenarios were Incoherent 
(i.e. a mixture of strengths and risks (Levels 2 and 3). Overall 36 were created (nine businesses x four 
levels of risk).  
Crucially, due to the construction of the scenarios (see Figure 3.3 for an example scenario construction), 
a Coherent scenario and its corresponding Incoherent scenario ended on the same item. This meant that 
it was possible to compare the reading times for like-for-like final items as a measure of fluency; the 
only difference being whether the items were preceded by those presenting a consistent pattern of risk 
(Coherent scenarios) or whether the items were preceded by those presenting an inconsistent pattern 
(Incoherent scenarios).  
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Figure 3.3: Example of business scenario construction.  
As a preliminary manipulation check on the perceived valence of the items used in the scenarios, an 
independent set of twenty participants (12 male, 8 female, average age = 25.65 years, SE ± 1.89 years) 
completed a rating task. The task required the participants to complete a questionnaire containing the 
task items (Table 3.2a-b), rating each item individually for Liking (on a 1-5 scale) and for Risk (on a 1-
7 scale) – counterbalanced to control for any priming effects that may have occurred. Results of paired 
samples t-tests showed that participants thought that the high risk items (M = 5.09) were indeed higher 
risk than the low risk items (M = 3.24, t(19) = 19.106, p < .001). Participants also gave lower liking 
ratings to the high risk items (M = 3.27) compared to the low risk items (M = 3.52, t(19) = 2.46, p < .05).  
Two rating scales were used in the main experiment: one for measuring liking and one for measuring 
risk. The liking scale was a five-point Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) scale for affective valence 
(Bradley & Lang, 1994; see Figure 3.4). The risk rating scale was a 1-7 self-report Likert scale, ranging 
from “extremely low risk” to “extremely high risk”. 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Self-Assessment Manikin scale. 
Adapted from Bradly & Lang (1994) by Soares et al. (2013). 
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Table 3.2a: Background information and items for the nine businesses. 
  Information 
Scenario Item Low risk High risk 
Leisure Centre Introduction A premium independent leisure centre in town offering state of the art facilities, including 25m 
swimming pool, fitness centre, squash courts, and individual suites for classes and courses.   
Item 1 Boom in interest in sport following the 
London 2012 Olympics 
Weak economy, and lack of disposable income, 
means membership fees are an expensive 
commitment 
Item 2 Extremely wet weather in 2012/13 means 
customers favouring indoor facilities 
Competition from large-chain gyms which are able 
to offer 24 hour opening times 
Item 3 Government increasingly promoting 
activities that lead to a healthy, active 
lifestyle, for example as part of the Health, 
Work and Wellbeing initiative 
Increase in popularity of free sports such as running 
and cycling increases competition 
Coffee Shop Introduction A popular brand coffee shop situated on a busy high-street in the town centre, offering a selection 
of hot and cold drinks to take away or drink inside, as well as a variety of sandwiches and cakes.   
Item 1 Out of home coffee purchases remain 
popular, with many people visiting a coffee 
shop as part of their daily 
commute/routine 
Fast food outlets have increased their coffee 
product offering, increasing competition from non-
specialist outlets 
Item 2 Fair trade products which support 
producers maintain goodwill with 
customers 
A very competitive market, with several well known 
brands operating coffee shops on the same high 
street 
Item 3 Customers enjoy a product different to 
what they usually have at home, such as 
something authentic or seasonal products 
Perception of high prices and poor value for money 
have caused consumers to explore cheaper 
alternatives 
Clothing Retail 1 Introduction A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s 
clothes, as well as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger 
consumers (16-24).    
Item 1 Prices are able to remain stable as 
consumers prioritise quality and durability 
Young consumers in particular feeling financial 
pressure, and reducing their spending 
Item 2 Social media sites  are an effective way of 
increasing the consumers' awareness of 
fashion, brands and offers 
High street shops face increasing pressure from 
online stores 
Item 3 Brand loyalty remains high, especially for 
those with a distinct USP (Unique Selling 
Point) 
Several big brands hold a large market share 
Clothing Retail 2 Introduction A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s 
clothes, as well as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger 
consumers (16-24).    
Item 1 Staff costs remain relatively low Retailers face competition from non-specialist 
stores such as Asda, Tesco etc 
Item 2 Shops are able to attract and maintain 
customers by differentiating from the 
competition 
Consumers place increasing importance on delivery 
options – retailers need to invest in delivery 
networks and supply chain 
Item 3 Historically been an area relatively immune 
to economic conditions – with consumers 
preferring to cut back in other areas 
Newness is an important consideration for 
consumers – retailers need to update ranges 
frequently 
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Table 3.2b: Background information and items for the nine businesses. 
  Information 
Scenario Item Low risk High risk 
Homeware Introduction A large independent homeware store selling the latest ranges in kitchenware, home décor, and soft 
furnishings. The store features a wide array of items on display, whilst also offering click-and-collect 
and home delivery options via in store or online. 
Item 1 Increased interest in home baking and 
cooking has increased the demand for 
cookware and bakeware 
Shops face large pressure from internet-only sellers 
Item 2 Consumers are cutting back on eating out, 
increasing the sales of cookware 
It has been difficult for younger people to get onto 
the housing ladder – those who live with parents or 
rent accommodation spend less than home-owners 
Item 3 TV cooking programmes have encouraged 
increasing numbers of people to cook from 
scratch 
The market is congested with high volumes of low 
priced goods 
Manufacturing 1 Introduction A large privately owned manufacturing company specialising in the development and production of 
fluid systems. Products are used by a wide range of businesses in different sectors including 
chemical, power, oil and gas, and water, both in the UK and overseas.   
Item 1 Specialised machinery is expensive, 
therefore high start-up costs discourage 
competitors entering the market 
Specialised machinery is expensive, which means 
high costs for purchasing and maintaining 
equipment 
Item 2 Supplies to a wide range of businesses, 
allowing the company to spread it’s risk 
Equipment is valuable, so risk of theft is high 
Item 3 Advances in technology means that 
products can be made more efficiently 
Working capital cycle can be high due to the time it 
takes to manufacture products, meaning cash-flow 
can be weak 
Manufacturing 2 Introduction A large privately owned manufacturing company specialising in the development and production of 
fluid systems. Products are used by a wide range of businesses in different sectors including 
chemical, power, oil and gas, and water, both in the UK and overseas.   
Item 1 The product is specialised and the company 
has accumulated a large amount of 
industry knowledge, making it difficult for 
new competitors to enter the market 
Large amounts of raw materials need to be stored, 
increasing the cost of warehouse rental 
Item 2 Supplies to a wide range of businesses, 
allowing the company to spread its risk 
Expensive shipping costs associated with 
distribution to other countries 
Item 3 High levels of production mean the 
company can make savings due to 
economy of scale 
Distribution to distant locations increases the risk of 
theft, damage or loss of products during 
transportation 
Pharmaceutical Introduction A national pharmaceutical company focussing the research, development, and marketing of a 
range of drug treatments and vaccinations 
Item 1 Holds several patents which means the 
product is unique 
Cost for research and development is high 
Item 2 Engages in large amounts of research and 
development which avoids tax 
Under constant pressure to develop new products 
to stay ahead of competition 
Item 3 Advances in technology means that 
production is increasingly efficient 
Must adhere to strict government policy 
Travel Introduction A well-known ‘bricks-and-mortar’ travel agent situated in town offering holiday bookings to a wide 
range of destinations, in the UK and overseas. The company has expanded its online offering, and 
has expertise in adventure, action, and sports holidays. 
Item 1 Recovery of global tourism industry An area which consumers look to cut back on during 
difficult economic times 
Item 2 The number of domestic holidays has 
steadily increased over the last few years 
Big competitor companies hold a large market share 
Item 3 The company is selling a desirable product Instability overseas can threaten consumer 
confidence 
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3.1.2.3 Design 
There were three dependent variables in Experiment 1: fluency, liking ratings, and risk ratings. For the 
dependent measure of fluency, the reading time of the final item in the business scenario was obtained. 
Liking and risk ratings were obtained from participant self-report scales.  
The two independent variables were Coherence (i.e. fluency) and Risk (i.e. valence). The construction 
of the business scenarios meant that there were four levels of risk: Level 1 = 3 strengths, 0 risks; Level 
2 = 2 strengths, 1 risk; Level 3 = 1 strength, 2 risks; Level 4 = 0 strengths, 3 risks. Coherent (fluent) 
scenarios were those that presented a consistent pattern of risk (Level 1 and Level 4), whilst Incoherent 
(non-fluent) scenarios were those that presented an inconsistent pattern (Level 2 and Level 3), resulting 
in two levels for coherence.  
To investigate the effect of coherence in high and low risk scenarios, the results were analysed with a 
2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High Risk vs Low Risk) repeated measures design. 
In addition, for the liking and risk ratings, the aim was to investigate how the participants perceived the 
four levels of manipulated risk. These self-report ratings were therefore also analysed with a one-way 
repeated measures design, with the level of risk as the independent variable (Level 1-4).  
3.1.2.4 Procedure 
Before the task, participants provided informed consent and read the briefing document. Participants 
were instructed to work quickly but carefully through the trials, and to base their judgement on first 
impression, rather than thinking too critically or analytically. Participants were also told that there were 
no right or wrong answers to the rating scales.  
The experimental task was run on E-Prime, displayed on a PC monitor. Participants input their 
responses on the computer keyboard. Each trial consisted of the following: participants were first shown 
a sentence explaining what the business is. Having read this, participants proceeded by pressing the 
Space bar. Participants were then shown three additional items of information relating to the business, 
presented sequentially in the centre of the screen. Participants pressed the Space bar once they had read 
each item of information to proceed. In between each item of information, a fixation cross appeared in 
the centre of the screen for 500ms. Once all three items had been presented, participants were shown 
the SAM scale and asked to rate how much the liked the scenario by pressing the corresponding 
keyboard key to proceed (ranging from 1 to 5). Following this, participants were asked to provide a 
rating for how risky they thought the scenario was using the keyboard to enter the appropriate score. 
See Figure 3.5 for a timeline presentation of the procedure. This was repeated until all 36 trials were 
completed, with the order being randomised for each participant. 
 
 
72 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Procedure timeline for Experiment 1. 
3.1.3 Results 
3.1.3.1 Pre-screening 
Data was first pre-screened for any outliers. This resulted in one participant being discarded from further 
analysis as their response times were too long compared to the data set (z-score > 3.29). This decision 
was made as response times this long indicated that the participant was potentially distracted during the 
experiment, and their response time data would have unnaturally influenced the mean.  
3.1.3.2 Response Latencies 
A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA was run on the reading 
times for the third items in the risk item triads, revealing a main effect of Coherence (F(1,28) = 30.375, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .520), with the reading time for the final item in the triad was shorter for Coherent scenarios 
(M = 3,083ms) than Incoherent scenarios (M = 3,596ms). There was no main effect of Risk (p = .139), 
and no interaction effect (p = .536). For additional information, follow-up paired samples t-tests 
(Bonferroni corrected) revealed that the Coherent scenarios were read faster than the Incoherent 
scenarios for both the Low risk (Coherent: M = 3,119ms; Incoherent: M = 3,689ms; t(1,28) = 3.569, p = 
.002) and High risk (Coherent: M = 3,047ms; Incoherent: M = 3,503ms; t(1,28) = 4.951, p < .001). Results 
are presented in Figure 3.6.  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. Error bars indicate Standard 
Error.  
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3.1.3.3 Liking ratings 
The liking ratings were initially analysed using a 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High 
vs Low) repeated measures ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect of Risk (F(1, 28) = 27.746, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .498), with participants liking the Low risk scenarios (M = 3.63) more than the High risk scenarios 
(M = 3.12). There was no main effect of Coherence (F(1, 28) = 2.269, p = .143, ηp2 = .075), but there was 
a significant interaction effect between Risk and Coherence (F(1, 28) = 28.604, p < .001, ηp2 = .505). 
Observed power for interaction effect was > 0.80.  
Unravelling the interaction effect, follow-up t-tests revealed that for Low risk condition, participants 
liked the Coherent scenarios (M = 4.01) more than the Incoherent scenarios (M = 3.25, t(28) = 5.878, p < 
.001). For the High risk condition, participants liked the Incoherent scenarios (M = 3.41) more than the 
Coherent scenarios (M = 2.82), t(28) = 4.002, p < .001). These results remained significant following 
Bonferroni correction.  
The liking ratings were also analysed with a one-way ANOVA with four levels depending on the number 
of high risk items in the triad as follows: (Level 1 = 3 strengths, 0 risks; Level 2 = 2 strengths, 1 risk; 
Level 3 = 1 strength, 2 risks; Level 4 = 0 strengths, 1 risk). Results revealed a main effect of level (F(3, 
84) = 25.337, p < .001, ηp2 = .475). On examination of the (Bonferroni corrected) pairwise comparisons, 
results showed that participants liked the lowest risk condition (Level 1) significantly more than the 
other conditions (p < .001), and they liked the highest risk condition (Level 4) significantly less than the 
other conditions (p < .005). However, there was not a significant difference between the liking ratings 
given to the incoherent conditions (Levels 2 and 3; p = .623). The means of the participant liking ratings 
can be seen in Figure 3.7 which shows the trend.  
One-sample t-tests revealed that the Coherent-Low risk (Level 1) scenarios were rated as significantly 
more positive than the midpoint on the liking scale (3; t(28) = 11.808, p < 001), but the Coherent-High 
risk (Level 4) scenarios were not rated significantly more negative than the midpoint (t(28) = 1.054, p = 
.301).   
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Figure 3.7: Liking ratings for the business scenarios across four levels of riskiness. 
(Level 1 = 3 strengths, 0 risks reported in the triad of information; Level 2 = 2 strengths, 1 risk; Level 3 = 
1 strength, 2 risks; Level 4 = 0 strengths, 3 risks). Error bars indicate Standard Error; the bold line 
indicates the midpoint on the Liking scale (3).  
 
3.1.3.4 Risk ratings 
As with the liking ratings, participants’ judgements of risk were first analysed using a 2 (Coherence: 
Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated measures ANOVA. Results indicated a main 
effect of Risk (F(1, 28) = 59.648, p < .001, ηp2 = .681), with participants rating the High risk scenarios (M 
= 5.074) as more risky than the Low risk scenarios (M = 4.935). There was no main effect of Coherence 
(F(1, 28) = 2.983, p = .095, ηp2 = .096), however there was a significant interaction effect between 
Coherence and Risk (F(1, 28) = 119.974, p < .001, ηp2 = .811).  
Unravelling the interaction effect, Bonferroni corrected t-tests revealed that for Low risk condition, 
participants judged the Coherent scenarios (M = 3.51) to be less risky than the Incoherent scenarios (M 
= 5.50). For the High risk condition, participants judged the Coherent scenarios (M = 6.36) to be more 
risky than the Incoherent scenarios (M = 4.65).  
The risk ratings were also analysed with a one-way ANOVA with four levels depending on the number 
of high risk items in the triad. Results of the one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of level (F(3, 84) = 
85.909, p < .001, ηp2 = .754). On examination of the Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons, results 
showed that participants judged the lowest risk condition (Level 1) as the least risky, followed by 
condition containing two strengths and one risk (Level 2), then the condition containing one strength 
and two risks (Level 3), and finally the highest risk condition (Level 4). All of the differences between 
levels were significant (for all comparisons p < .001), with the trends shown in Figure 3.8.  
One-sample t-tests revealed that the Coherent-Low risk (Level 1) scenarios were rated as significantly 
less risky than the midpoint on the liking scale (4; t(28) = 2.438, p = .021), and that the Coherent-High 
risk (Level 4) scenarios were rated as significantly more risky than the midpoint (t(28) = 13.279, p < 
.001). 
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Figure 3.8: Risk ratings for the business scenarios across four levels of riskiness. 
(Level 1 = 3 strengths, 0 risks reported in the triad of information; Level 2 = 2 strengths, 1 risk; Level 3 = 
1 strength, 2 risks; Level 4 = 0 strengths, 3 risks). Error bars indicate Standard Error; the bold line 
indicates the midpoint on the Risk scale (4). 
 
3.1.4 Discussion 
The first experiment in this thesis introduced a novel set of business scenarios as the stimuli. Due to 
this novelty, the first aim of Experiment 1 was to test and validate the new material. As discussed in the 
introduction, the new materials needed to be able to manipulate overall perception of risk, valence of 
scenario, and reading time (as a measure of fluency). Provided these criteria were met, Experiment 1 
could also provide an initial test of theory regarding the pattern of affective response to fluency.  
The business scenarios used level of risk as a more subtle manipulation of valence. It was therefore 
important to first determine whether the scenarios were effectively manipulating perceived risk. First, 
the individual items that the scenarios are constructed from were assessed. Results from a manipulation 
check suggested that participants did indeed perceive the high risk items to be riskier than the low risk 
items. A similar finding was observed once the items were arranged into scenarios. Results from the 
main experiment indicated a main effect of Risk, suggesting that participants judged the scenarios 
containing risk items to be riskier than scenarios constructed from strengths. Furthermore, when the 
business scenarios were arranged over four levels according to the proportion of risk items in the 
scenario (Level 1 = 3 strengths, 0 risks; Level 2 = 2 strengths, 1 risk; Level 3 = 1 strength, 2 risks; Level 
4 = 0 strengths, 3 risks), results of the one-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of Level. The risk 
judgements, as displayed in Figure 3.6, formed a linear pattern, with each level of risk being judged as 
incrementally more risky.  
The business scenarios passed the first hurdle of successfully manipulating overall perceived risk. It 
was next important to confirm that these differences in risk rating would translate to differences in 
valence. Previous literature has demonstrated that this can be the case. For example, the research on 
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risk as feelings has shown that presenting people with the benefits of a technology (e.g. nuclear power) 
results in positive affect, whilst presenting people with risks results in negative affect (Finucane et al., 
2000; Slovic et al., 2004). However, a notable difference with the extant literature and the current study 
is that previous research has used risk-related stimuli which are likely to be associated with strong 
emotional opinions, such as nuclear power, cigarettes, pesticides, and alcoholic beverages (Finucane et 
al., 2000). Experiment 1 on the other hand, used stimuli relating to business scenarios such as clothing 
retail, coffee shops, and leisure centres, which might not necessarily evoke such emotions. Despite this 
difference from established research, the results of the current experiment did support the necessary 
prediction that valence could be manipulated via risk. This was firstly shown at the item-level, with the 
initial manipulation check indicating that participants liked the low risk items more than the high risk 
items. This was supported at the scenario-level, with results of the main experiment indicating that the 
Low risk scenarios were liked more than the High risk scenarios. Overall, these findings provided 
assurance that valence could be manipulated via riskiness. 
For the next check on the materials, it was important to ensure that the business scenarios could 
manipulate fluency. Results indicated that there was a main effect of Coherence on the reading times. 
In other words, participants read the final item in a scenario when it was consistent with the preceding 
two items with regards to the level of risk being presented. This finding was consistent with the partial 
activation hypothesis, which would predict that when participants read two items belonging to a 
particular category (strength or risk), they would be primed to expect the third item to also belong to 
that category. This priming should facilitate the processing of the final item in the triad of information, 
reflected by faster reading times of that item. This consistency was found despite the current experiment 
differing from previous research on partial activation in terms of the stimuli material. Whilst past 
research, adopting a RAT design (Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bowers et al., 1990; Mednick, 1962, 
Topolinski & Strack, 2009c), used single words as their stimuli items (e.g. SALT, DEEP, FOAM), 
Experiment 1 used longer sentences as the items (see Table 3.2a-b for a complete item list). 
Furthermore, previous studies have used a word as the common semantic associate (e.g. SEA), whereas 
Experiment 1 used the level of risk as the concept to link the items in a coherent scenario. Nonetheless, 
the current experiment demonstrated that fluency could be facilitated by coherence in longer scenarios. 
This has immediate benefits as it helped to validate the materials used in the current thesis, but also 
provides promising evidence that more ecologically valid scenarios can be developed for the study of 
processing fluency. 
With confirmation that the business scenarios were able to manipulate both valence and processing 
speed, it was therefore possible to examine the affective response to fluency. Plotting the four levels of 
risk, the liking ratings formed a step-like function, resembling a fluency amplification pattern. One 
explanation for this could be that the level of riskiness between each level of risk was not even. 
However, the riskiness of these four levels, as revealed by the participants’ risk ratings, formed a straight 
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line, with each level of risk being judged as significantly different from its neighbouring levels, a pattern 
that could be explained by tallying the number of strengths and risks in each scenario (Dawes, 1979). 
As the liking ratings did not follow this tallying pattern (i.e. incrementally increasing alongside the risk 
ratings), it suggests that there is more to the affective responses than merely the balance of strengths 
and risks in the scenario.  
The pattern of liking results appeared to support the fluency amplification pattern. For Level 1 (3 
strengths, 0 risks), the coherence of containing all low risk items appeared to result in a boost in affective 
ratings in the positive direction, increasing the liking ratings. For level 4 (0 strengths, 3 risks), the 
coherence of containing all high risk items appeared to result in a boost in the other direction, decreasing 
the liking ratings. Interestingly, the effect of coherence on liking ratings for the Low risk scenarios was 
larger than the effect of coherence on liking ratings for the High risk scenarios. A possible explanation 
for this difference could be provided by the multi-source model: perhaps in the High risk scenarios, the 
amplification effect was reduced by the simultaneous elicitation of positive affect as a result of hedonic 
marking.  
However, before focussing in on this effect, it is important to point out a limitation of the current design. 
In the current experiment, coherence was manipulated by keeping the number of strengths or risks in 
the scenarios consistent (i.e. all strengths or all risks), whereas incoherence was created by presenting 
a scenario containing a mixture of strengths and risks. A consequence of this design was that by 
adjusting the coherence of the scenario, the overall valence also changed, making the independent 
variables confounded. Therefore, whilst providing promising support for the use of the more 
ecologically valid business scenarios to manipulate valence and coherence, the entanglement of these 
variables meant that Experiment 2 needed to adjust the design.  
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3.2 Experiment 23 
 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 1 provided important validation for the novel set of business scenarios used in this thesis, 
demonstrating that the materials could manipulate valence indirectly using the level of risk in the 
scenarios, as well as manipulating fluency by altering the coherence of the scenarios. Whilst the 
previous experiment also provided an initial test of theory as its secondary aim, a limitation was noted 
in the design, such that entanglement of the independent variables occurred. Specifically, it had not 
been possible to manipulate the fluency of the scenarios without also changing the overall valence of 
the scenario. It was therefore integral for Experiment 2 to alter the design so that fluency and valence 
could be manipulated independently. An initial aim of Experiment 2 was to therefore validate the 
updated design. Furthermore, by unpicking the contributions of manipulated valence and fluency to 
affective response, the main aim of Experiment 2 was to provide a clearer test of theory between the 
hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source models. 
3.2.1.1 The current study 
The current experiment retained the RAT format (Bolte & Goschke, 2005; Bowers et al., 1990; 
Mednick, 1962) from the previous experiment: triads of information were presented sequentially, with 
the triads either converging on a common associate (fluent triads), or containing no associate in common 
(non-fluent triads). However, rather than using the level as risk as the common associate, Experiment 2 
used stereotypicality. An example of this approach can be seen in Table 3.3 for the Travel business 
scenario. For the fluent trials, all three of the items of information in the triad were stereotypical of a 
Travel business, which was achieved by extracting the items from related industry reports (Datamonitor, 
Mintel, as per Experiment 1). For the non-fluent trials, the final item in the triad was instead extracted 
from a different industry, in this case from reports relating to Leisure Centres, reducing its 
stereotypicality.  
Evidence in the literature that stereotypicality increases processing fluency comes from several different 
sources. Firstly, in the domain of art appreciation, Belke et al. (2015) demonstrated that more typical 
 
3 Note: This experiment was published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 28th 
June 2019 as part of the following manuscript: Gamblin, D. M., Banks, A. P., & Dean, P. J. A. 
(2019). Affective responses to coherence in high and low risk scenarios. Cognition and Emotion. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1640663 
This experiment is Experiment 1 in the above publication. 
 
79 
 
portraits were associated with greater ease of comprehension and lower cognitive stimulation than 
atypical portraits. Further evidence from perceptual studies, Förster and Denzler (2012) found that 
simple characters that were more closely related to their prototype were responded to faster. Similarly, 
dot patterns that were lightly distorted, and were therefore more closely related to their prototype, were 
responded to faster than those that received greater distortion (Winkielman, et al., 2006). In the 
conceptual domain, Rubin et al. (2013) found that, in general, participants self-reported that it was easier 
to process descriptions of individuals that were in line with stereotype. Combining perceptual and 
conceptual manipulations, Zitek and Tiedens (2012) found that more typical social hierarchies were 
learned faster than less typical social hierarchies.  
Following these findings, it was expected that in the current experiment, the business scenarios that 
were coherent with typical schemas that people hold, would be processed faster than those which feature 
an incoherent item.  
1. Response times for Coherent scenarios are shorter than for Incoherent scenarios.  
This difference in processing ease should therefore have an effect on liking ratings. In line with the 
predictions presented in Table 3.1, the hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source models 
all predict that there is a positive affective response to fluency for positive stimuli. Therefore, in the 
current experiment, all three models predict that fluent (Coherent) scenarios would be liked more than 
non-fluent (Incoherent) scenarios when the items are positive (Low risk).  
2. In the Low risk condition, Coherent scenarios are liked more than Incoherent scenarios. 
However, the three models diverge for stimuli of a negative valence. The hedonic marking hypothesis 
suggests that fluency is positively marked, and therefore the fluent scenarios should be liked more than 
the non-fluent scenarios regardless of the stimuli valence. In contrast, fluency amplification predicts 
that, for the negative (High risk) condition, the fluent scenarios should be disliked more than the non-
fluent scenarios. Finally, the multi-source account predicts that both the hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification mechanisms contribute to affective responses to fluency. Therefore, the multi-source 
account predicts that, for the negative condition, the fluent scenarios would result in greater liking and 
disliking than the non-fluent scenarios. As postulated in the previous experiment, these differing 
affective responses are expected to interact. This may result in the positive and negative affective 
responses completely cancelling each other out (which would appear as no significant difference in 
liking rating between fluent and non-fluent scenarios in the negative condition), or at least reducing the 
intensity of the affective response (which would appear as a smaller difference between fluent and non-
fluent scenarios in the negative condition compared to the difference in the positive condition). 
Specifically, the three models predict: 
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3. In the High risk condition: 
a. Hedonic marking: Coherent scenarios are liked more than Incoherent scenarios 
b. Fluency amplification: Coherent scenarios are liked less than Incoherent scenarios  
c. Multi-source: There is no difference in liking between Coherent and Incoherent 
scenarios OR The difference between Coherent and Incoherent scenarios will be less 
than the difference between Coherent and Incoherent scenarios in the Low risk 
condition.  
Experiment 2 continued to measure self-reported risk ratings. This was firstly done as a manipulation 
check and secondly to compare against the liking ratings. Following the results of Experiment 1, it was 
expected that risk would be assessed in a tallying pattern, and would therefore not display any 
differences between fluent and non-fluent scenarios. The hypothesis regarding risk judgements is 
therefore:  
4. High Risk scenarios will be judged to be higher risk than Low risk scenarios.  
 
3.2.2 Method 
3.2.2.1 Participants 
Thirty two (27 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology undergraduate course (28 
psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab token scheme. The mean age 
was 20.19 years old (SE ± 0.35 years). Power analysis suggested that a sample of this size was 
appropriate to provide > 80% power for large effect sizes and alpha levels of 5%. 
3.2.2.2 Materials 
The Coherent (fluent) conditions in this experiment were identical to Coherent conditions in Experiment 
1, using the same nine High risk (negative) and nine Low risk (positive) scenarios. To construct the 
Incoherent (non-fluent) conditions, the final item in a Coherent scenario (e.g. Travel) was replaced with 
the final item from another Coherent scenario (e.g. Leisure), as shown in the example in Table 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: The four conditions for the Travel business scenario.  
 Low risk 
Coherent 
High risk 
Coherent 
Low risk 
Incoherent 
High risk 
Incoherent 
Item 1 
Recovery of global 
tourism industry 
An area which 
consumers look to cut 
back on during difficult 
economic times 
Recovery of global tourism 
industry 
An area which 
consumers look to cut 
back on during difficult 
economic times 
Item 2 
The number of 
domestic holidays has 
steadily increased over 
the last few years 
Big competitor 
companies hold a large 
market share 
The number of domestic 
holidays has steadily 
increased over the last few 
years 
Big competitor 
companies hold a large 
market share 
Item 3 
The company is selling 
a desirable product 
Instability overseas can 
threaten consumer 
confidence 
Government increasingly 
promoting activities that 
lead to a healthy, active 
lifestyle, for example as 
part of the Health, Work 
and Wellbeing initiative 
Increase in popularity 
of free sports such as 
running and cycling 
increases competition 
Note. The schema Incoherent items (shaded cells) were taken from 
the Coherent conditions of the Leisure Centre scenario. 
 
The resulting Incoherent scenarios were created to present three items of information that were relevant 
to the business, however the final item would be less typically associated with that business. In total, 
there were four scenarios for each of the nine business types – Coherent-High risk, Coherent-Low risk, 
Incoherent-High risk, Incoherent-Low risk – totalling 36 business scenarios in this experiment. 
Participants were shown each scenario once, and in a random order. To control for factors such as 
sentence length and difficulty, the scenarios were balanced: each triad item appeared once in a Coherent 
scenario, and once in an Incoherent scenario. The two rating scales, for liking and for risk, were the 
same as used in Experiment 1.  
3.2.2.3 Design 
The independent variables were Coherence (as the fluency manipulation) and Risk (as the valence 
manipulation). The dependent variables were the reading times for the final items in the business 
scenarios, as well as self-reported judgements of liking, and risk. The dependent variables were 
analysed in a 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High Risk vs Low Risk) repeated 
measures design.  
3.2.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as for Experiment 1. 
  
 Schema Coherent 
 Schema Incoherent 
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3.2.3 Results 
3.2.3.1 Response latencies 
A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated measures 
ANOVA was run on the reading times for the third items in the risk item triads. Analysis revealed a 
main effect of Coherence (F(1,31) = 18.591, p < .001, ηp2 = .375), with participants reading Coherent 
scenarios (M = 2,800ms) faster than Incoherent scenarios (M = 3,165). Results revealed no main effect 
of Risk (F(1,31) = .080, p = .779, ηp2 = .003), and no interaction effect (F(1,31) = .763, p = .389, ηp2 = .024). 
For further information, Bonferroni adjusted paired-samples t-tests revealed that the main effect of 
Coherence resulted from the reading time for the final item in the triad being shorter for Coherent triads 
than Incoherent triads for both the Low risk condition (Coherent: M = 2,752ms; Incoherent: M = 
3,190ms;  t(1,31) = 3.568, p = .002) and the High risk condition (Coherent: M = 2,848ms; Incoherent: M 
= 3,141ms; t(1,31) = 2.558, p = .032), as shown in Figure 3.9.  
 
 
Figure 3.9: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. Error bars indicate Standard 
Error. 
 
3.2.3.2 Liking ratings 
For the analysis of liking ratings, a 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: 
High vs Low) repeated measures ANOVA was run on participants’ liking and risk judgements. For the 
participants’ liking ratings, a main effect of Risk was revealed (F(1,31) = 21.443, p < .001, ηp2 = .409), 
with participants liking the Low risk scenarios (M = 3.74) more than the High risk scenarios (M = 2.99), 
as a significant interaction between Risk and Coherence (F(1,31) = 6.568, p = .015, ηp2 = .175), but no 
main effect of Coherence (F(1,31) = 2.786, p = .105, ηp2 = .082). The observed power for the interaction 
effect was 0.70.  
Follow up t-tests revealed that the interaction occurred due to participants liking Coherent triads (M = 
3.83) more than Incoherent triads (M = 3.65, t(1,31) = 2.784, p = .009) in the Low risk conditions, which 
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remained significant following Bonferroni adjustment. However, in the High risk conditions there was 
no significant difference between the liking of Coherent (M = 2.99) and Incoherent (M = 2.99, t(1,31) = 
.003, p = .998) triads, as shown in Figure 3.10. 
One sample t-tests revealed that the Low risk scenarios were rated as significantly more positive than 
the midpoint (3.00; both p-values < .001). However, the High risk scenarios were not rated as 
significantly more negative than the midpoint (both p-values > .950).  
 
  
Figure 3.10: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error; the bold line indicates the midpoint on the 
Liking scale (3). 
 
3.2.3.3 Risk ratings 
As with the liking ratings, judgements of risk were analysed with a 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs 
Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA. Results indicated a main effect of Risk (F(1,31) 
= 292.883, p < .001, ηp2 = .904), with High risk scenarios being rated as more risky (M = 6.36) than 
Low risk scenarios (M = 3.34). Results did not reveal a main effect of Coherence (F(1,31) = .001, p = 
.981, ηp2 < .001), nor a significant interaction effect (F(1,31) = 2.966, p = .095, ηp2 = .087), as shown in 
Figure 3.11. 
One sample t-tests revealed that the Low risk scenarios were rated as significantly less risky than the 
midpoint (4.00; both p-values < .001), and that the High risk scenarios were rated as significantly more 
risky than the midpoint (both p-values < .001).  
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Figure 3.11: Risk ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and Incoherent 
conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error; the bold line indicates the midpoint on the Risk scale (4). 
 
3.2.4 Discussion 
Experiment 2 progressed from the previous experiment by manipulating coherence using business 
scenarios that were either consistent or inconsistent with typical schemas that people hold. In line with 
aforementioned studies showing that prototypical artwork (Belke et al., 2015), patterns (Förster & 
Denzler, 2012; Winkielman et al., 2006), behaviours (Rubin et al., 2013), and hierarchies Zitek & 
Tiedens, 2012) are processed more fluently, the results of Experiment 2 showed that the response times 
for scenarios coherent with typical schemas were shorter than for scenarios that were incoherent. This 
was also consistent with the results of Experiment 1, which too showed that Coherent scenarios were 
responded to faster than Incoherent scenarios; and is also an integral first manipulation check. This was 
an important finding, as it meant that coherence and fluency could be manipulated independent of 
valence, providing a model for the coming experiments in this thesis. 
Having successfully manipulated processing fluency, the affective responses could be examined. For 
the positive scenarios (operationalised as Low risk), the results indicated that the fluent (Coherent) 
scenarios were liked more than the non-fluent (Incoherent) scenarios. This finding is consistent with 
the predictions of all three of the core models under scrutiny: hedonic marking, fluency amplification, 
and the multi-source account. As shown in Table 3.1, all three models predict that for positive stimuli, 
increasing the processing fluency should be met with a positive affective response. This is again 
consistent with the findings of Experiment 1, which suggested that increased fluency in the positive 
condition resulted in an increased positive affective response, but also a wealth of evidence observed in 
the Meta-Analysis (Chapter 2) which found large amounts of support for increased positive reactions 
to fluency in positive conditions.  
Whilst the models make similar predictions for stimuli of a positive valence, for negative stimuli the 
hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source models diverge, making the negative 
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scenarios (operationalised as High risk) in the current experiment crucial for drawing comparisons. 
Results for the negative scenarios suggested that there was no significant difference between the fluent 
and non-fluent scenarios. This finding cannot be explained by either the hedonic marking account or 
the fluency amplification account in isolation: The hedonic making model suggests that fluency is 
positively marked, and therefore fluent scenarios should be liked more than non-fluent scenarios 
regardless of the valence of the stimuli; the fluency amplification model suggests that fluency results in 
amplification of the stimuli valence, and therefore that fluent scenarios should have been disliked more 
than non-fluent scenarios in the negative condition.  
Whilst neither hedonic marking nor fluency amplification can explain the result in isolation, the 
observation that there was no significant difference between fluent and non-fluent scenarios in the 
negative condition can be explained if one considers that both models are active, as suggested by the 
multi-source account. Specifically, the fluency of the scenario could have evoked positive affect via 
hedonic marking and negative affect via fluency amplification. These two opposing affective Reponses 
may have then cancelled each other out completely. This was also consistent with the suggestion from 
Experiment 1, whereby it was theorised that the overall affective response had been reduced due to the 
interaction of individual positive and negative responses.  
The nullification of affective responses is however just one interpretation of the results. There is also 
the possibility that there was no affective response to fluency in the negative condition. One reason for 
this could be that the scenarios were not negative enough: as in Experiment 1, the negative scenarios 
were rated as significantly more negative than the midpoint on the bipolar liking scale. Therefore, 
fluency amplification may not have been able to occur, as this mechanism requires negative valence to 
amplify. However, if this was the case, and the scenarios were felt to be neutral by the participants, then 
it would still be expected to see a positive affective response, as hedonic marking predicts that 
increasing the fluency for neutral stimuli results in higher liking. Similarly, it could be the case that the 
scenarios were too negative, making it impossible to detect any positive affective response. 
Furthermore, in extremely negative scenarios, operating at a floor-level of liking, it would also be 
impossible to detect any negative affective response. However, this explanation seems unlikely given 
that business scenarios are unlikely to evoke extreme emotions, as well as the results of one sample t-
tests which place the scenarios in a neutral category.  
Despite these arguments, it is important to acknowledge that there may have been no affective response 
in the negative scenarios. The following experiments targeted this risk, with Experiment 3 aiming to 
increase any affective responses to fluency by increasing the time pressure of the task (a manipulation 
which has been shown to increase heuristic responses; De Neys, 2006; Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), whilst Experiments 4-6 in subsequent chapters introduced separate 
measurement of positive and negative affect as a more diagnostic approach for detecting co-occurrence.  
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3.3 Experiment 3 
3.3.1 Introduction 
In the first two experiments, results indicated that liking ratings for business scenarios are influenced 
by fluency. In Experiment 1, the liking ratings appeared to be amplified in the fluent scenarios, 
producing a step-like function: In the positive condition (operationalised as Low risk), the fluent 
scenarios were liked more than the non-fluent scenarios; in the negative condition (operationalised as 
High risk), the fluent scenarios were disliked more than the non-fluent scenarios, although to a lesser 
extent. However, this was potentially confounded by the way in which valence and fluency were related 
in the materials. Experiment 2 manipulated valence and fluency separately, and found a similar effect 
for the positive condition only. The negative condition however, displayed no significant difference 
between the fluent and non-fluent scenarios. Although it was argued that these findings were consistent 
with the predictions of the multi-source account, alternative accounts may suggest that there were 
undetectable affective responses to fluency, rather than two opposing affective responses cancelling 
each other out. The first aim of Experiment 3 was therefore to try to alter the design in a way that would 
increase these responses to fluency.  
The first two experiments also provided an interesting comparison between affective responses and risk 
judgements. As discussed above, fluency appeared to influence liking ratings, however, the participants’ 
judgements of risk did not appear to be affected. Firstly in Experiment 1, whilst the liking ratings formed 
a step-like pattern when plotted across four levels of manipulated valence, the judgements of risk 
themselves formed a straight line relationship. This linear relationship would be predicted by tallying 
(Dawes, 1979), with perceived risk being based on the proportion of high and low risk items in a 
scenario. Similarly in Experiment 2, the results indicated that risk judgements were only influenced by 
the main effect of manipulated valence, with no significant difference being found between fluent and 
non-fluent scenarios. Although the primary intention of this thesis was to investigate affective 
responses, the way in which such responses might influence other judgements would also be of interest 
in the field of metacognition. Therefore, the second aim of Experiment 3 was to investigate whether 
fluency, or its affective response, could influence judgements of risk.  
One technique for increasing the magnitude of the above responses is imposing time limits. Research 
has suggested that this is because time pressure reduces the capacity that people have to engage in 
analytic deliberation, and as a result are encouraged to use intuitive or heuristic methods (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). For example, the likelihood of people using belief bias increases when they are placed 
under time pressure (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005). Similarly, participants working on the Linda 
problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) were more likely to commit the conjunction fallacy when 
working quickly (De Neys, 2006), whilst those completing the Wason selection task were more likely 
to use a matching bias when the task was speeded (Roberts & Newton, 2001). Across these studies, a 
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systematic pattern emerged whereby deliberative reasoning was inhibited by time pressure, in favour 
of more intuitive, heuristic methods. 
The use of fluency as a cue for judgement has also been described as a heuristic. This fluency heuristic 
(Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) predicts that when people make inferences such as “Which city is larger?”, 
“Which company has the larger revenue?”, or “Which music artist has the greater record sales?”, people 
tend to select the option which is easier (i.e. more fluent) to retrieve (Hertwig et al., 2008). This heuristic 
can prove to be useful when the ecological validity between the subject, inference, and environment is 
high. For example, larger cities are more likely to feature in the media than smaller cities, resulting in 
a stronger relationship between city size and exposure. As the number of exposures to a city name 
increases, as does the retrieval ease, which makes the fluency heuristic a comparatively valid method 
for inferring city size (Hertwig et al., 2008). As an illustration, someone using the fluency heuristic 
might make an inference that Shanghai had a larger population than Karachi. The authors also noted 
that people make inferences consistent with the fluency heuristic when fluency is manipulated 
experimentally. For example, when the fluency for target cities was manipulated by a pre-test syllable 
counting task, participants tended to infer that those fluent targets had larger populations than the non-
fluent control cities.  
Relating the above to the results of the previous experiments, a reason why risk judgements were 
unaffected by fluency could have been that the participants were engaging in a more rational, 
deliberative tallying of the risk items. This could explain why, in Experiment 2, there was no main 
effect of fluency on risk judgements: The fluent and non-fluent scenarios contained the same number 
of high and low risk items, so if a participant was calculating risk by simply counting the number of 
high risk items, it would be expected that no difference in risk judgement would appear. In a similar 
fashion, deliberative processing may have reduced the impact of fluency on the liking ratings.  
If deliberative processing was occurring, then peripheral cues such as fluency may have been 
discounted. Therefore, if time pressure increases the use of heuristics (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; 
De Neys, 2006; Roberts & Newton, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) by reducing the ability for 
people to use reasoned deliberation (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004), and the use of fluency 
in judgement is one such heuristic (Hertwig et al., 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005), then it is 
reasonable to suggest that imposing time limits on the business scenario rating task should encourage 
participants to use the fluency heuristic at the expense of reasoned deliberation. As a result, it would be 
expected that time pressure would lead to larger differences between fluent and non-fluent scenarios in 
terms of liking, as well as the appearance of differences in risk ratings between these types of scenario 
that had not emerged in the previous two experiments.  
Whilst the above examples support the prediction that time pressure could increase the influence of 
fluency on judgements in general, there is also evidence that considers liking and risk specifically. 
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Firstly, in terms of liking, Kruglanski, Freund, and Bar-Tal (1996) demonstrated that a switch in 
reasoning styles from deliberative to intuitive processing had an effect on the fluency-affect 
relationship. In a mere exposure design, the authors presented participants with a series of artworks at 
varying levels of exposures. When participants were informed that their responses would be evaluated 
(encouraging deliberative reasoning), the typical mere exposure effect was not found: liking ratings 
were not affected by increasing the number of exposures. However, when participants were placed 
under time pressure (encouraging intuitive responses), increased exposures (and therefore fluency) 
resulted in increased liking ratings for positive artworks and decreased liking ratings for negative 
artworks, highlighting the influence of fluency in a fluency amplification pattern. In addition, Pronin 
and colleagues (Pronin, Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006) have observed increased 
affective responses from participants who had been encouraged to increase their thought speed. This 
evidence further supports the expectation that increasing time pressure in the current experiment will 
increase affective responses to fluency.  
Increasing time pressure has also been shown to have an influence on the way in which people make 
risk judgements. Finucane et al. (2000) presented participants with a series of activities and technologies 
such as alcoholic beverages, food preservatives, cars, cigarettes, nuclear power plants, and microwaves, 
and asked them to make judgements regarding their risk and benefit. Whilst in reality it has been 
observed that there is a positive correlation between risk and benefit (Fischhoff et al., 1978), results 
indicated that there was an inverse relationship between the participants’ perceived risk and benefit of 
each technology. This indicated the use of the affect heuristic – that participants’ risk judgements were 
guided by the extent that they felt positive or negative about each item. Importantly, this inverse 
relationship strengthened when participants were forced to act under time pressure, suggesting that 
imposing time limits could increase the use of intuitive heuristics. Applying this to the current 
experiment, it would be expected that by discouraging more deliberative reasoning, peripheral cues 
such as fluency, or its affective response, should influence risk judgements, resulting in differences 
emerging between fluent and non-fluent scenarios.  
Whilst the above suggests that differences in risk ratings may emerge, it is important to consider in 
which direction these ratings would be influenced. According to two-step models such as perceptual 
fluency/attribution (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) and nonspecific activation (Mandler et al., 
1987), fluency can enhance the ratings on any reasonable judgement domain (Winkielman et al., 2003). 
These models would therefore predict that risk ratings would increase in line with fluency. In contrast, 
the FAIM model (Topolinski, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009d) suggests that affect is the link in the 
process between fluency and judgement. Therefore, FAIM would predict that the risk ratings would 
follow the same pattern as the liking judgements.  
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In summary, Experiment 3 predicted that by putting time pressure on the participants to complete their 
rating tasks, it would encourage a shift to a more intuitive reasoning style, and would be reflected by a 
larger affective response to fluency. This means that the predictions from Experiment 2 remain 
consistent (predictions 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 3c). Specifically, in the positive condition (operationalised as Low 
risk), it was predicted that participants would like the fluent (Coherent) scenarios more than the non-
fluent (Incoherent) scenarios, and that this difference would be larger than in Experiment 2. For the 
negative condition (operationalised as High risk), the hedonic marking hypothesis would similarly be 
that the fluent scenarios would be liked more than the non-fluent scenarios. On the other hand, fluency 
amplification would predict that the non-fluent scenarios would be liked more than the fluent scenarios. 
Finally, the multi-source account would predict that although the affective response should increase, it 
would increase in both the positive and negative directions, resulting in no significant difference 
between the fluent and non-fluent scenarios, consistent with Experiment 2. Experiment 3 also makes 
additional predictions regarding the participants’ risk ratings:  
4. Risk ratings for Coherent scenarios are significantly different from Incoherent scenarios: 
a. Fluency/attribution: Coherent scenarios are rated as more risky than Incoherent 
scenarios. 
b. FAIM: Risk ratings follow the same pattern as the liking ratings. 
 
3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
Thirty (22 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology undergraduate course (22 
psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab token scheme. The mean age 
was 23.32 years old (SE ± 1.54 years). Power analysis suggested that a sample of this size was 
appropriate to provide > 80% power for large effect sizes and alpha levels of 5%. 
3.3.2.2 Materials 
The materials were the same as in Experiment 2. 
3.3.2.3 Design 
The independent variables were Coherence (as the fluency manipulation) and Risk (as the valence 
manipulation). The dependent variables were the reading times for the final items in the business 
scenarios, as well as self-reported judgements of liking, and risk. The dependent variables were 
analysed in a 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High Risk vs Low Risk) repeated 
measures design.  
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3.3.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2, except for the addition of time limits in the 
current experiment, with the timeline displayed in Figure 3.12. The time limits were placed on the liking 
and risk rating screens, such that participants only had 1.5s to input their ratings. If a participant was 
too slow to enter their rating, the E-Prime programme moved on to the next slide and recorded the 
response as a ‘miss’. Participants were informed about the time limits at the start of the experiment, and 
had the chance to familiarise themselves with the timings with three practice trials.  
 
Figure 3.12: Procedure timeline for Experiment 3. 
 
3.3.3 Results 
3.3.3.1 Response latencies 
A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA was run 
on the reading times for the third items in the risk item triads, revealing a main effect of Coherence 
(F(1,29) = 9.871, p = .004, ηp2 =.254), but no main effect of Risk (F(1,29) = 3.290, p = .080, ηp2 = .102), 
nor an interaction effect (F(1,29) = 1.144, p = .294, ηp2 = .038). For the main effect of Coherence, paired 
samples t-tests revealed that the effect resulted from the reading time for the final item in the triad being 
shorter for coherent triads (M = 3,666ms) than incoherent triads (M = 4,195ms, t(29) = 2.707, p = .011) 
in the Low risk conditions, but there was no significant difference between Coherent triads (M = 
3,593ms) and Incoherent triads (M = 3,833ms, t(29) = 1.430, p = .163) in the High risk conditions, as 
shown in Figure 3.13. 
 
Figure 3.13: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. Error bars indicate Standard 
Error. 
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3.3.3.2 Liking ratings 
For the analysis of liking ratings, a 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: 
High vs Low) ANOVA was run on participants’ self-reported liking. Results indicated only a main 
effect of Risk (F(1,29) = 58.844, p < .001, ηp2 = .670). No main effect of Coherence (F(1,29) = .042, p = 
.839, ηp2 = .001), nor a significant interaction effect (F(1,29) = 1.992, p = .169, ηp2 = .064) was found. 
Results are shown in Figure 3.14. 
One sample t-tests revealed that the Low risk scenarios were rated as significantly more positive than 
the midpoint (3.00; both p-values < .001), and that the High risk scenarios were rated as significantly 
more negative than the midpoint (both p-values < .001).  
 
 
Figure 3.14: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error; the bold line indicates the midpoint on the 
Liking scale (3). 
 
3.3.3.3 Risk ratings 
Results of the 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated 
measures ANOVA indicated a main effect of Risk (F(1,29) = 173.295, p < .001, ηp2 = .857), but no main 
effect of Coherence (F(1,29) = .526, p = .474, ηp2 = .018). However, a significant interaction effect was 
found (F(1,29) = 7.442, p = .011, ηp2 = .204), as shown in Figure 3.15. Observed power for the interaction 
effect was 0.75.  
Paired samples t-tests showed that the interaction effect occurred due to Coherent triads (M = 3.02) 
being judged less risky than Incoherent triads (M = 3.40, t(29) = 2.640, p = .013) in the Low risk 
condition, however in the High risk condition there was no significant difference between Coherent and 
Incoherent triads (t(29) = 1.399, p = .172).  
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Figure 3.15: Risk ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and Incoherent 
conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error; the bold line indicates the midpoint on the Risk scale (4). 
 
3.3.4 Discussion 
This experiment aimed to increase the responses to fluency by increasing the time pressure that 
participants were under whilst completing their rating scales. The rationale behind this was that the 
relationship between risk and affect has been shown to increase under time pressure (Finucane et al., 
2000), with participants operating under pressure being more likely to use a variety of heuristics and 
biases (Evans & Curtis-Holmes, 2005; De Neys, 2006; Roberts & Newton, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983), including the fluency heuristic (Hertwig et al., 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Results 
suggested that whilst fluent (Coherent) scenarios were processed faster than non-fluent (Incoherent) 
scenarios (although notably only in the positive condition), only the differences in risk rating responses 
were increased with the addition of time pressure. In comparison, rather than increasing the differences 
in liking rating between fluent and non-fluent scenarios, the addition of time pressure appeared to reduce 
the difference, such that there was no longer a significant difference between the two scenario types.  
Although the addition of time pressure failed to increase the affective response to fluency that had been 
evoked in Experiment 2, the additional pressure did cause an interesting difference regarding the risk 
ratings. In Experiment 1, the risk ratings appeared to be unaffected by the fluency manipulation, with 
each level of risk being rated incrementally more risky than the last, producing a straight line 
relationship between risk rating and level of risk. In contrast, the liking ratings did appear to be affected 
by the fluency manipulation, with the liking ratings appearing to be amplified when the scenarios were 
fluent, producing a step-like pattern for liking rating and level of risk. Similarly in Experiment 2, whilst 
the results showed a significant difference in liking between the fluent and non-fluent scenarios (for the 
positive condition), there was no significant difference in risk ratings between the fluent and non-fluent 
scenarios. The results of these experiments therefore suggested that participants were judging the level 
of risk in each scenario by tallying the number risky items, rather than being influenced by fluency. 
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However, when time pressure was added for the current experiment, encouraging the participants to use 
intuitive reasoning, the risk ratings became affected by fluency, with fluent scenarios being judged as 
being less risky than the non-fluent scenarios for the positive condition. This finding is consistent with 
Hertwig et al. (2008) who found that when participants made inferences regarding city size, they tended 
to make their decision in accordance with the fluency heuristic.  
However, the results suggest that the risk ratings may not have been directly influenced by fluency as 
predicted by two-step accounts such as the perceptual fluency/attribution hypothesis (Bornstein & 
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994). This hypothesis would have expected there to be a main effect of fluency on 
the risk ratings, with ratings of risk being higher in the fluent conditions. Instead, an interaction was 
found between fluency and valence: in the positive condition (operationalised as Low risk), risk ratings 
were lower for fluent scenarios; in the negative condition (operationalised as High risk), no difference 
in risk rating was found between fluent and non-fluent scenarios. This pattern was similar to that of the 
liking ratings in Experiment 2, suggesting that affect may mediate that link between fluency and 
judgement, as predicted by FAIM (Topolinski, 2011; Topolinski & Strack, 2008, 2009d).  
The comparison of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 also provides support for the concept of naïve theory 
and the malleable meaning of fluency. Specifically, these experiments have demonstrated that under 
some circumstances, fluency can be used as a cue for liking, whilst in others fluency can be used as a 
cue for risk. This is consistent with the finding that fluency cue in a wide range of judgement domains 
(Oppenheimer, 2008). Furthermore, research has demonstrated that the meaning of fluency can change 
depending on context. For example, fluency has been shown to be interpreted as positive when choosing 
utilitarian products (such as orange juice), but negative when choosing hedonic products (such as wine; 
Mantonakis et al., 2013). A similar reversal has also been found when comparing everyday products 
and special occasion products (Pocheptsova et al., 2010). This change in meaning has also been 
manipulated experimentally, with Briñol et al. (2006) demonstrating that fluency can be interpreted as 
positive or negative depending on a pre-evaluation framing task. Applying this research to the current 
findings, it may be the case that when there is no time pressure, fluency is interpreted as a cue for liking, 
whilst when times pressure is added, fluency is interpreted as a cue for risk. This type of naïve theory 
makes sense conceptually: for example, people may associate time pressure with stressful activities 
such as exams, and therefore encountering fluency in this context could indicate a reduced risk of 
failure. Similarly, although liking can be intuitive, it is rare for someone to be asked whether they like 
something under time pressure; therefore, fluency encountered under such circumstances may be 
attributed to a different judgement domain.  
Although adding time pressure to the experimental design was intended to encourage intuitive 
reasoning, there is evidence from the current experiment that the opposite may have occurred with 
regards to the liking ratings. This is illustrated by the time that it took participants to read the final item 
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in the business scenarios. In an additional piece of analysis, these response times were compared 
between Experiment 2 and Experiment 3. Results indicated a significant between groups effect, with 
the response times in Experiment 3 (M = 3,821ms) being significantly longer than those in Experiment 
2 (M = 2,983ms; F(1,60) = 7.926, p = .007). In other words, knowing that they would be forced to respond 
quickly to the rating scales, participants adjusted their strategy and took more time reading the scenario, 
thereby preparing their rating in advance.  
This appears to have impacted the liking and risk ratings in different ways. For the liking ratings, 
participants were able to spend more time on the preceding screen (the final item in the business 
scenario, self-paced) to prepare their response. This may have encouraged deliberative processing, 
consistent with Kruglanski et al.’s (1996) evaluation condition: deliberative reasoning was encouraged, 
resulting in the elimination of an affective response to fluency. However, for the risk ratings, both the 
risk rating screen and the preceding liking rating screen were under time limits, reducing the opportunity 
for preparation. Time pressure may have encouraged intuitive processing in this case, consistent with 
Kruglanski et al.’s (1996) speeded condition.  
- 
Considering the findings of Experiment 3 alongside the previous two experiments, the work conducted 
in Chapter 3 has made a significant contribution. Firstly, in terms of experimental design, the first three 
experiments have validated a novel set business scenarios. Results across these experiments have shown 
that is has been possible to use business scenarios to manipulate stimuli valence using risk, as well as 
fluency by altering the coherence of the scenarios: either to a consistent level of risk (Experiment 1), or 
to typical schemas that people hold (Experiments 2 & 3). Experiment 1 found that the design was able 
to produce an affective response to fluency, although the risk and coherence manipulations were 
entangled. Experiment 2 built on this by demonstrating that an affective response to coherence was 
possible when the manipulations were unconfounded. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that the 
response to fluency was not limited to liking ratings, but that the addition of time pressure could cause 
risk ratings to be influenced by fluency.  
Taking the design forward into Chapter 4, it was decided that the fluency measure in Experiments 2 and 
3 was preferable due to the unconfounded nature. Therefore, the following experiments continue to use 
coherence to typical schemas as the fluency manipulation. In addition, although the time pressure 
manipulation in Experiment 3 provided interesting suggestions regarding the malleable meaning of 
fluency and the potential for risk judgements to be influenced by coherence, worthy of further 
investigation in their own right, this thesis is primarily interested in investigating affective responses to 
fluency. Therefore, it was decided that for the remaining experiments in this thesis, time pressure posed 
a risk that participants would alter their strategies when completing the tasks, and as a result, the time 
limits were removed going forward.  
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The first three experiments also provided initial tests of theory between two established models – 
hedonic marking and fluency amplification – as well as a novel multi-source account which theorises 
that these models co-occur. All three of these accounts predict that fluency evokes a positive affective 
response when stimuli are positive, and this has been a consistent finding across the experiments in 
Chapter 3. The experiments also produced interesting results for the negative scenarios, the point where 
the models are expected to diverge. Experiment 1 produced a step-like function when liking ratings 
were plotted over four levels of risk. Although this pattern appeared to be in line with the fluency 
amplification model, with fluency appearing to evoke an affective response congruent with the stimuli 
valence, it was noted that the magnitude of affective response in the negative condition was lower than 
in the positive condition. Furthermore, in Experiment 2, no significant difference was found between 
fluent and non-fluent scenarios in the negative condition. One interpretation for these findings was that, 
in the negative conditions, fluency had evoked positive affect (due to the positive marking of fluency) 
and negative affect (due to amplification of stimuli valence), with the interaction of these two affective 
responses leading to reduced magnitude in Experiment 1 and complete cancellation in Experiment 2.  
However, in order for this interpretation to be tested, it was crucial to separately measure the positive 
and negative affective responses. Chapter 4 continues this line of investigation by introducing separate 
positive and negative unipolar scales, whilst Chapter 5 does so using fEMG to separately record 
zygomaticus major (smiling muscle; positive affect) and corrugator supercilii (frowning muscle; 
negative affect) activity.  
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Chapter 4: Experiments Measuring Unipolar Affective Responses to Coherence 
 
4.1 Experiment 4 
4.1.1 Introduction 
In Experiments 1 and 2, it had been possible to affect liking ratings with a fluency manipulation, and in 
both of these experiments, the effect appeared different for the positive and negative conditions. In 
Experiment 1, fluency appeared to amplify the valence of the condition, resulting in a step-like function 
resembling the findings of Albrecht and Carbon (2014). However, the degree to which the liking ratings 
appeared amplified was larger for the positive scenarios compared to the negative scenarios. In 
Experiment 2, fluency appeared to increase the liking ratings in the positive condition. However, in the 
negative condition, there was no difference in liking rating between the fluent and non-fluent conditions.  
Two potential explanations could account for these differences between positive and negative 
conditions. The first would be that whilst fluency produces positive affect in scenarios of positive 
valence, for negative scenarios this does not occur. A second explanation would be a multi-source 
account: that in scenarios of negative valence, increasing fluency could produce positive affect as a 
result of hedonic marking, as well as negative affect as a result of fluency amplification of the scenario’s 
valence. As the first two experiments recorded the participants’ liking ratings on a bipolar scale, it is 
possible that the two sources of affect cancel each other out.  
Chapter 3 argued against the first explanation – that the fluency generated from the negative stimuli 
failed to evoke an affective response. Firstly, whilst it may be the case that with extremely negative 
stimuli, any negative response to fluency would be undetectable as the liking ratings are already at floor 
level, and any positive response would be masked by the overall negativity of the stimuli valence, it is 
noted that the business scenarios were rated as only mildly negative over the first three experiments. 
Secondly, if the stimuli were too neutral then one would expect there to be no negative response to 
fluency, as this negative response relies on amplifying the stimuli valence; however, if this was the case 
it would still be expected to detect a positive response as there is a wealth of evidence (summarised in 
the Meta-Analysis) suggesting that neutral stimuli are liked more when fluent vs non-fluent.  
Despite these arguments, it was integral to design an experiment to provide a more diagnostic account 
of the fluency-affect relationship and rule out this alternative explanation with empirical evidence. The 
aim of the current experiment was to unpack the affective responses to fluency, using separate 
measurement of positive and negative affect.  
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4.1.1.1 The current study 
The multi-source model makes a unique prediction for stimuli that are fluent and negative, suggesting 
that in these circumstances it is possible that both positive and negative affect are evoked. The positive 
affect is expected to be evoked as a result of the positive marking of fluency, as predicted by the hedonic 
marking model (Winkielman et al., 2003); whilst the negative affect is expected to be evoked as a result 
of the amplification of stimuli valence, as predicted by the fluency amplification model (Albrecht & 
Carbon, 2014). Whilst the experiments presented in the previous chapter alluded that this pattern was 
occurring, it is important to note that a true test of these predictions is only possible with not only the 
examination of both positive and negative stimuli, but also the separate measurement of positive and 
negative affect. The current experiment therefore divides the bipolar SAM scale (Figure 3.4), used in 
Experiments 1-3, into two separate unipolar scales: one for liking and one for disliking (Figure 4.1; 
Bradley & Lang, 1994). With updated scales, it was now possible to make more precise predictions 
regarding the hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source models.  
 
Figure 4.1: Unipolar SAM scales for Liking (a) and Disliking (b).   
 
The hedonic marking hypothesis suggests that fluency is positively marked, and therefore increasing 
the fluency (operationalised as coherence) in the current experiment should be met with an increase in 
liking ratings on the positive valence unipolar scale. Furthermore, this increase should occur regardless 
of whether the business scenarios are positive (operationalised as Low risk) or negative (operationalised 
as High risk).  
The predictions of the hedonic marking hypothesis are less clear when concerned with disliking ratings. 
On the one hand, Reber et al. (1998) asked different participants to judge the liking, disliking, prettiness, 
or ugliness of fluent and non-fluent targets. Results indicated an interaction between fluency and 
judgement type, finding that increased fluency of targets resulted in higher liking and prettiness 
judgements, but lower disliking and ugliness judgements. Extrapolating these findings to the current 
experiment, it might therefore be expected that fluent (Coherent) scenarios will be liked more and also 
disliked less than non-fluent (Incoherent) scenarios. On the other hand, Winkielman and Cacioppo 
(2001) asked different groups of participants to focus and report on either their positive affective 
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responses or their negative affective responses whist being presented with targets under a priming 
fluency manipulation. As in the previous study (Reber et al., 1998), participants who were focussed on 
positive responses, indicated increased positive affect for fluent stimuli compared to non-fluent stimuli. 
However, differing from the above, participants who focussed on negative responses did not report a 
difference in negative affect between the fluent and non-fluent stimuli. Therefore, the hedonic marking 
hypothesis could also predict that whilst fluent and non-fluent scenarios differ in terms of liking, there 
would be no difference between the scenarios in terms of disliking.  
The hedonic marking hypothesis is however clearer about the pattern of disliking results which would 
not be predicted. Hedonic marking specifies that fluency “selectively enhances positive evaluations” 
(Winkielman et al., 2003, p. 13), but not negative evaluations, drawing a contrast against two-step 
theories which predict that fluency could effectively enhance positive or negative evaluations (e.g. 
nonspecific activation; Mandler et al., 1987). Therefore, in the current study, fluent scenarios should 
not receive higher disliking ratings than non-fluent scenarios, in order to be consistent with hedonic 
marking.  
The fluency amplification model (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014) was proposed as an extension of hedonic 
marking, developing its predictions to account for negative stimuli. Therefore, fluency amplification 
makes the same predictions as hedonic marking for positive stimuli. Specifically, positive stimuli 
should be liked more when fluent than non-fluent. For disliking, the hedonic marking predictions were 
not clear, but the fluency amplification model would similarly not expect positive scenarios to be 
disliked more when fluent than non-fluent. However, fluency amplification does deviate from hedonic 
marking when the stimuli are negative, suggesting that fluency amplifies the negative valence. 
Therefore, in the current experiment, fluency amplification would predict that negative stimuli should 
be disliked more when fluent than non-fluent.  
The multi-source account suggests that both hedonic marking and fluency amplification contribute to 
the overall affective response. Therefore, the prediction remains consistent with these models regarding 
positive stimuli: Fluent scenarios should be liked more than non-fluent scenarios. Attempting to explain 
the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 – notably the reduced magnitude of affective response for the 
negative condition in Experiment 1, and the lack of difference between fluent and non-fluent scenarios 
in Experiment 2’s negative condition – multi-source suggested that for fluent-negative scenarios, it was 
possible that both positive and negative affect were evoked. Therefore, in the current experiment, it 
would be predicted that, in the negative condition, the fluent scenarios would receive higher liking 
ratings and higher disliking ratings than the non-fluent scenarios. The full list of these predictions is 
presented in Table 4.1, and as can be seen, the crucial cells are for the negative scenarios, where the 
models deviate.  
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Table 4.1: Predictions (unipolar) for hedonic marking, fluency amplification, and multi-source. 
 
Increased processing fluency (Coherent vs Incoherent) for… 
Positively Valenced Stimuli 
(Low Risk) 
Negatively Valenced Stimuli 
(High Risk) 
Hypothesis Liking rating Disliking rating Liking rating Disliking rating 
Hedonic 
Marking 
Increase liking 
Decrease disliking 
Or 
No difference 
Increase liking 
Decrease disliking 
Or 
No difference 
Fluency 
Amplification 
Increase liking 
Decrease disliking 
Or 
No difference 
Decrease liking 
Or 
No difference 
Increase disliking 
Multi-source 
account 
Increase liking 
Decrease disliking 
Or 
No difference 
Increase liking Increase disliking 
 
In summary, the predictions for Experiment 4 were as follows: 
1. Response times for Coherent scenarios are shorter than for Incoherent scenarios.  
2. In the Low risk condition, Coherent scenarios are liked more than Incoherent scenarios. 
3. In the High risk condition: 
a. Hedonic marking: Coherent scenarios are liked more than Incoherent scenarios. 
b. Fluency amplification: Coherent scenarios are disliked more than Incoherent scenarios. 
c. Multi-source: Coherent scenarios are both liked more AND disliked more than 
Incoherent scenarios. 
It has been argued that the novel predictions of the multi-source account have not been previously 
identified as the co-occurrence of positive and negative affective responses to fluent-negative stimuli 
could only be detected in experimental designs which manipulate stimuli valence as well as separately 
measure positive and negative affect. For example, whilst Albrecht and Carbon (2014) did manipulate 
stimuli valence, their report scale was bipolar. However, if the predictions of multi-source hold true, 
then it would be expected that in Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) fluent-negative condition, there would 
have been a co-occurrence of positive and negative affect that went unobserved. There are some hints 
that this many have been the case. For example, in the “very negative” condition, fluent images were 
disliked more than non-fluent images, demonstrating the authors’ predicted amplification effect. 
However, in the “mildly negative” condition, there was no significant difference in affective response 
between the fluent and non-fluent images. This lack of difference did not occur for positive stimuli, 
with fluent images liked more than non-fluent images for both the “mildly positive” and “very positive” 
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conditions. Therefore, could it have been the case that in the “mildly negative” condition, fluency had 
generated positive and negative affect, cancelling each other out? 
The second part of Experiment 4 aimed to test this question. In addition to the business scenarios, 
participants also completed an image rating task in a similar fashion to Albrecht and Carbon (2014). 
The difference was that in the current experiment, participants would complete separate liking and 
disliking unipolar scales, testing for the co-occurrence of positive and negative affective responses to 
fluency. Although the stimuli were different in this part of the experiment, the predictions regarding the 
three models remained consistent, specifically: 
1. Response times for Coherent images are shorter than for Incoherent images.  
2. For Positive images, Coherent images are liked more than Incoherent images. 
3. For Negative images: 
a. Hedonic marking: Coherent images are liked more than Incoherent images. 
b. Fluency amplification: Coherent images are disliked more than Incoherent images. 
c. Multi-source: Coherent images are both liked more AND disliked more than Incoherent 
images. 
4.1.2 Method 
4.1.2.1 Participants 
Forty-two (32 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology undergraduate course (38 
psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab token scheme. The mean age 
was 19.32 years old (SE ± 0.07 years). Power analysis suggested that a sample of this size was 
appropriate to provide > 80% power for large effect sizes and alpha levels of 5%. 
4.1.2.2 Materials 
Structurally, the business scenarios were consistent with Experiments 2 and 3. Nine different business 
types were used, with four different conditions for each business (Coherent-Low risk, Coherent-High 
risk, Incoherent-Low risk, Incoherent-High risk), resulting in 36 business scenarios. Each scenario 
consisted of a piece of background information, followed by three additional items. For the Low risk 
conditions (operationalising positive valence), these items were strengths related to the business; for the 
High risk conditions (operationalising negative valence), these items were risks that the business faces. 
As shown in the example in Table 3.3, Coherent (operationalising fluent) scenarios were those whose 
items were stereotypical; Incoherent (operationalising non-fluent) scenarios were those with a final item 
that was stereotypical of a different business in the experiment. As before, scenario construction was 
balanced such that each item appeared once in a Coherent scenario and once in an Incoherent scenario. 
This allowed for the comparison of like-for-like items when discerning reading times.  
101 
 
However, following feedback from participants that some of the scenarios were potentially too 
complicated for the target sample, the content of the scenarios was updated for the current experiment:  
the wording was simplified, and the more complex businesses (e.g.  manufacturing, pharmaceutical) 
were replaced with more straightforward ones (e.g. zoo, cinema). An updated list of items used in 
constructing the business scenarios can be seen in Table 4.2a-b.  
Table 4.2a: Background information and items for the nine businesses. 
  Information 
Scenario Item Low risk High risk 
Leisure Centre 
Introduction 
A premium independent leisure centre in town offering state of the art facilities, including 25m 
swimming pool, fitness centre, squash courts, and individual suites for classes and courses. 
Item 1 Offers a good variety of services Risk of injury to customers 
Item 2 Appeals to up-market customers Staff must be well trained 
Item 3 Promotes a healthy, positive image Maintaining equipment is expensive 
Coffee Shop 
Introduction 
A popular brand coffee shop situated on a busy high-street in the town centre, offering a selection 
of hot and cold drinks to take away or drink inside, as well as a variety of sandwiches and cakes. 
Item 1 Good range of products 
High streets are congested with similar shops as 
competition 
Item 2 Busy high street location High staff turnover 
Item 3 Recognisable brand Needs to stand out to be successful 
Clothing Retail 
Introduction 
A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s 
clothes, as well as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger 
consumers (16-24). 
Item 1 The brand is well established Sells to a limited age range 
Item 2 Sells a good range of products May be unaffordable to younger customers 
Item 3 Has identified a target market 
Popularity is very dependent on reputation and 
image 
Restaurant 
Introduction 
A large family run restaurant on the high street in the centre of town. The restaurant serves a 
variety of mainly Italian dishes including pizza and pasta, and is popular with families. 
Item 1 Good image thanks to being family run Limited variety of dishes 
Item 2 Popular type of food being served Family problems could disrupt business 
Item 3 Has a good location Must adhere to food hygiene standards 
Amusement Park 
Introduction 
A large amusement park on the outskirts of London, featuring a range of thrill rides and games, as 
well as gentle and family rides. 
Item 1 Good location for tourists Reliant on good weather 
Item 2 Games provide an extra source of revenue Expensive up-keep 
Item 3 Popular day out for families Safety concerns for customers 
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Table 4.2b: Background information and items for the nine businesses. 
  Information 
Scenario Item Low risk High risk 
Cinema 
Introduction 
A small independent cinema located in a large city. The cinema shows the latest blockbuster films 
as well as independent and alternative movies. 
Item 1 Shows a wide variety of films Competition with larger cinemas 
Item 2 Its uniqueness is a selling point Too small to put on large screenings 
Item 3 Independence allows for greater control Need to invest in marketing to make people aware 
Pub 
Introduction 
A traditional pub in the centre of town, featuring a cosy interior as well as a beer garden, serving a 
variety of beers and ales, as well as a menu of traditional food. 
Item 1 Inviting for new customers Tough to stand out against competitors 
Item 2 
Customers know what to expect with 
traditional food 
No uniqueness offered 
Item 3 Regulars provide stable income Could attract undesirable customers 
Supermarket 
Introduction 
A large supermarket just outside the town centre. The shop targets more upmarket shoppers, with 
high quality food ranges and organic products. 
Item 1 Organic products promote a healthy image May be hard for customers to reach without a car 
Item 2 Attracts more high end customers Selling price may be too high for some 
Item 3 
Higher selling prices can mean more 
revenue 
Larger overheads associated with more upmarket 
premises and goods 
Zoo 
Introduction 
A large zoo on the outskirts of a major city. The zoo houses a variety of exotic animals, including a 
reptile house. The zoo has a good reputation of rescuing animals from around the world, and is 
particularly popular with school trips. 
Item 1 
Can help to educate people about 
conservation 
Costly to run 
Item 2 Currently has a good reputation Need to be aware of health and safety issues 
Item 3 Schools provide a stable customer base 
Popularity is very dependent on reputation and 
image 
 
Experiment 4 introduced images as a second set of stimuli. These images were photographs obtained 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) database (Lang et al., 2008). IAPS provides 
affective norms for their database of photographs; for this experiment, twelve images that had a positive 
valence and twelve images that had a negative valence were selected. As in Albrecht and Carbon (2014), 
images with sexual content were excluded, as were images of considerable complexity, such as those 
depicting interactions between more than two people. These images were used as the targets in 
Experiment 4, and a list of IAPS codes used can be seen in Table 4.3. For each target image, a prime 
image was created. The primes were degraded, black and white images, displaying the contours of the 
target image. Examples of targets and primes can be seen in Figure 4.2.  
The rating screens differed from previous experiments. Instead of the bipolar SAM scale, Experiment 
4 used separate liking and disliking unipolar SAM scales, as shown in Figure 4.1.   
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Table 4.3: IAPS images used in Experiment 4.  
Positive images  Negative images 
No.  IAPS number Valence 
 
No.  IAPS number Valence 
1 1440 8.19 
 
1 1321 4.32 
2 1463 7.45 
 
2 1110 3.84 
3 1920 7.90 
 
3 2120 3.34 
4 7260 7.21 
 
4 9622 3.10 
5 1710 8.34 
 
5 9902 2.33 
6 4641 7.20 
 
6 9000 2.55 
7 5833 8.22 
 
7 1930 3.79 
8 8190 8.10 
 
8 1201 3.55 
9 7325 7.06 
 
9 6570 2.19 
10 8510 7.32 
 
10 9600 2.48 
11 7350 7.10 
 
11 1274 3.17 
12 7057 5.35 
 
12 1525 3.09 
 
Mean 7.45 
  
Mean 3.15 
Note. The Valence ratings are those provided by Lang et al.’s (2008) validation. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Examples of a Coherent (top) and an Incoherent (bottom) combination of prime and target 
from Experiment 4. The images were used, with permission, from the IAPS database (Lang et al., 2008)   
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4.1.2.3 Design 
Experiment 4 consisted of two tasks, a business scenario task and an image rating task, which 
participants completed in a random order. For the business scenario task, as in previous experiments, 
the independent variables were Coherence and Risk. In addition, Experiment 4 added Scale as an 
independent variable, as participants were completing liking and disliking ratings. The resulting design 
was a 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High Risk vs Low Risk) x 2 (Scale: Liking vs 
Disliking) repeated measures design. The dependent variables were the reading times for the final items 
in the business scenarios, as well as self-reported judgements of liking and disliking.  
For the image rating task, the independent variables were: the scale used to rate images, the valence of 
the target image, and whether the trial was coherent or incoherent. The resulting design was a 2 
(Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Valence: Positive vs Negative) x 2 (Scale: Liking vs 
Disliking) repeated measures design. The dependent variables were the response time to the target 
image (participants had to press the Space bar once they knew what the image was), and the self-
reported liking and disliking ratings.  
4.1.2.4 Procedure  
There were two parts to this experiment: a business scenario task, and an image rating task. Participants 
took part in both tasks, however the order was randomised: some participants completed the business 
rating task first, other completed the image rating task first. 
For the business scenario part of the experiment, the procedure was largely the same as for Experiments 
1 and 2 (Figure 4.3). However, for the current experiment, the bipolar scale for measuring liking was 
replaced with a unipolar liking scale. Additionally, the risk rating task was removed and replaced with 
a disliking rating screen. Participants completed both the liking rating and the disliking rating task, both 
of which were self-paced. The order in which participants viewed the rating screens was randomised so 
that some participants completed the liking task first, and others completed the disliking task first.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Procedure timeline for Experiment 4’s business scenarios rating task.  
The participants either completed both a liking rating scale and a disliking rating scale (marked 1st rating 
scale and 2nd rating scale in the above); the order in which they completed the scales was randomised. 
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The image rating task was completed in two blocks. The procedure was largely the same in both blocks; 
the difference was that in Block A, the participants completed the liking SAM scale, whilst in Block B 
the participants completed the disliking SAM scale. Participants completed both blocks, and the order 
of the blocks was randomised. Participants were first shown a mask screen for 500ms, followed by a 
prime image for 17ms. The prime duration of 17ms was chosen as this represents an approximation of 
a single screen refresh, suggested by Forster et al. (2013). The prime was followed by a second mask 
screen (500ms) followed by the target image. The targets were self-paced: participants were required 
to press the Space bar once they knew what the image was. Target images were followed by another 
mask screen (500ms), and finally a SAM rating screen – which was either a liking or a disliking scale, 
depending on which block the participant was completing. The procedure is shown in Figure 4.4.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Procedure timeline for Experiment 4’s image rating task.  
The rating task (labelled “Rating (SAM)” in the above) was either a liking or a disliking scale, depending 
on which block the participants were completing. 
 
4.1.3 Results 
4.1.3.1 Business scenarios 
The omnibus 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) x 2 
(Scale: Liking vs Disliking) interaction effect was signification (F(1,41) = 5.623, p = .023, ηp2 = .121), 
suggesting that it was appropriate to separately analyse the liking and disliking ratings below.  
4.1.3.1.1 Response latencies 
A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA was run 
on the reading times for the third items in the risk item triads, revealing a main effect of Coherence 
(F(1,41) = 5.276, p = .027, ηp2 = .114), with the reading times in Coherent scenarios (M = 2,413ms) being 
faster than for Incoherent scenarios (M = 2,649ms), and a main effect of Risk (F(1,41) = 47.133, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .535), with the reading times for Low risk scenarios (M = 2,141ms) being faster than for High risk 
scenarios (M = 2,921ms). Results did not reveal a significant interaction effect between Coherence and 
Risk (F(1,41) = 1.896, p = .176, ηp2 = .044). Results are shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5: Response times (ms) for reading the final item in the scenarios. Error bars indicate Standard 
Error. 
 
4.1.3.1.2 Liking ratings 
For the analysis of liking ratings, a 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: 
High vs Low) ANOVA was run on participants’ self-reported liking. Results indicated a main effect of 
Coherence (F(1,41) = 4.704, p = .036, ηp2 = .103), with Coherent scenarios (M = 5.82) liked more than 
Incoherent scenarios (M = 5.71), a main effect of Risk (F(1,41) = 155.740, p < .001, ηp2 = .792), with Low 
risk scenarios (M = 7.18) liked more than High risk scenarios (M = 4.36), and a significant interaction 
effect (F(1,41) = 4.624, p = .037, ηp2 = .101). The observed power for the interaction effect was 0.56.  
Analysing the interaction effect, follow up t-tests indicated that Coherent scenarios (M = 7.31) were 
liked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 7.04, t(41) = 2.854, p = .007) in the Low risk conditions, 
which remained significant following Bonferroni adjustment. However, in the High risk conditions, 
there was no significant difference between the Coherent (M = 4.34) and Incoherent (M = 4.37, t(41) = 
.337, p = .738) conditions. Results are shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and Incoherent 
conditions.  Error bars indicate Standard Error.  
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4.1.3.1.3 Disliking ratings 
For the analysis of disliking ratings, a 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: 
High vs Low) ANOVA was run on participants’ self-reported disliking. Results indicated a main effect 
of Risk (F(1,41) = 161.944, p < .001, ηp2 = .798), with High risk scenarios (M = 4.76) disliked more than 
Low risk scenarios (M = 2.09), and a significant interaction effect (F(1,41) = 4.613, p = .038). The 
observed power for the interaction effect was 0.56. The main effect of Coherence approached 
significance (F(1,41) = 3.938, p = .054, ηp2 = .088).  
Analysing the interaction effect, follow up t-tests indicated that Coherent scenarios (M = 4.89) were 
disliked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 4.63, t(41) = 2.558, p = .014) in the High risk conditions, 
which remained significant following Bonferroni adjustment. However, in the Low risk conditions, 
there was no significant difference between the Coherent (M = 2.08) and Incoherent (M = 2.11, t(41) = 
.403, p = .689) conditions. Results are shown in Figure 4.7.  
 
Figure 4.7: Disking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions.  Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
 
4.1.3.2 IAPS images 
The omnibus 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Valence: Positive vs Negative) x 2 (Scale: 
Liking vs Disliking) interaction effect was signification (F(1,41) = 6.265, p = .016, ηp2 = .133), suggesting 
that it was appropriate to separately analyse the liking and disliking ratings below.  
4.1.3.2.1 Response latencies 
A 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Valence: Positive vs Negative) ANOVA was run on the 
response times to the target IAPS images, revealing a main effect of Coherence (F(1,41) = 25.113, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .380), with the response times in Coherent scenarios (M = 1,467ms) being faster than for 
Incoherent scenarios (M = 1,612ms), and an effect of Valence that approached significance (F(1,41) = 
4.059, p = .051, ηp2 = .090), with the response times for Positive images (M = 1,495ms) being faster 
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than for Negative images (M = 1,583ms). Results did not reveal a significant interaction effect between 
Coherence and Risk (F(1,41) = 0.362, p = .551, ηp2 = .009). Results are shown in Figure 4.8. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Response times to the positive and negative IAPS images, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions.  Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
 
4.1.3.2.2 Liking ratings 
For the liking of IAPS images, a 2 (Coherent: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Valence: Positive vs 
Negative) ANOVA was run on participants’ self-reported liking. Results indicated a main effect of 
Coherence (F(1,41) = 21.042, p < .001,  ηp2 = .339), with participants liking Coherent images (M = 4.65) 
more than Disfluent images (M = 4.48). Results also indicated a significant main effect of Valence 
(F(1,41) = 404.899, p < .001, ηp2 = .908), with participants liking the Positive images (M = 6.93) more 
than the Negative images (M = 2.17). The interaction effect between Coherence and Valence was not 
significant (F(1,41) = 1.337, p = .254, ηp2 = .032). Results are shown in Figure 4.9.  
 
 
Figure 4.9: Liking ratings for Positive and Negative IAPS images, comparing Fluent and Disfluent 
conditions.  Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
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4.1.3.2.3 Disliking ratings 
For the disliking of IAPS images, a 2 (Coherent: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Valence: Positive vs 
Negative) ANOVA was run on participants’ self-reported disliking. Results indicated a main effect of 
Valence (F(1,41) = 438.654, p < .001, ηp2 = .915), with participants disliking the Negative images (M = 
6.91) more than the Positive images (M = 1.89), but no main effect of Coherence (F(1,41) = .103, p = 
.750, ηp2 = .003). Results did reveal a significant interaction effect between Coherence and Valence 
(F(1,41) = 6.478, p = .015, ηp2 = .136) were significant, with results shown in Figure 4.10. The observed 
power for the interaction effect was 0.70.  
Analysing the interaction effect, follow-up t-tests suggested that, for Positive images, there was no 
difference in disliking between Coherent (M = 1.85) and Incoherent images (M = 1.93; t(41) = 1.306, p 
= .199). For Negative images, participants disliked Coherent images (M = 6.93) more than Incoherent 
images (M = 6.85; t(41) = 1.993, p = .053) at a level approaching significance. However, neither of these 
effects were significant once Bonferroni adjustments were applied.  
 
 
Figure 4.10: Disliking ratings for Positive and Negative IAPS images, comparing Fluent and Disfluent 
conditions.  Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
 
4.1.4 Discussion  
According to the multi-source account, when processing fluency is increased for negative stimuli, it 
should be possible to evoke both positive and negative affect: the positive affect evoked through hedonic 
marking (Winkielman et al., 2003), and the negative affect evoked through the amplification of the 
stimuli’s valence (fluency amplification; Albrecht & Carbon, 2014). When measured on a bipolar scale, 
it was hypothesised that these sources of affect would interact. This interaction may result in positive 
and negative affect cancelling each other out: either partially – giving the impression that there is a 
reduced affective response to fluency in negative scenarios – or completely – giving the impression that 
there is no affective response to fluency in negative scenarios. This may have been the case in 
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Experiment 1, where the affective response to fluency appeared to be lower in magnitude for negative 
scenarios compared to positive scenarios, and also in Experiment 2, where for negative scenarios, there 
was no significant difference in liking ratings between the fluent and non-fluent conditions. These 
possibilities demonstrate the importance for not only the manipulation of stimuli valence, but the 
separate measurement of positive and negative affect. The current experiment therefore replaced the 
bipolar rating scale from previous experiment for two separate unipolar scales, one for liking and one 
for disliking, which participants completed in a repeated measures design.  
For the business scenario task, results indicated that participants liked fluent (operationalised as 
Coherent) business scenarios more than non-fluent (operationalised as Incoherent) business scenarios, 
but only when those scenarios were positive (operationalised as Low risk). In contrast, when the 
scenarios were negative (operationalised as High risk), there was no significant difference in liking 
ratings between the fluent and non-fluent business scenarios. When asked to provide disliking ratings, 
participants disliked fluent business scenarios more than non-fluent business scenarios, but only when 
the scenarios were negative. In contrast, for positive scenarios, there was not a significant difference in 
disliking between the fluent and non-fluent business scenarios.  
These results indicated that fluency could produce positive or negative affect, with the pattern of 
responses consistent with the predictions of the fluency amplification account (Albrecht & Carbon, 
2014). Specifically, the valence of the stimuli determined the direction of affective response: when the 
stimuli were positive, fluency appeared to evoke a positive affective response; when the stimuli were 
negative, fluency appeared to evoke a negative affective response. This was in opposition to the hedonic 
marking hypothesis, which predicted that fluency should result in increased liking for both the positive 
and negative scenarios, and also the multi-source account, which predicted that fluency would produce 
both positive and negative affect. Specifically, the multi-source account predicted that in the negative 
condition, the fluent scenarios would still be disliked more than the non-fluent scenarios, however the 
fluent scenarios should also be liked more than the non-fluent scenarios.   
A possible reason for why the predicted multi-source pattern did not emerge was due to the repeated 
measures design. As the participants had to provide both a liking rating and a disliking rating, perhaps 
it was not possible for them to use the fluency generated from the Coherence of the scenario as a cue 
for both of the scales. This would be consistent with concepts of attribution (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 
1994) and naïve theory (Oppenheimer, 2008; Schwarz, 2004), which suggest that fluency is used as a 
cue for the most reasonable explanation for the source. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that when 
dealing with a positive scenario, fluency may be attributed onto the positive scale (i.e. the liking scale). 
Similarly, when dealing with a negative scenario, fluency may be attributed onto the negative scale (i.e. 
the negative scale). This has some consistencies with the findings of Experiment 3, where the 
interpretation of fluency appeared to be influenced by the addition of time pressure. Taking these results 
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together, evidence has been gathered for the presence of naïve theories (Oppenheimer, 2008) and the 
malleable meaning of fluency (Briñol et al., 2006). 
The explanation regarding the influence of additional scales does appear to be partially in opposition to 
the findings of the Meta-Analysis presented in Chapter 2, as those results suggested that participants’ 
liking ratings were still influenced by fluency, even with the addition of an extra rating scale. In fact, 
the participants’ liking ratings were still influenced by fluency when multiple scales were added. 
However, it is worth noting that in this sample, the additional scales were typically unrelated to affect. 
For example, many were related to a fluency measure such as self-reported ease of processing (Chae & 
Hoegg, 2013) or felt fluency (Forster et al., 2015, 2016), a confidence measure (Topolinski & Strack, 
2009b), and most commonly a recognition measure (Westerman, Klin, & Lanska, 2015; Westerman, 
Lanska, & Olds, 2015). None of the observations in the sample asked participants to complete both a 
liking and disliking scale in a within subjects fashion.  
The argument that the between groups design interfered with fluency’s effect on affective responses, 
notably the lack of increased liking ratings for the fluent-negative condition, is strengthened once the 
results of the image rating task are considered. Rather than using a repeated measures design whereby 
participants completed a liking and disliking rating on each trial, the image rating task used a blocked 
design. Whilst participants were still required to make liking and disliking ratings, these rating tasks 
were separated by block. Results indicated that fluent images were liked more than non-fluent images, 
even when those images were of a negative valence, which was a pattern consistent with both hedonic 
marking and the multi-source account. Therefore, the separation of liking and disliking rating tasks 
appeared to help the participants to separate their positive and negative affective responses to fluency. 
Examining the disliking ratings from the image task also provided important insight. Results indicated 
an interaction effect between fluency and valence for the disliking ratings. Unpicking this interaction, 
the trend suggested that participants disliked the fluent-negative images more than the non-fluent-
negative images. Although the follow-up test fell short of significant, the significance of the interaction 
effect does provide some evidence that fluency may increase disliking responses for negative stimuli, 
as predicted by both fluency amplification and the multi-source account. Taking the results of the image 
rating task together, an observed hedonic marking pattern emerged for positive images, and an 
amplification pattern emerged for the negative images. The presence of both of these mechanisms is 
therefore support for the multi-source account. 
Of course, experimental design was not the only difference between the two tasks in Experiment 4. An 
alternate explanation would be that the difference was down to the change in stimuli. The following 
experiment therefore examined whether the multi-source pattern could be realised using the business 
scenarios. Lessons were taken from the design of the two tasks in this experiment: it was interpreted 
that increasing the separation between the liking and disliking tasks would help the participants to 
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separate their liking and disliking responses, and therefore the method was adapted to a between groups 
design. This meant that participants would either complete a liking or a disliking scale, thereby 
removing the conflicting contextual cues presented to participants.  
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4.2 Experiment 54 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 4 aimed to detect the separate elicitation of positive and negative affect through the use of 
separate positive and negative unipolar scales. This was an important methodological adjustment to 
expand on the results of Experiments 1 and 2, which hypothesized that positive and negative affect had 
been evoked by processing fluency, but had cancelled each other out when measured on the bipolar 
scale. It was also important due to the lack of studies that measure positive and negative affect 
separately, as identified by the Meta-Analysis presented in Chapter 2.  
The results of Experiment 4’s business scenario task, which recorded liking and disliking in a repeated 
measures design, did find that fluency could produce both positive and negative affect. However, this 
was split by scenario type: for positive scenarios, increasing processing fluency appeared to increase 
liking (but not disliking), whereas for negative scenarios, increasing processing fluency appeared to 
increase disliking (but not liking). These results were in line with fluency amplification (Albrecht & 
Carbon, 2014), but not the proposed multi-source account. However, for Experiment 4’s image rating 
task, which increased the separation between rating scales by adopting a blocked design, results did 
support the multi-source account: a hedonic marking pattern (main effect of fluency on the liking 
ratings) was observed for positive images, and an amplification pattern (interaction effect between 
fluency and valence on the disliking ratings) was observed for negative images; demonstrating co-
existence of mechanisms.  
As argued in the previous discussion, the lack of evidence for a multi-source account during the business 
scenario task may have been due to the within subjects design, and the challenges that participants might 
have had in completing opposing affective scales. The current experiment changed the design. 
However, rather than adopting the blocked design from the image rating task in Experiment 4, 
separation between the liking and disliking rating scales was further increased by changing to a between 
groups design; participants completed either a liking scale or a disliking scale depending on their 
randomly assigned group, rather than completing both scales. The aim of Experiment 5 was to therefore 
 
4 This experiment was published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 28th June 
2019 as part of the following manuscript: Gamblin, D. M., Banks, A. P., & Dean, P. J. A. (2019). 
Affective responses to coherence in high and low risk scenarios. Cognition and Emotion. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1640663 
This experiment is Experiment 2 in the above publication.  
 
114 
 
test for co-occurrence of positive and negative responses to fluency, as predicted by the multi-source 
account, without the opposing contextual cues provided by the multiple scales. 
4.2.1.1 The current study 
The current experiment also aimed to rule out an alternative explanation: that the changes in affective 
response were caused by differences in meaning between the fluent (operationalised as Coherent) and 
non-fluent (operationalised as Incoherent) scenarios, rather than the processing fluency. In other words, 
despite the scenarios being balanced so that each item appeared once in a fluent scenario and once in a 
non-fluent scenario, there was still a possibility that the addition of a final schema incoherent item could 
change the overall meaning of a scenario. For example, would a final incoherent item make the scenario 
feel less believable overall? Was the incoherent item making the participants feel frustrated or annoyed?  
To rule out this alternate explanation, it was important to create a new set of scenarios which contained 
the same information as the non-fluent scenarios, but would be processed fluently. This was done by 
reordering the non-fluent scenarios, keeping the content exactly the same, but presenting the incoherent 
item first in the triad, and therefore ending on two schema coherent items. These new scenarios were 
termed Early Incoherent scenarios, and by finishing with coherent items, they should feel more fluent 
overall than the non-fluent scenarios. If meaning caused the difference in affective responses, then there 
should be no difference in liking and disliking between Early Incoherent and the non-fluent scenarios. 
However, if fluency was causing the differences in affective responses, then the Early Incoherent 
scenarios should differ from the non-fluent scenarios in terms of liking and disliking, with the Early 
Incoherent scenarios behaving in the same way as the fluent scenarios instead.  
Specifically, and in line with the multi-source account, it was predicted that the Early Incoherent 
condition would be liked more than the Incoherent condition, regardless of whether the scenarios were 
positive (operationalised by Low risk) or negative (operationalised by High risk). The Early Incoherent 
condition would also be disliked more than the Incoherent condition when the valence of the scenario 
is negative (High risk). 
1. Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios are responded to faster than Incoherent scenarios. 
2. For both the Low risk and High risk conditions, Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios are 
liked more than Incoherent scenarios. 
3. For the High risk condition, Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios are disliked more than 
Incoherent stimuli.  
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4.2.2 Method 
4.2.2.1 Participants 
Forty-one (35 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology undergraduate course (39 
psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab token scheme. The mean age 
was 20.00 years (SE ± 0.43 years). In a between subjects design, twenty participants (16 female, mean 
age = 20.13 years, SE ± 0.88 years) completed the experiment using a liking scale, and twenty one 
participants (19 female, mean age = 19.90 years, SE ± 0.40 years) completed the experiment using a 
disliking scale. Power analysis suggested that a sample of this size was appropriate to provide > 80% 
power for large effect sizes and alpha levels of 5%. 
4.2.2.2 Materials 
The Coherent (operationalising fluent) and Incoherent (operationalising non-fluent) business scenarios 
remained the same as Experiment 4. For the current experiment, a third condition was added: Early 
Incoherent. These scenarios were constructed by reorganising the items from the Incoherent scenarios, 
but keeping the overall content exactly the same. As in Experiments 2-4, Incoherent scenarios ended on 
the schema incoherent item; for Early Incoherent scenarios, the incoherent item was presented first, 
followed by the two coherent items. For each of the nine business types, participants were presented 
with six conditions (four were the same as the prior experiments: Coherent-High risk, Coherent-Low 
risk, Incoherent-High risk, Incoherent-Low risk; two were new to Experiment 5: Early Incoherent-High 
risk, Early Incoherent-Low risk), totalling 54 business scenarios in this experiment. Participants were 
shown each scenario once, and in a random order. Examples of Coherent, Incoherent, and Early 
Incoherent scenarios can be seen in Table 4.4.  
 
Table 4.4: Coherent, Incoherent, and Early Incoherent scenarios for an Amusement Park business. 
 Coherent Incoherent Early Incoherent 
Item 1 
Reliant on good 
weather 
Reliant on good 
weather 
Must adhere to food 
hygiene standards 
Item 2 Expensive up-keep Expensive up-keep 
Reliant on good 
weather 
Item 3 
Safety concerns for 
customers 
Must adhere to food 
hygiene standards 
Expensive up-keep 
 
 Schema Coherent 
 Schema Incoherent 
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For the rating scales, the same unipolar liking and disliking SAM scales were used from Experiment 4. 
However, as the design changed from repeated measure to between groups, participants no longer saw 
both scales, with roughly half (n = 20) instructed to use the liking unipolar scale and roughly half (n = 
21) using the disliking unipolar scale.  
4.2.2.3 Design 
The experiment used a three (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent vs Early Incoherent) by two (Risk: 
High risk vs Low risk) by two (Scale: Liking scale vs Disliking scale) mixed design, with the type of 
scale manipulated as the between groups variable. As in the previous experiment, the dependent 
variables were liking and disliking. Due to the reordering of the stimuli, it was no longer to compare 
like-for-like final items in the triads. Therefore, instead of recording reading time for final items, the 
dependent variable of fluency was measured as the response time to complete the self-report (liking or 
disliking) scales. 
4.2.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure followed that of Experiment 4, save for the following adjustments. Firstly, the IAPS 
image rating portion of the experiment was removed, meaning the participants were only responding to 
business scenarios. Secondly, the experiment changed to a between groups design, and therefore 
participants no longer responded to both liking and disliking scales. This meant that participants only 
responded to a single unipolar scale, which was either for liking or disliking, depending on the 
participant’s group (assigned at random). Thirdly, the Early Incoherent (detailed above) condition was 
added, which lengthened the business rating task to 54 scenarios. Finally, due to the extra length, a 
break was added in the middle of the experiment to allow participants to relax their eyes. The length of 
the break was determined by the participants. 
 
  
 
Figure 4.11: Procedure timeline for Experiment 5. The rating task (labelled “Rating (SAM)” in the 
above) was either a liking or a disliking unipolar scale, depending on which condition the participants 
were assigned to.    
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4.2.3 Results 
4.2.3.1 Response Latencies 
A 3 (Coherence: Coherent, Incoherent, Early Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) x 2 (Scale: Liking vs 
Disliking) mixed ANOVA was run, with Scale as the between groups variable on the time to respond 
to the rating (liking or disliking) SAM scales. Results showed a main effect of Coherence (F(2, 78) = 
26.877, p < .001, ηp2 = .408) and a main effect of Risk (F(1, 39) = 15.171, p < .001, ηp2 = .280). There 
was no significant main effect regarding Scale (F(1, 39) = 0.674, p = .417, ηp2 = .017), nor significant 
interaction effects. Simple effects revealed that the response time to rate Incoherent scenarios (1,733ms) 
was longer than Coherent scenarios (1,415ms, p < .001) and Early Incoherent scenarios (1,263ms, p < 
.001). Results are shown in Figure 4.12.  
 
Figure 4.12: Response times (time for participants to complete the rating scales) for High and Low risk 
business scenarios, comparing Coherent, Incoherent, and Early Incoherent conditions. Error bars indicate 
Standard Error. 
 
4.2.3.2 Liking Ratings 
A 3 (Coherence: Coherent, Incoherent, Early Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated measures 
ANOVA was run on the liking ratings. Results (Figure 4.13) revealed main effects of Coherence (F(2, 
38) = 21.128, p < .001, ηp2 = .527) and Risk (F(1, 19) = 16.438, p = .001, ηp2 = .464). The interaction effect 
between Coherence and Risk was not significant (F(2, 38) = 0.187, p = .830, ηp2 = .010).  
For additional information, follow up t-tests revealed that, for the High risk condition, Coherent 
scenarios (M = 6.22) were liked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 4.72, t(19) = 4.804, p < .001, dz = 
1.074). Early Incoherent scenarios (M = 6.00) were also liked more than the Incoherent scenarios (t(19) 
= 4.024, p = .001, dz = .900) in the High risk condition. There was no significant difference in liking 
ratings between the Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios (t(19) = 1.816, p = .085, dz = .406).  
Similarly for the Low risk condition, the follow up t-tests revealed that Coherent scenarios (M = 7.49) 
were liked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 6.08; vs Coherent: t(19) = 4.882, p < .001, dz = 1.092). 
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Early Incoherent scenarios (M = 7.31) were also liked more than the Incoherent scenarios (t(19) = 4.263, 
p < .001, dz = .953) in the Low risk condition. There was no significant difference in liking ratings 
between the Coherent and Early Incoherent scenarios (p = .105, dz = .381). 
 
 
Figure 4.13: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent, Incoherent, 
and Early Incoherent conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
 
4.2.3.3 Disliking Ratings 
A 3 (Coherence: Coherent, Incoherent, Early Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated measures 
ANOVA was run on the disliking ratings. Results (Figure 4.14) revealed a main effect of Risk (F(1, 20) 
= 73.741, p < .001, ηp2 = .787), which was qualified by a significant Coherence x Risk interaction effect 
(F(2, 40) = 5.847, p = .006, ηp2 = .226). The observed power for the interaction effect was > 0.80. The 
main effect of Coherence was not significant (F(2, 40) = 2.702, p = .079, ηp2 = .119).  
Unpacking the significant interaction effect, follow-up t-tests revealed that, in the High risk condition, 
Coherent scenarios (M = 6.45) were disliked more than Incoherent scenarios (M = 5.86, t(20) = 2.527, p 
= .020, dz = .551). Early Incoherent scenarios (M = 6.51) were also disliked more than the Incoherent 
scenarios (t(20) = 2.631, p = .016, dz = .574). Both tests remained significant following Bonferroni 
corrections. There was no significant difference in disliking ratings between the Coherent and Early 
Incoherent scenarios (t(20) = .498, p = .624, dz = .109). 
In comparison, the Low risk condition showed no significant difference in rating between Coherent (M 
= 2.57) and Incoherent scenarios (M = 2.69, t(19) = .890, p = .384, dz = .194), between Early Incoherent 
(M = 2.76) and Incoherent scenarios (t(19) = .298, p = .769, dz = .065), or between Coherent and Early 
Incoherent scenarios (t(19) = 1.228, p = .234, dz = .268).  
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Figure 4.14: Liking ratings for High and Low risk business scenarios, comparing Coherent and 
Incoherent conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
4.2.4 Discussion 
As in previous experiment, processing fluency was successfully manipulated by coherence of scenario; 
with fluent (operationalised as Coherent) scenarios being responded to faster than non-fluent 
(operationalised as Incoherent) scenarios. The increased processing fluency appeared to influence both 
liking and disliking ratings, measured separately with unipolar scales.  
The results from the liking ratings showed that fluent scenarios were liked more than non-fluent 
scenarios, regardless of whether the scenarios were positive (operationalised by Low risk) or negative 
(operationalised by High risk). In contrast, the disliking ratings demonstrated that the valence of the 
scenario had an effect: when the scenarios were negative, participants disliked the fluent scenarios more, 
but when the scenarios were positive, there was no significant difference in disliking ratings.  
Although the findings have consistencies with hedonic marking (including rare evidence of hedonic 
marking using negative stimuli) and fluency amplification, neither of these models can account for the 
full pattern of results individually. For example, hedonic marking would not account for an increase in 
disliking for fluent scenarios in the negative condition. Similarly, fluency amplification would not 
account for an increase in liking for fluent scenarios in the negative condition. Instead, the results are 
consistent with the proposed multi-source model; where in these special circumstances – fluent and 
negative – we saw increased liking and increased disliking.  
These results also shed light on the negative condition of Experiment 2, where the results indicated no 
significant difference in liking ratings between fluent and non-fluent scenarios. Extrapolating the results 
from the current experiment, it is suggested that positive and negative affect had been evoked by 
fluency, before cancelling each other out when participants completed the bipolar rating scale.  
The current experiment also addressed an alternative explanation for the changes in affective responses 
to fluent and non-fluent conditions: that differences in affective response could be due to changing 
meaning, rather than fluency. To rule out this explanation, the Early Incoherent condition was created 
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by reordering the information from the non-fluent scenarios. With the addition of Early Incoherent 
scenarios, it was therefore possible to alter the processing fluency, without changing the content. Tests 
of response time indicated that the manipulation was successful in altering processing fluency, with 
Early Incoherent scenarios being responded to faster than the non-fluent scenarios. Despite containing 
the same information, results showed that participants liked Early Incoherent scenarios more than the 
non-fluent scenarios. In the negative condition, participants also disliked the Early Incoherent scenarios 
more than the non-fluent scenarios. The pattern of results mirrors that of the fluent vs non-fluent 
comparison; providing evidence that fluency effects affective responses, even when the meaning is 
tightly controlled.  
As well as providing evidence against the above account of meaning as an alternative explanation, the 
Early Incoherent scenarios also provided an interesting insight into fluency generation. The Early 
Incoherent scenarios, which contained an incoherent piece of information, behaved in the same way as 
the fluent scenarios, which contained only coherent information. This included an increase in processing 
speed in comparison to the non-fluent scenarios. It therefore suggests that it was not coherence per se 
that facilitated response times, but whether the scenarios ended with coherent pieces of information. 
This holds similarities with the peak-end rule (Kahneman, 2011) which demonstrates that people place 
greater weight to more recent experiences. Whilst researchers have shown this effect for judgements 
(Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996), 
Experiment 5 suggests that it could be the case with meta-cognition too – perhaps ending a scenario 
with fluent information gives the impression that the scenario was fluent overall. Further investigation 
would be beneficial, as the effect would have implications for areas such as agenda setting. For example, 
if a speaker needs to convey a mixture of coherent and incoherent information, they may get the 
incoherent information out of the way early and end on the coherent information, in order to leave an 
overall feeling of coherence and fluency with the audience.  
- 
Taking the findings of Experiments 4 and 5 together, Chapter 4 made significant methodological and 
theoretical contributions. This chapter introduced separate unipolar liking and disliking scales in order 
to capture the separate liking and disliking responses that were predicted by the multi-source account, 
and argued as interacting in Experiments 1 and 2. Although this separation allowed Experiment 4’s 
business scenario task to demonstrate that fluency could evoke a positive or negative affective response, 
the pattern was in line with the fluency amplification effect (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014), rather than that 
of the proposed multi-source account. Specifically, the multi-source account predicted that increasing 
the fluency of the negative condition would result in an increase in both positive and negative affective 
responses, whilst results only demonstrated an increase in the disliking ratings. 
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The pattern predicted by the multi-source account did however appear once the distance between the 
two unipolar scales was increased, firstly by the blocked design of Experiment 4’s image rating task, 
and then further by Experiment 5’s between groups design. Overall, this suggests that the difficulty that 
participants have in reported separate positive and negative responses can be alleviated by instructing 
them to only focus on one of these responses at a time. This is consistent with the work of Cacioppo 
and colleagues, who have suggested that whilst separate reporting can feel unnatural (Winkielman et 
al., 2003), it is possible with focussed instruction (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1994; Cacioppo, Gardner, & 
Berntson, 1997).  
However, whilst separating the unipolar liking and disliking scales across groups was beneficial for 
recording separate affective responses, an argument remains as to whether participants were actually 
simultaneously experiencing positive and negative affect. For the participants in the liking group, when 
fluency increased their liking of the negative scenarios, were they also experiencing an increase in 
negative affect? Likewise for the participants in the disliking group, when fluency increased their 
disliking of the negative scenarios, were they also experiencing the increase in positive affect that the 
other group reported? Therefore, to test for the co-occurrence of these affective responses, it appears 
that within-subjects is the appropriate design. However, as noted in the business scenario task of 
Experiment 4, there are considerable difficulties with asking participants to complete both a liking and 
disliking scale within trial. This issue was addressed in the following chapter, where the self-report 
scales were replaced with fEMG, a technique which could simultaneously record positive (via a 
participant’s smiling muscle) and negative (via the participant’s frowning muscle) within each trial.  
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Chapter 5: Facial Electromyographic Responses to Coherence5 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Experiment 5 showed that under certain conditions – fluent and negative – it was possible for positive 
and negative affect to be evoked by processing fluency, as predicted by the multi-source account. 
However, in order to observe this pattern, a between groups design had to be adopted, with participants 
either completing the task with a liking scale or with a disliking scale. The question remained whether 
one could therefore conclude that participants were experiencing the co-occurrence of positive and 
negative affect. Although a within-groups design had proved to be problematic using self-report scales 
in Experiment 4’s business scenario task, the current experiment introduced facial Electromyography 
(fEMG) as a means to record separate affective responses within-trial, and without the need to self-
report scale. The aim of the current Experiment 6 was to therefore test whether co-occurrence of positive 
and negative affect could emerge in response to increased fluency, using fEMG as a more diagnostic 
test.  
5.1.1 The current study 
fEMG is an electromyographic technique for measuring the activity of facial muscles. As certain facial 
muscles are associated with emotional reactions, fEMG can therefore be used to infer emotional 
responses to stimuli. Two muscles which have received attention are the zygomaticus major muscle and 
the corrugator supercilii muscle. Zygomaticus is situated on the cheek and is the muscle which is active 
in smiling; Corrugator is situated roughly on the eyebrow and is responsible for knitting the brow when 
frowning (see Figure 5.1 for locations). Both of these muscles are connected to affective responses. For 
example, Dimberg (1990) has demonstrated that zygomaticus shows increased activity from baseline 
when participants view happy faces, whilst corrugator shows increased activity when they view angry 
faces. One might suggest that this effect was due to participants mirroring the facial stimuli, however 
similar results were observed when participants viewed a wide array of other stimuli such as images of 
flowers (increased zygomaticus activity), snakes (increased corrugator), pleasant landscapes  (increased 
zygomaticus), hospitals (increased corrugator), and when listening to high intensity auditory tones 
 
5 This experiment was published by Taylor & Francis in Cognition and Emotion on 28th June 
2019 as part of the following manuscript: Gamblin, D. M., Banks, A. P., & Dean, P. J. A. (2019). 
Affective responses to coherence in high and low risk scenarios. Cognition and Emotion. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2019.1640663 
This experiment is Experiment 3 in the above publication. 
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(increased corrugator). These results are supported by Cacioppo et al. (1986) who observed increased 
zygomaticus activity for pleasant visual stimuli and increased corrugator activity for unpleasant visual 
stimuli. Furthermore, fEMG activity was in line with self-reported ratings of liking, leading authors to 
suggest that zygomaticus can reveal positive affective responses and corrugator can reveal negative 
affective responses. Support for the use of fEMG as an equivalent measure of affective response to self-
report has been gained from the Meta-Analysis presented in Chapter 2 of this thesis, with results 
indicating that there was no significant difference in effect sizes between studies measuring affect using 
self-report and those using fEMG.  
fEMG allows for the measurement of both the zygomaticus and corrugator activity at the same time. 
This presented a significant advantage for this thesis, as asking participants to complete both liking and 
disliking scales within-trial runs the risk of becoming too difficult for participants, or exposing the 
results to attribution effects, as noted in Experiment 4’s business scenario task. Whilst this can be 
avoided by separating the scales across blocks (Experiment 4’s image rating task) or across different 
groups (Experiment 5), these designs make it hard to conclude that simultaneous positive and negative 
affective reaction occurred. fEMG’s separate and simultaneous measurement of positive and negative 
affect therefore provides an appropriate means to test the predictions of the multi-source account. 
There are additional benefits to utilising fEMG. Firstly, fEMG has been shown to capture facial muscle 
responses which are undetectable from mere observation, providing a significant advantage over 
observing or recording participants (Cacioppo et al., 1986; Dimberg, 1990), as well as those which are 
fast and fleeting (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Topolinski et al., 2009). More significantly 
for the current study is that fEMG also allows for the recording of affective responses without the need 
for self-report measures. The methodological advantage of this was noted above, however it also 
provides an advantage from a theoretical standpoint, as it allowed for further comparison of hedonic 
marking’s “hot” account of the fluency-affect relationship against the “cold” account from two-step 
models. 
Previous Chapters in this thesis have already tested one element of the hedonic marking hypothesis, 
which is the claim that fluency “selectively increases positive, but not negative evaluations” 
(Winkielman et al., 2003; p. 7) of stimuli. In contrast, two-step accounts such as the perceptual 
fluency/attribution model (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) and the nonspecific activation 
hypothesis (Mandler et al., 1987) suggest that increased fluency would result in an increase in any 
relevant evaluation, which would include an increase in disliking ratings. Results from the Meta-
Analysis (Chapter 2) demonstrated that fluency stimuli were not only liked more than non-fluent 
stimuli, but were also disliked less than non-fluent stimuli, which opposes two-step models. 
Furthermore, results from Experiment 5 and Experiment 4’s (Chapter 4) image rating task showed that 
disliking ratings engaged in an interaction effect with fluency, demonstrating that fluency only increases 
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disliking ratings under certain circumstances – findings which are consistent with fluency amplification, 
but neither the hedonic marking nor the two-step accounts.  
However, the second element of the hedonic marking has not yet been tested in this thesis. This second 
element predicts that fluency makes direct contact with the affective system. Interpreting the results 
from previous chapters through this lens, it would suggest that positive affect had genuinely be evoked 
by the fluency instantiated via coherence. On the other hand, two-step accounts suggested that fluency 
is attributed onto relevant scales, such as liking, but that affect is not experienced. Applying this to the 
previous chapters, it would suggest that positive affect was never genuinely evoked, and that any 
increase in liking was merely down to an artefact of the attribution process. Whilst this difference is 
difficult to test using self-report scales, fEMG provided the opportunity to test whether affect was 
genuinely evoked. If affect was evoked, then it would be expected that increasing fluency would result 
in an increase in zygomaticus activity; if the liking observed in the previous experiments was merely 
an artefact, then fluency would not be expected to have an influence on zygomaticus activity.  
As the multi-source account suggests that both hedonic marking and fluency amplification contribute 
to the affective response to fluency, it would be expected that fluency would make direct contact with 
the affective system. Specifically, increased fluency should result in increased zygomaticus activity, 
regardless of stimuli valence. The predictions of fluency amplification should also be observed: 
increasing fluency for negative stimuli should be met with an increase in corrugator activity (i.e. 
negative affect). To summarise the predictions of the multi-source account for the use of fEMG: 
1. For both the Low risk and High risk conditions, Coherent scenarios will result in a greater increase 
in zygomaticus activity from baseline, compared to Incoherent scenarios.  
2. For the High risk condition, Coherent scenarios will result in a greater increase in corrugator 
activity from baseline, compared to Incoherent scenarios.  
Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that participants judged the risk of each scenario using a tallying process 
(Dawes, 1979), and that the risk ratings were not influenced by fluency. However, Experiment 3 
suggested that under certain conditions, such as by adding time pressure, fluency may influence risk. It 
was argued that participants attributed fluency onto the “most parsimonious” (Bornstein & D’Agostino, 
1994, p. 106) explanation for where the fluency is arising; in the case of Experiments 1 and 2, this 
appeared to be the liking scale, and in Experiment 3 this appeared to be the risk scale. As the current 
experiment replaces the liking scale with the fEMG measure, participants will now only encounter the 
risk rating scale. As there is now only the risk scale available to attribute fluency onto, the current 
experiment would expect fluency effects to emerge. Specifically, the multi-source model predicts: 
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3. For the Low risk condition, Coherent scenarios are judged as lower risk than Incoherent 
scenarios. 
4. For the High risk condition, there is no difference in risk rating between Coherent and 
Incoherent scenarios.  
 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
Forty-one (35 female) students were recruited, mostly from the psychology undergraduate course (34 
psychology students), in return for credits towards the University’s lab token scheme. The mean age 
was 19.39 years old (SE ± 0.23 years). Power analysis suggested that a sample of this size was 
appropriate to provide > 80% power for large effect sizes and alpha levels of 5%. 
5.2.2 Materials 
The business scenarios used in this experiment were the same as in Experiment 4, however due to the 
likelihood discarded trials due to artefacts such as eye blinks, it was necessary to double the number of 
trials from 36 to 72. This was done by swapping the positions of the first and second items in each 
scenario. With the additional trials, there were now 18 of each type of scenario (Coherent-High risk, 
Coherent-Low risk, Incoherent-High risk, Incoherent-Low risk). Ratings of risk were recorded on a 1-
7 self-report Likert scale, ranging from “extremely low risk” to “extremely high risk”, consistent with 
Experiments 1-3; the self-report SAM scales were removed for this experiment.  
5.2.3 Design 
The experiment used a 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High risk vs Low risk) repeated 
measures design, with fEMG amplitude as the dependent variable. Self-reported risk was also recorded, 
but reading time of the final item was not, as the experiment required a constant window in which to 
record fEMG.  
5.2.4 Procedure 
Once the participant had given consent, their face was prepared for electrode placement. The left cheek, 
left eyebrow, centre of forehead, and right jaw were wiped with alcohol. At these sites, the skin was 
also gently abraded using conductive gel. Bilateral electrodes were prepared with conductive gel and 
then attached at the left cheek and left eyebrow using surgical tape – with the electrode placement 
following Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986; see Figure 5.1). A ground electrode was attached in the same 
way at the centre forehead, as well as a reference electrode at the right jaw. The impedance was 
monitored during electrode placement to ensure smooth signals would be recorded. If any site indicated 
impedance greater than 10kΩ, the electrodes were removed, the skin was gently abraded with 
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conductive gel, and the electrodes were re-secured with surgical tape. Once all site indicated impedance 
lower than 10kΩ, the experimental procedure began. 
 
Figure 5.1: Sites of electrode placement. Adapted from Fridlund and Cacioppo (1986).  
 
The experimental procedure followed that of Experiment 2, except for the following alteration to 
accommodate fEMG. The final item of information in the triad was no longer self-paced. Instead, the 
final item remained on the screen for 3,000ms, whilst facial muscle activity was recorded, before 
automatically progressing to the next screen. This next screen was then the risk rating screen, as per 
Experiment 2, with the SAM scale for liking ratings no longer being used. Figure 5.2 shows the timeline 
for the current procedure.  
 
 
Figure 5.2: Procedure timeline for Experiment 6. 
 
For each trial, fEMG activity was captured from the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii at two 
key segments. The first was a pre-stimulus baseline, which was a period of 0-500ms prior to the onset 
of the final item of information. At this point, the participant was viewing a fixation cross in the centre 
of the screen. The second segment was the test period, 1,501-3,000ms post onset of the final item of 
information. During this period, the final item of information was still visible on the screen (see Figure 
5.2). The test period was selected based on previous findings, with no significant differences in 
zygomaticus or corrugator activity being found between Coherent and Incoherent trials in the period 0-
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1,500ms post stimulus onset (Topolinski et al., 2009). Similarly, fluency effects on zygomaticus activity 
have not been found periods later than 3,000ms (Winkielman & Cacioppo, 2001).  
5.2.5 fEMG 
The fEMG raw signal was recorded using 32-Channel BrainAmp DC (Brain Products), with six flat 
8mm Ag/AgCl electrodes positioned. Electrodes were positioned bilaterally at the zygomaticus and 
corrugator sites, and using single placement for the ground and reference measurements, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. Data was recorded in DC mode, using Brain Vision Recorder (1.21.0004) at 500Hz, with 
impedance kept below 10kΩ.  
fEMG data was transferred to Brain Vision Analyzer (2.1.1.327), where trials were screened in 
particular for artefacts from movement such as blinking. Any trials containing such artefacts were 
manually rejected following visual inspection. For the remaining trials, the average, absolute activity 
was exported. This activity was standardised and any trials with a z-score of ±3.29 were discarded. The 
number of rejected trials across conditions was compared to ensure that no condition was over or under 
represented (as noted in the Results section; 5.3.4) 
For the remaining trials, the rectified, average absolute activity from the test segment was compared to 
the pre-stimulus baseline from the same trial. This gave a percentage change from baseline for each 
trial, for both the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscles.  
  
5.3 Results 
The overall 2 (Muscle: Zygomaticus vs Corrugator) x 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: 
High vs Low) returned a significant Muscle x Coherence x Risk interaction (F(1, 36) = 5.288, p = .027, 
ηp2 = .13), which allowed for the separate analysis of each muscle. 
5.3.1 Zygomaticus 
A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated measures 
ANOVA was run on the Zygomaticus data for the test interval (1501-3000ms post stimulus onset) 
against the pre-stimulus baseline. Results revealed a main effect of Coherence (F(1,40) = 6.927, p = .012, 
ηp2 = .15), with Coherent triads (M = .050) showing a greater increase in activity from baseline than 
Incoherent triads (M = .022). Neither the main effect of Risk (F(1,40) = 0.269, p = .607, ηp2 < .01), nor 
the interaction effect (F(1,40)  = 0.015, p = .905, ηp2 < .01) were significant. Percentage changes from 
baseline for all four conditions are shown in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Zygomaticus activity in the test phase (1,501-3,000ms post stimulus onset) shown as a 
percentage change from pre-stimulus baseline. Comparing coherent and incoherent triads, for both high 
risk and low risk conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
 
5.3.2 Corrugator 
 A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) repeated measures 
ANOVA was run on the Corrugator data for the test interval (1501-3000ms post stimulus onset) against 
the pre-stimulus baseline, revealing a significant interaction effect between Coherence and Risk (F(1,36) 
= 5.590, p = .024, ηp2 = .13). The observed power for the interaction effect was 0.63. Neither the main 
effect of Coherence (F(1,36) = 1.761, p = .193, ηp2 = .05), nor the main effect of Risk (F(1,37) = 1.583, p = 
.216, ηp2 = .04) were significant. Percentage changes from baseline for all four conditions are shown in 
Figure 5.4.  
Unpacking the interaction effect, paired samples t-tests revealed that for the High risk condition, 
Corrugator activity rose from baseline significantly more for Coherent scenarios (M = .065) compared 
to Incoherent scenarios (M = .019, t(36) = 2.403, p = .022, dz = .395). For the Low risk condition, there 
was no significant difference between Coherent (M = .045) and Incoherent scenarios (M = .061, t(36) = 
1.095, p = .281, dz = .180).  
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Figure 5.4: Corrugator activity in the test phase (1,501-3,000ms post stimulus onset) shown as a 
percentage change from pre-stimulus baseline. Comparing coherent and incoherent triads, for both high 
risk and low risk conditions. Error bars indicate Standard Error. 
 
5.3.3 Risk ratings 
 A 2 (Coherence: Schema Coherent vs Schema Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) ANOVA was run 
on the participants’ risk ratings, revealing a main effect of Risk (F(1,40) = 343.304, p < .001, ηp2 = .90), 
with the high risk conditions (M = 6.53) receiving higher risk ratings than the low risk conditions (M = 
3.12), and a significant interaction effect between Coherence and Risk (F(1,40) = 6.517, p = .015, ηp2 = 
.14). The main effect of Coherence approached significance (F(1,40) = 3.983, p = .053, ηp2 = .09).  
Paired samples t-tests were used to investigate the interaction effect. Results revealed that for the Low 
risk condition, Coherent scenarios (M = 3.06) were judged to be significantly less risky than Incoherent 
scenarios (M = 3.19, t(40) = 3.428, p = .001, dz = .535). For the High risk condition, no significant 
differences were found between Coherent (M = 6.53) and Incoherent scenarios (M = 6.53, t(40) = .179, 
p = .859, dz = .028). 
5.3.4 Rejected trials 
The number of rejected trials due to artefacts, such as eye blinks, were compared across condition. A 2 
(Muscle: Zygomaticus vs Corrugator) x 2 (Coherence: Coherent vs Incoherent) x 2 (Risk: High vs Low) 
returned only a significant effect of Muscle (F(1, 36) = 104.079, p < .001, ηp2 = .743), indicating that 
artefacts were more likely to occur from corrugator measurement than zygomaticus.  
5.4 Discussion 
The use of fEMG in this experiment allowed for the separate measurement of positive and negative 
affective responses by separately measuring the zygomaticus major and corrugator supercilii muscles. 
Crucially, fEMG allowed for the simultaneous measurement of these two affective responses, as well 
as testing whether responses to fluency represented genuine affect.  
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 The results from the zygomaticus major muscle (indicating positive affect) demonstrated a greater 
increase in activity from baseline for fluent (operationalised as Coherent) scenarios, compared to non-
fluent (operationalised as Incoherent) scenarios. This main effect occurred for both positive 
(operationalised as Low risk) and negative (operationalised as High risk) scenarios, supporting the 
hedonic marking of fluency. In contrast, the results from the corrugator supercilii muscle (indicating 
negative affect) showed an interaction effect. As illustrated in Figure 5.4, the affective response to 
fluency was dependent on the valence of the scenario. In negative scenarios, muscle activity increased 
more for fluent scenarios than non-fluent scenarios. In positive scenarios, muscle activity increased 
more for non-fluent scenarios than fluent scenarios. This pattern is consistent with a fluency 
amplification account.  
Although these findings demonstrate patterns consistent with the hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification models, neither account can fully explain the results in isolation. Firstly, hedonic marking 
would not predict an increase in negative affect (i.e. increased corrugator activity) in response to fluency 
in negative scenarios, as the model predicts that fluency “selectively increases positive, but not negative 
evaluations” (Winkielman et al., 2003; p. 7). Similarly, fluency amplification would not have predicted 
an increase in positive affect in response to fluency in negative scenarios, as the model suggests the 
fluency amplifies stimuli valence; as the stimuli were negative, the model can only account for a 
negative affective response. Therefore, viewing hedonic marking and fluency amplification as 
competing accounts, as has been done in the past (Cheetham et al., 2014; Chetverikov & Kristjánsson, 
2016; Gerger et al., 2016; Muth et al., 2015), cannot account for the full pattern of results. However, 
the multi-source account, which predicts the co-occurrence of hedonic marking and fluency 
amplification, can explain the results. Notably, the multi-source account predicted that increasing the 
processing fluency in negative conditions results in both a positive affective response (indicated by 
increase zygomaticus activity from baseline), and a negative affective response (indicated by increase 
corrugator activity from baseline).  
The observation that fluent-negative stimuli can evoke both positive and negative affect also sheds light 
on the findings from Chapter 3, which used bipolar rating scales. Specifically, Experiment 1 
demonstrated a diminished affective response to fluency in High risk scenarios compared to Low risk 
scenarios, and in Experiment 2, it had appeared as though there was no affective response to fluency in 
the High risk condition. According to the results of the current experiment however, it was possible that 
the fluency-negative conditions in the previous experiments were similarly evoking positive and 
negative affect. The two affective responses could have then interacted when the participants were asked 
to complete their bipolar liking response, leading to reduced magnitude of response, or even 
cancellation.  
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The current experiment also allowed for the testing of affective responses in the absence of a self-report 
liking scale. Results indicated, that there was a positive affective response to coherence, measured 
directly from the increased zygomaticus activity. This is therefore consistent with the predictions of the 
hedonic marking model, which suggests that fluency makes hot contact with the affective system. It is 
also evidence in contrast to cold, two-step theories, such as the perceptual fluency/attribution model 
(Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994) and the nonspecific activation hypothesis (Mandler et al., 1987). 
These models suggested that increases in liking in response to fluency are merely an artefact of the 
attribution process, and that the liking response is not genuine affect. Extrapolating the findings of this 
experiment across the others in this thesis, confidence can be gained that genuine affect has been 
measured in response to fluency.  
One could however question whether the increase in corrugator activity indeed reflected an increase in 
negative affect, or could have instead indicated an increase in effort, the emotion of surprise, or 
frustration in comprehension, rather than negative affect. However, if this was the case, we would 
expect greater activity for non-fluent conditions compared to fluent conditions, regardless of valence, 
such as demonstrated by Topolinski & Strack (2015). Instead, the corrugator results showed an 
interaction effect and no main effect of fluency. Confidence can therefore be gained that corrugator 
activity was indeed representing negative affect. 
In summary, the current experiment supported the findings of experiment 5, which observed a pattern 
of results consistent with the co-occurrence of hedonic marking and fluency amplification mechanisms, 
predicted by the multi-source account. Whilst Experiment 5 relied on a between groups design to 
appropriately separate affective responses, fEMG in the current experiment allowed for separate, 
simultaneous, and direct measurement of positive and negative affect. Results provided further support 
for the multi-source account, strengthened by the properties of fEMG testing.  
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Chapter 6: General Discussion 
 
Previous literature has demonstrated that fluency is a versatile cue that can be instantiated from a variety 
of sources and influence a wide range of judgement domains (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Of the 
possible judgement domains, the affective response to fluency has been argued to be of particular 
significance due to its ability to cue other judgements itself (Finucane et al, 2000; Slovic et al., 2004; 
Topolinski, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009d). Evidence has also suggested that affect is a genuine 
response to fluency, rather than a cold, attributional artefact noted in other judgement domains 
(Winkielman et al., 2003). However, despite the importance of affective responses to fluency, there has 
been disagreement in the literature regarding the pattern of affective responses. The dominant hedonic 
marking hypothesis (Winkielman et al., 2003) suggests that fluency is positively marked, and therefore 
responses to fluency should be positive, whilst the fluency amplification model (Albrecht & Carbon, 
2014) suggests that the affective response is dependent on stimuli valence. A third model, the multi-
source model proposed by this thesis, hypothesizes that these models may in fact co-exist and both 
contribute to the affective response.   
The main aim of this thesis was to examine affective responses to fluency. In this chapter, the results of 
a Meta-Analysis, five behavioural experiments, and one fEMG experiment will be discussed against 
the predictions of the three core models above, highlighting the theoretical and methodological 
contributions, limitations, and directions for future study exposed by the current thesis.  
6.1 Hedonic Marking 
The hedonic marking model makes two key predictions: that fluency is affectively positive, and that 
this positive affect is a genuine response to fluency. These predictions are in contrast with two-step 
models which present a cold account of fluency, whereby any increase in positive affective response is 
due to attribution, cued by presenting participants with appropriate scales (Winkielman et al., 2003).  
A large amount of evidence was gathered for the hedonic marking model in the Meta-Analysis (Chapter 
2) conducted in this thesis. From the systematic analysis of 591 observations, results indicated that the 
fluent conditions received more positive responses than the non-fluent conditions. Most frequently (k = 
315) this was measured using liking scales, indicating that participants liked fluent stimuli more than 
non-fluent stimuli. However, there was some generalisability across affective measures, with 
participants also finding fluent stimuli as more pleasant (k = 23) and beautiful (k = 19) than non-fluent 
stimuli. Participants also chose fluent stimuli over non-fluent stimuli in preference choice (k = 20), 
evaluated fluent stimuli higher (k = 31), and rated fluent stimuli higher on composite scales such as 
PANAS (k = 5) and those created by the authors of their respective studies (k = 67). Importantly, fluent 
conditions were also disliked less (k = 31) than non-fluent conditions, which is consistent with the 
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hedonic marking position stating that fluency is affectively positive, but not with two-step models (e.g. 
perceptual fluency/attribution, Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; nonspecific activation, Mandler 
et al., 1987) which suggest that fluency is affectively neutral and can be attributed to any relevant scale. 
Two step models would therefore have predicted that fluent conditions would be disliked more than 
non-fluent conditions.  
Support for the hedonic marking prediction that affect is genuinely evoked by fluency was also 
supported by the Meta-Analysis. Results indicated that participants reacted more positively to fluent 
stimuli compared to non-fluent stimuli when recorded using fEMG (k = 24). Crucially, this captured a 
positive affective response in absence of a rating scale. This is again in opposition to two-step models 
which predict that increased affective responses to fluency are not genuine, and only manifest when 
cued with an appropriate rating scale (such as a liking scale).  
When the hedonic marking model’s predictions are applied to the set of materials in this thesis, it would 
be expected that the fluent (operationalised as Coherent) business scenarios would be liked more than 
the non-fluent (operationalised as Incoherent) scenarios, regardless of whether those scenarios were 
positive (operationalised as Low risk) or negative (operationalised as High risk). The results of the 
business scenario tasks in Experiments 1, 2, (Chapter 3) and 4 (Chapter 4) showed support for hedonic 
marking in the positive conditions, with liking ratings increasing in response to fluency, although this 
was not the case for the negative conditions. However, results from the IAPS image rating task in 
Experiment 4 did demonstrate that fluent stimuli were liked more than non-fluent stimuli, regardless of 
whether the images were positive or negative. Stronger support was obtained from Experiment 5 
(Chapter 4), when separate liking and disliking unipolar scales (unlike Experiments 1 and 2, which used 
bipolar scales) were used, and the separation of the scales was increased to between groups (unlike 
Experiment 4, which used repeated measures for the completion of unipolar scales). Results from 
Experiment 5 demonstrated that fluency could evoke a positive affective response in both positive and 
negative scenarios. This was consistent with Experiment 6 (Chapter 5), which demonstrated increased 
zygomaticus activity from baseline for fluent (vs non-fluent) scenarios, for both positive and negative 
conditions. Experiment 6 also supported the second prediction of hedonic marking, by demonstrating 
that increased fluency results in an increased positive affective response in the absence of self-report 
scales to cue the participants, highlighting that genuine affect had been evoked.  
However, not all of the results obtained from the current set of studies could be explained by the hedonic 
marking mode. Firstly from the Meta-Analysis, when the observations were categorised based on the 
valence of stimuli used, results indicated that participants responded positively to fluency when stimuli 
were positive, neutral, or a mixture of valences. However, when stimuli were negative, participants did 
not show a preference for fluent stimuli. There were also inconsistencies from the experimental data. 
Firstly, although Experiment 2 and the business scenario task in Experiment 4 demonstrated that 
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participants liked fluent scenarios more than non-fluent scenarios in the positive condition, this was not 
the case in the negative condition, where no significant differences in liking were found between fluent 
and non-fluent scenarios. The results of Experiments 4, 5, and 6 also found differences when positive 
and negative affect were measured separately. Although hedonic marking’s predictions for disliking are 
not as clear as for liking, it would not expect for fluent conditions to be disliked more than non-fluent 
conditions. This pattern is in line with two-step accounts (perceptual fluency/attribution: Bornstein & 
D’Agostino, 1992, 1994; nonspecific activation: Mandler et al., 1987), which hedonic marking 
explicitly contends. Therefore, the findings that negative images were disliked more when fluent than 
non-fluent (Experiment 4), that negative business scenarios were disliked more when fluent than non-
fluent (Experiments 4 & 5), and that negative business scenarios were met with a greater increase in 
corrugator activity from baseline when fluent than non-fluent, are all inconsistent with hedonic marking. 
Therefore, despite considerable evidence for the hedonic marking hypothesis, in the extant literature 
via Meta-Analysis and from new experiments presented in this thesis, it is clear that the model cannot 
explain the full pattern of results. A common approach to fluency research is to compare the hedonic 
marking hypothesis against fluency amplification (Cheetham et al., 2014; Chetverikov & Kristjánsson, 
2016; Gerger et al., 2016; Muth et al., 2015). However, as shown in the following section, the analysis 
of fluency amplification against the findings in this thesis presents a similar problem of only partial 
explanation of the results.  
6.2 Fluency Amplification 
The fluency amplification model was initially proposed as an extension of the hedonic marking 
hypothesis, with Albrecht and Carbon (2014) noting that previous studies on affective responses to 
fluency had predominantly used neutral and positive stimuli. This argument was supported by the 
results of the Meta-Analysis presented in this thesis, which found that observations using negative 
stimuli (k = 30) were in the minority, compared to those using neutral (k = 445) or positive stimuli (k = 
87). Adding to Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) observation, the Meta-Analysis also found that studies 
using negative scales (k = 31) were also in the minority (out of 591 observations). Furthermore, 
observations that had used both negative stimuli and negative scales was limited to just three, all 
originating from a single study (Holman, 2013), highlighting the importance of addressing this gap in 
the current thesis.  
This thesis also found support consistent with the predictions of fluency amplification: that the affective 
response to fluency is not always positive, but is dependent on, and congruent with, the valence of the 
stimuli in question. Experiment 1 provided some initial suggestion of this pattern, with the results 
forming a step-like function when plotted across four levels, consistent with the prediction that fluency 
boosts the affective response in the direction of the stimuli’s valence. The confounded nature of 
Experiment 1 meant that this finding should be treated tentatively, however later experiments added 
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stronger support once positive and negative affect were measured separately. In both Experiment 4 
(image rating and business scenario tasks) and Experiment 5, results indicated that fluent stimuli were 
liked more than non-fluent stimuli in the positive conditions, and that fluent stimuli were also disliked 
more than non-fluent stimuli in the negative conditions. This pattern was consistent when measured 
using fEMG in Experiment 6: fluent scenarios were met with a greater increase in zygomaticus 
(indicating positive affect) activity compared to non-fluent scenarios in the positive condition; fluent 
scenarios were met with a greater increase in corrugator (indicating negative affect) activity compared 
to non-fluent scenarios in the negative condition.  
However, as with the analysis of the hedonic marking model (6.1), fluency amplification was not able 
to explain the full range of results obtained in this thesis. Significant deviations from fluency 
amplification were found in the Meta-Analysis, which found that participants preferred fluent stimuli 
to non-fluent stimuli when those stimuli were of a neutral valence (k = 445). Furthermore, there was no 
significant difference the in the effect sizes between observations using neutral stimuli to those using 
positive stimuli (k = 87). This is in contrast to the fluency amplification account, which suggests that 
fluency amplifies stimuli valence; if the valence of the stimuli is neutral, then there is nothing to amplify. 
In other words, fluency amplification would predict no difference in affective response between fluent 
and non-fluent stimuli of a neutral valence. Results of the Meta-Analysis also failed to observe the 
model’s predicted amplification of negative stimuli valence: the effect size for observations using 
negative stimuli (k = 30) was not significantly different from 0.  
There were also results inconsistent with fluency amplification arising from the experiments conducted 
in this thesis. Firstly, although Experiment 1 appeared to support a fluency amplification pattern, it 
could be questioned why the magnitude of affective response to fluent-positive stimuli was greater than 
that to the fluent-negative stimuli. Perhaps this was due to the asymmetricity of the scenario valences, 
with the negative scenarios being closer to neutral valence and the positive scenarios being further away 
from neutral valence. However, it should also be noted that a similar pattern emerged in Albrecht and 
Carbon’s (2014) paper on fluency amplification. Results from this paper suggested that fluent stimuli 
were liked more than non-fluent stimuli in the very positive and mildly positive categories; but fluent 
stimuli were only disliked more than non-fluent stimuli in the very negative category – for the mildly 
negative category, there was no significant difference between fluent and non-fluent stimuli. It is 
unclear from the interpretation of fluency amplification alone, why differing magnitudes of response 
might emerge between positive and negative stimuli. 
The fluency amplification account was also unable to explain the results from Experiment 2, where no 
difference was found between the fluent and non-fluent scenarios in the negative condition. Fluency 
amplification would have instead predicted that the fluent scenarios would be disliked more than the 
non-fluent scenarios. Similarly in Experiments 5 and 6, results showed that fluent scenarios were liked 
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more than non-fluent scenarios in both the positive and negative conditions. In contrast, fluency 
amplification would have predicted that the increase in positive affect would have only occurred in the 
positive condition, whereas increasing fluency in the negative condition should only have resulted in a 
negative affective response i.e. amplifying the stimuli’s valence. Therefore, although evidence has been 
found for the fluency amplification pattern, the above deviations demonstrate that the model was unable 
to explain the full range of results obtained across this thesis. 
6.3 Multi-source account 
As the previous sections demonstrate, neither the hedonic marking nor the fluency amplification models 
can explain all of the results in isolation. Therefore, prior approaches to assessing affective responses 
to fluency by comparing the models as competing accounts are inappropriate. Instead, the full pattern 
of results can be explained if the two models are considered to be separate mechanisms, both 
contributing to the overall affective response. This co-existence is predicted by the multi-source 
account, a novel model proposed by the current thesis.  
With hedonic marking and fluency amplification both contributing to affective responses, the multi-
source account predicts that increasing fluency will result in an increase in positive affect (via hedonic 
marking), as well as an increase in negative affect when stimuli are negative (via fluency amplification). 
Evidence for this combined response has been found across the current set of experiments. Firstly, when 
measured on bipolar scales, the multi-source account suggests that increasing fluency in the negative 
condition would result in both positive and negative affect being evoked, which would then interact 
when participants made their overall affective response judgements. This interaction could explain the 
reduced affective response, as shown in Experiment 1. Furthermore, the two directions of affective 
response could cancel each other out, leading to the appearance of no significant difference between 
fluent and non-fluent scenarios in Experiment 2’s negative condition.  
The co-occurrence of positive and negative affect was then more diagnostically tested in Chapters 4 
and 5, where these affective responses were recorded separately. This was firstly done using self-report 
scales. In the image rating task in Experiment 4 and the business scenario rating task in Experiment 5, 
the findings indicated that fluency resulted in an increase in liking for both positive and negative stimuli, 
as well as an increase in disliking for the negative stimuli. This pattern is in line with the predictions of 
the multi-source account, whilst hedonic marking alone would not account for the increase in negative 
affect, and fluency amplification alone would not account for the increase in positive affect in the 
negative conditions.  
Although these experiments demonstrated that fluency could result in increases in both positive and 
negative affect, it was questioned whether this showed that the affective responses were occurring 
simultaneously: Experiment 4 measured liking and disliking one after the other, and Experiment 5 
measured liking and disliking in a between groups design. Experiment 6 however, used fEMG to 
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separately and simultaneously measure positive and negative affect. Results indicated that fluency 
resulted in an increase in zygomaticus activity (indicating positive affect; Cacioppo et al., 1986) in both 
positive and negative conditions, as well as an increase in corrugator activity (indicating negative affect; 
Cacioppo et al., 1986) in the negative condition. Once again this is consistent with the multi-source 
account. In contrast, the hedonic marking hypothesis suggests that fluency selectively evokes positive 
affective responses (Winkielman et al., 2003), and therefore does not account for the increase in 
corrugator activity. Similarly, fluency amplification suggests that fluency amplifies the valence of 
stimuli (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014), and therefore does not account for the increase in zygomaticus 
activity in the negative condition.  
One result that was inconsistent with the multi-source account was from the business scenario task in 
Experiment 4. In this experiment, results indicated that fluency resulted in an increase in positive affect 
in the positive scenarios and an increase in negative affect in the negative scenarios. This was a pattern 
consistent with fluency amplification. However, there was no significant difference in liking between 
the fluent and non-fluent scenarios in the negative condition, which was predicted by the multi-source 
account. It was argued that a reason for the lack of this finding was due to the within-subjects design. 
Firstly, participants may have found it too difficult to complete both a liking and disliking scale for each 
trial (Winkielman et al., 2003). Secondly, naïve theory suggests that people attribute fluency to the most 
appropriate source (Oppenheimer, 2008; Schwarz, 2004). In Experiment 4, participants may have 
therefore attributed fluency onto the liking scale in positive scenarios, and onto the disliking scale in 
the negative scenarios. This would explain why fluency did not increase ratings on both scales. Evidence 
for this argument was gathered in subsequent experiments when the measurement of affect was 
separated by a between groups design (Experiment 5) or by using fEMG in place of self-report scales 
(Experiment 6).  
Previous accounts of affective responses to fluency had positioned fluency amplification as an extension 
of the hedonic marking hypothesis (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014). This thesis has demonstrated that this 
stance is inappropriate, due to the differing predictions regarding neutral stimuli. Fluency amplification 
predicts that increasing fluency results in the amplification of stimuli valence; if the stimuli are neutral, 
then there is no valence to amplify. As suggested in Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) paper, there should 
be no difference in affective responses between fluent and non-fluent neutral stimuli. This is in 
opposition to hedonic marking, which predicts that the increase in fluency should result in an increase 
in positive affect, a wealth of evidence in the extant literature (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009; Cacioppo 
et al., 1986; Harmon-Jones & Allen, 2001; Reber et al., 1998; Topolinski et al., 2009; Winkielman & 
Cacioppo, 2001), and the results of the Meta-Analysis presented in Chapter 2. This significant 
difference regarding neutral stimuli renders fluency amplification incompatible as an extension of 
hedonic marking. Other accounts had positioned hedonic making and fluency amplification as 
competing accounts. This stance was also problematic, as previous research had not fully examined 
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positive and negative responses to stimuli of varying valences. For example, previous research has 
traditionally not utilised stimuli of negative valence (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014; Winkielman & 
Cacioppo (2001), whilst Albrecht and Carbon’s (2014) own paper on fluency amplification did not 
separately measure positive and negative affect. The current thesis has instead suggested that these two 
models actually co-exist, with both mechanisms contributing to the overall affective response. The 
multi-source account therefore makes a novel theoretical contribution to the study of affective responses 
to fluency. 
In short, researchers have been questioning the pattern of affective responses to fluency: “(according to 
the hedonic marking hypothesis) the feeling of fluency is claimed to be per se positive… Others claim 
that the feeling of fluency is affectively unspecific… or that fluency amplifies affective evaluations… 
Conclusive evidence is still lacking” (Forster et al., 2015, p. 2). This thesis addresses the question, 
proposing that both hedonic marking and fluency amplification contribute to affective responses in a 
multi-source model, and that conclusive evidence had not been previously found due to inappropriate 
positioning of these accounts as competing explanations.  
6.4 Methodological contribution 
In addition to the above theoretical contributions, the current thesis also made methodological 
contributions for researchers interested in studying the effects of fluency. Similar to many studies in the 
literature (Albrecht & Carbon, 2014; Belke et al., 2010; Forster et al., 2016; Greifender et al., 2010; 
Topolinski & Strack, 2009c; Winkielman et al., 2006), Experiments 1-3 in the current thesis used 
bipolar scales to measure liking. However, bipolar scales are only able to measure an overall affective 
response, rather than the individual positive and negative reactions. It is therefore important for 
researchers to also use separate positive and negative unipolar scales. It is also important that these 
scales are separated in the experimental procedure. As was shown in Experiment 4, asking participants 
to complete the two scales one after the other, can be difficult for participants (Winkielman et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, this difficulty may lead to participants attributing fluency onto one scale; in Experiment 
4, it was argued that participants attributed fluency onto the liking scale when the scenario was positive, 
but onto the disliking scale when the scenario was negative. However, separating the scales using a 
blocked design (Experiment 4’s image rating task) or using a between groups design (Experiment 5), 
allowed clearer measurement of separate positive and negative affect. Finally, the use of fEMG was 
able to separately measure positive and negative affect simultaneously.  
Each of the methods have advantages and limitations. The use of bipolar scales cannot separately 
measure positive and negative affect, but do provide clues for how these two responses interact. 
Separate unipolar measurement can measure positive and negative affect, but it is not possible to 
determine whether these responses occurred at the same time. fEMG could detect simultaneous positive 
and negative affect, but with this method alone does not inform researchers whether the affect was 
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consciously experienced. Only through the combination and triangulation of these methods could a full 
picture of affective responses to fluency could be painted, thereby challenging future research to adopt 
a range of approaches.  
6.5. Judgements of Risk 
Although the main aim of this thesis was to investigate affective responses to coherence and fluency, 
the results of the experiments presented here have also provided insight regarding fluency’s influence 
on judgements of risk. Firstly, Experiments 1 and 2 found that when risk rating scales were presented 
alongside liking scales for participants to complete, fluency only appeared to have an effect on liking. 
In Experiment 1, the business scenarios were rated for risk in a linear fashion, in a pattern predicted by 
simple tallying of the number of high and low risk items in each scenario (Dawes, 1979), whilst 
Experiment 2 found neither a significant main effect of fluency, nor a significant interaction effect 
between fluency and valence, on the risk ratings. However, when participants completed the same task 
under time pressure (Experiment 3), results indicated that the risk ratings were influenced by fluency. 
The pattern of risk ratings suggested that fluent scenarios were judged to be less risky than non-fluent 
scenarios in the positive condition. In the negative condition, there was no difference in risk rating 
between fluent and non-fluent scenarios. This provided two important theoretical implications. Firstly, 
that risk ratings can be influenced by fluency under time pressure. This was consistent with previous 
research that has suggested that time pressure increases the use of heuristics (De Neys, 2006; Evans & 
Curtis-Holmes, 2005; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Roberts & Newton, 2001; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983), including for the judgement of risk (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et al., 2004), and therefore adds 
support to this literature on decision making under time constraints.  
Secondly, the pattern of risk ratings in Experiment 3 was similar to that of the liking ratings in 
Experiment 2 (i.e. effect of fluency in positive scenarios; no effect of fluency in negative scenarios), 
which had been predicted by the multi-source account. It is therefore possible that, under time pressure, 
risk ratings are cued by affective response. This would be consistent with Finucane et al. (2000) and 
Slovic et al. (2004) who noted the use of the affect heuristic under time pressure, and also Topolinski’s 
(Topolinski, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009d) FAIM model which suggests that fluency-evoked affect 
serves as a cue for judgement. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 therefore provided initial evidence 
that judgements other than affect are also follow a multi-source pattern. 
This was supported by the results of Experiment 6. In this experiment, participants only completed a 
risk rating self-report scale, with their affective responses measured using fEMG in place of the liking 
SAM scale. With removal of the liking scale, the risk ratings once again followed the multi-source 
pattern: In the positive condition, participants judged fluent scenarios to be less risky non-fluent 
scenarios; In the negative condition there was no significant different in risk ratings between fluent and 
non-fluent scenarios.  
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This also has practical implications. If schema coherent businesses are judged to be less risky than 
schema incoherent businesses, it suggests that people find typical or expected risks to be less 
problematic than atypical or unexpected risks. In terms of decision making, it is not clear whether this 
effect would be damaging. On the one hand, underweighting typical risks might not be a problem, as 
typical risks are those that people are most likely to mitigate, insure against, or design safeguards for. 
On the other hand, underweighting of typical risks could be dangerous, as these are the risks which are 
more likely to occur. This effect is therefore worth further investigation, which could be done by 
matching business scenario items with actuarial data. Widening the scope, it is also of interest to 
determine whether other judgments follow a multi-source patter; not just for risk judgements, but also 
truth, familiarity, value, and other domains that have been shown to be influenced by fluency (see Alter 
& Oppenheimer, 2009, for a review). 
6.6 Limitations and Direction of Research 
6.6.1 Ecological Validity  
Alongside the primary aim of investigating the patterns of affective responses to fluency, it was the 
intention of this thesis to introduce a novel set of materials. The rationale for this was to expand the 
literature on fluency by adding stimuli which were both conceptual by nature and had ecological validity 
– two categories of stimuli which were found to be under represented in the literature review (Chapter 
1) and Meta-Analysis (Chapter 2). The task items themselves had ecological validity as they were 
derived from industry reports, such as those obtained from Mintel and Datamonitor. However, one 
might argue that the task itself lacked the same level of ecological validity. This was because the task 
items were presented one at a time, sequentially on-screen, with participants being asked to enter a 
numerical liking and/or risk rating. This process is quite different from the way in which people interact 
with business scenarios and industry reports in real life as they would typically have access to the entire 
article at once. The rationale for sequential presentation was that it provided the opportunity to measure 
response times for like-for-like items of information, whilst the presentation of a full business report 
will lose the element of control. Nonetheless, the task is not entirely artificial. For example, someone 
completing a systematic review would undergo a similar task of reading information from an article 
and numerically score criteria for bias or risk.  
A benefit of the current thesis was the validation of the set of business scenarios. Whilst the experiments 
presented here utilised sequential presentation of items, future studies may be able to present full 
business reports based on this validation. A similar approach has been taken in the literature. For 
example, Holman’s (2013) study manipulated fluency using contour priming based on this manipulation 
being successful in Reber et al. (1998), rather than re-confirming it; Topolinski et al. (2009) manipulated 
fluency using semantic coherence based on Topolinski and Strack (2009c); Mantonakis et al. (2013) 
used a font manipulation based on Song and Schwarz (2008). Therefore, whilst there may be arguments 
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regarding the realism of the task used in the current experiments, the design has been necessary and 
provides support for future studies.  
6.6.2 Mild Valence  
Related to the issue of ecological validity is that of the level of valence used in the current experiments. 
The business scenarios were constructed to be either mildly positive or mildly negative. This decision 
was made partially to make the business scenarios realistic, and industry reports from which the items 
were gathered do not tend to be emotionally-charged. It should be noted that it is possible to create 
scenarios with more emotive content, such as the examples used by Finucane et al. (2000) and Slovic 
et al. (2004), such as cigarettes, nuclear power, and pesticides, however, this was decided against in 
order to detect affective responses to fluency which have been described as “brief, mild” (Winkielman 
& Cacioppo, 2001, p. 989) and “subtle” (Topolinski, 2011, p. 280). Therefore, creating scenarios which 
were extremely negative would increase the risk that affective responses would become undetectable 
against the stimuli valence. Mildly valenced scenarios were also chosen based on the results of Albrecht 
and Carbon (2014), who found a significant difference in liking between fluent and non-fluent stimuli 
which were mildly positive, but no difference in liking for the mildly negative stimuli. The multi-source 
account hypothesised that this was because the fluent, mildly negative stimuli evoked both positive and 
negative affect; crafting mildly negative stimuli for the current set of experiments therefore allowed for 
the testing of this hypothesis.   
6.6.3 Valence-only Affect Measurement 
The experiments in this thesis measured affective responses using the valence version of the SAM scale 
and using fEMG. A limitation of this thesis is therefore that affective responses were limited to valence. 
However, there is more to affect than valence, such as arousal and motivation dimensions (Harmon-
Jones et al., 2011; Lang et al., 1990). The reason for choosing to measure affect along the valence 
dimension was to investigate the contributions of the hedonic marking and fluency amplification 
models, both of which have been researched in terms of valence. This was supported by the findings of 
the Meta-Analysis (Chapter 2), where the overwhelming majority of observations had measured affect 
using valence: 315 observations used a liking self-report scale, 67 used a composite scale incorporating 
liking, 31 observations used an evaluation scale (e.g. good-bad), and 27 used the valence version of the 
SAM scale. In contrast, only a minority of observations used arousal (k = 2) or intensity (k = 1). Some 
observations (k = 5) did use an approach/avoidance apparatus to record affective response. This 
apparatus asks participants to make bicep flexion (approach) or tricep extension (avoidance) motions 
to indicate their response, and can therefore be used to capture the motivation aspect of affect. However, 
the studies that used this method also labelled the apparatus; participants were told to make the 
associated movement to indicate whether they liked/disliked the target stimuli (Jones et al., 2011), or 
whether the target stimuli were good/bad (Carr et al., 2016). As a result, the disentanglement of the 
motivation dimension from the valence dimension becomes difficult.  
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As the aim of the current thesis was to further understand the contributions of hedonic marking and 
fluency amplification, and these models had been based on studies investigating valence, it was rational 
for the current experiments to also use a valence measure. However, as has been discovered from the 
Meta-Analysis, there is a gap in the literature regarding arousal and motivation responses to fluency. A 
challenge for future studies is to determine whether fluency’s influence on valence generalise to other 
dimensions of affect.  
6.6.4 Objective and Subjective Fluency 
Fluency may or may not be consciously experienced (Reber et al., 2002; Winkielman et al., 2003). The 
current set of studies recorded objective fluency by measuring the response times to stimuli, 
demonstrating that participants processed Coherent information faster than Incoherent information. On 
the other hand, subjective fluency is the conscious experience of processing ease. Whilst increases in 
objective fluency can influence subjective fluency (e.g. self-reported judgements of processing ease; 
Reber et al., 2002), these types of fluency can also be dissociated. Firstly, objective fluency is not 
necessarily consciously felt by the participants, as with well-practised tasks (Winkielman et al., 2003). 
Secondly, subjective fluency can arise in absence of increased objective fluency. For example, Forster 
et al. (2015) provided participants with false feedback regarding their skin conductance, informing them 
that this corresponded to processing ease. Participants reported higher self-reported felt fluency 
(subjective fluency) after they had been given false feedback indicating high processing ease, even 
when the objective fluency was controlled. Finally, objective and subjective fluency can produce 
opposing responses. Anecdotally, alcohol creates a sense of subjective fluency, despite actually slowing 
response times (Winkielman et al., 2003). Experimentally, Whittlesea and Williams (1998) found that 
novel real words were processed faster than novel pseudohomophones (words that look like nonwords, 
but are pronounced like real words: PHRAWG, KANSER, BAUTEL), however the subjective fluency 
measure was greater for the pseudohomophones.  
As a next step, it would therefore be interesting to investigate how subjective fluency relates to the 
multi-source account. One argument would be that the liking ratings captured in the current set of 
experiments were really the affective aspect of felt fluency, and therefore reflected subjective fluency 
(Forester et al., 2015). This is consistent with Topolinski’s Fluency Affect Intuition Model (FAIM; 
Topolinski, 2009; Topolinski & Strack, 2009d), which suggests that the affective response triggered by 
objective fluency emerges as a subjective feeling, as well as the findings of Forster et al. (2013) who 
demonstrated positive association between objective fluency, liking, and subjective fluency ratings. If 
this was the case, the multi-source account would predict that ratings of felt fluency would mirror those 
of the bipolar affective response. This has implications for negative stimuli: increasing the fluency of 
negative stimuli would result in a positive (via hedonic marking) and negative (via fluency 
amplification) affective response, and these two directions of affective response would interact, and 
possibly cancel each other out. If subjective fluency was based on this affective response, it could 
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therefore give a false impression of reduced fluency. Alternatively, people may be able to dissociate 
their positive and negative affective responses, with subjective fluency being based on just one of these. 
Although further investigation is required, a combination of fEMG, bipolar liking scales, and felt 
fluency measurement could help to determine whether subjective fluency was more closely based on 
objective fluency, an individual affective response, or the combined affective response.  
6.6.5 Power 
Sensitivity analysis conducted for each experiment revealed that the sample sizes obtained were suitable 
to provide sufficient power (> .80) for larger effect sizes. Whilst this is appropriate for the larger, 
significant main effects, the reliance on larger effect sizes presents a challenge for interpreting the 
interaction effects. This is because the interaction effects arose due to null effects in certain 
comparisons, reducing the effect sizes and observed power. With reduced power, there is an increased 
risk of making Type II errors, and therefore caution must be taken with interpretation when the null 
hypotheses were not rejected.  
For example, Experiment 2 found a significant interaction effect between fluency (operationalised by 
coherence) and valence (operationalised by risk), whereby fluency appeared to evoke increased liking 
in the positive scenarios, but not in the negative scenarios. The interpretation of this null effect 
suggested that it occurred due to both positive and negative affective responses arising from fluency, 
which cancelled each other out. This was argued against an alternative explanation suggesting that no 
affect had been evoked. However, the interaction effect had an observed power (0.70) that was below 
the desirable threshold (0.80). There is therefore a third explanation for the null effect: that there was a 
true difference in liking between the fluent and non-fluent scenarios, but the study lacked the power to 
detect it. Similarly, Experiment 6 found a significant interaction effect between fluency and valence for 
the corrugator activity, suggesting that fluency evokes negative affect (increased corrugator activity) in 
negative scenarios, but not in positive scenarios. The observed power for this interaction (0.63) was 
again below the threshold, meaning the possibility of a true difference should not be ruled out.  
Despite this uncertainty, confidence for a multi-source account can be gained. Firstly, due to the number 
of replications in the current thesis with an emerging pattern of results best described by multi-source, 
and inconsistent with hedonic marking or fluency amplification in isolation. Secondly, this pattern of 
results remains to be best explained by multi-source over the other two accounts, even once the null 
effects are ignored and only the significant effects are ignored. Thirdly, Experiment 5 – which provided 
the clearest test of the accounts amongst the current behavioural experiments – found effects that were 
not only consistent with multi-source, but were also sufficiently powered (including the interaction 
effect). Nonetheless, replications with larger sample sizes would be advisable in order to increase the 
power for interaction effects. Further confidence can also be gained by extending the cut-off date for 
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the Meta-Analysis conducted in Chapter 2 to include the results of the experiments in this thesis, 
amongst other available literature, and achieving greater power through the pooling of observations.  
6.7 Conclusion 
This thesis investigated the pattern of affective responses to coherence, using Meta-Analysis, 
behavioural experimentation, and fEMG. Based on the results gathered across these methods, a novel 
multi-source approach was proposed. The multi-source model advances the understanding of affective 
responses to fluency, by demonstrating that affect can be evoked by both the hedonic marking and 
fluency amplification hypotheses, which is a stance not previously considered in the literature. 
Interestingly, this meant that when fluency is increased for negative stimuli, both positive and negative 
affect can be evoked, which highlights the importance for future studies involving fluency to consider 
separate measurement of positive and negative affect, alongside manipulation of stimuli valence.  
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Appendix I – Business scenarios for Experiment 1 
Leisure Centre Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A premium independent leisure centre in town offering state of the art facilities, including 25m swimming pool, 
fitness centre, squash courts, and individual suites for classes and courses. 
Item 1 Boom in interest in sport 
following the London 
2012 Olympics 
Boom in interest in sport 
following the London 
2012 Olympics 
Weak economy, and lack 
of disposable income, 
means membership fees 
are an expensive 
commitment 
Weak economy, and lack 
of disposable income, 
means membership fees 
are an expensive 
commitment 
Item 2 Extremely wet weather in 
2012/13 means customers 
favouring indoor facilities 
Extremely wet weather in 
2012/13 means customers 
favouring indoor facilities 
Competition from large-
chain gyms which are able 
to offer 24 hour opening 
times 
Competition from large-
chain gyms which are able 
to offer 24 hour opening 
times 
Item 3 Government increasingly 
promoting activities that 
lead to a healthy, active 
lifestyle, for example as 
part of the Health, Work 
and Wellbeing initiative 
Increase in popularity of 
free sports such as running 
and cycling increases 
competition 
Government increasingly 
promoting activities that 
lead to a healthy, active 
lifestyle, for example as 
part of the Health, Work 
and Wellbeing initiative 
Increase in popularity of 
free sports such as running 
and cycling increases 
competition 
     
Coffee Shop Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A popular brand coffee shop situated on a busy high-street in the town centre, offering a selection of hot and cold 
drinks to take away or drink inside, as well as a variety of sandwiches and cakes.   
Item 1 Out of home coffee 
purchases remain popular, 
with many people visiting 
a coffee shop as part of 
their daily 
commute/routine 
Out of home coffee 
purchases remain popular, 
with many people visiting 
a coffee shop as part of 
their daily 
commute/routine 
Fast food outlets have 
increased their coffee 
product offering, 
increasing competition 
from non-specialist outlets 
Fast food outlets have 
increased their coffee 
product offering, 
increasing competition 
from non-specialist outlets 
Item 2 Fair trade products which 
support producers 
maintain goodwill with 
customers 
Fair trade products which 
support producers 
maintain goodwill with 
customers 
A very competitive 
market, with several well 
known brands operating 
coffee shops on the same 
high street 
A very competitive 
market, with several well 
known brands operating 
coffee shops on the same 
high street 
Item 3 Customers enjoy a product 
different to what they 
usually have at home, such 
as something authentic or 
seasonal products 
Perception of high prices 
and poor value for money 
have caused consumers to 
explore cheaper 
alternatives 
Customers enjoy a product 
different to what they 
usually have at home, such 
as something authentic or 
seasonal products 
Perception of high prices 
and poor value for money 
have caused consumers to 
explore cheaper 
alternatives 
 
  
II 
 
Clothing Retail 
1 
Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s clothes, as well 
as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger consumers (16-24).    
Item 1 Prices are able to remain 
stable as consumers 
prioritise quality and 
durability 
Prices are able to remain 
stable as consumers 
prioritise quality and 
durability 
Young consumers in 
particular feeling financial 
pressure, and reducing 
their spending 
Young consumers in 
particular feeling financial 
pressure, and reducing 
their spending 
Item 2 Social media sites  are an 
effective way of increasing 
the consumers' awareness 
of fashion, brands and 
offers 
Social media sites  are an 
effective way of 
increasing the consumers' 
awareness of fashion, 
brands and offers 
High street shops face 
increasing pressure from 
online stores 
High street shops face 
increasing pressure from 
online stores 
Item 3 Brand loyalty remains 
high, especially for those 
with a distinct USP 
(Unique Selling Point) 
Several big brands hold a 
large market share 
Brand loyalty remains 
high, especially for those 
with a distinct USP 
(Unique Selling Point) 
Several big brands hold a 
large market share 
     
Clothing Retail 
2 
Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s clothes, as well 
as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger consumers (16-24).    
Item 1 Staff costs remain 
relatively low 
Staff costs remain 
relatively low 
Retailers face competition 
from non-specialist stores 
such as Asda, Tesco etc 
Retailers face competition 
from non-specialist stores 
such as Asda, Tesco etc 
Item 2 Shops are able to attract 
and maintain customers by 
differentiating from the 
competition 
Shops are able to attract 
and maintain customers by 
differentiating from the 
competition 
Consumers place 
increasing importance on 
delivery options – retailers 
need to invest in delivery 
networks and supply chain 
Consumers place 
increasing importance on 
delivery options – retailers 
need to invest in delivery 
networks and supply chain 
Item 3 Historically been an area 
relatively immune to 
economic conditions – 
with consumers preferring 
to cut back in other areas 
Historically been an area 
relatively immune to 
economic conditions – 
with consumers preferring 
to cut back in other areas 
Newness is an important 
consideration for 
consumers – retailers need 
to update ranges frequently 
Newness is an important 
consideration for 
consumers – retailers need 
to update ranges frequently 
 
  
III 
 
Homeware Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A large independent homeware store selling the latest ranges in kitchenware, home décor, and soft furnishings. The 
store features a wide array of items on display, whilst also offering click-and-collect and home delivery options via 
in store or online. 
Item 1 Increased interest in home 
baking and cooking has 
increased the demand for 
cookware and bakeware 
Increased interest in home 
baking and cooking has 
increased the demand for 
cookware and bakeware 
Shops face large pressure 
from internet-only sellers 
Shops face large pressure 
from internet-only sellers 
Item 2 Consumers are cutting 
back on eating out, 
increasing the sales of 
cookware 
Consumers are cutting 
back on eating out, 
increasing the sales of 
cookware 
It has been difficult for 
younger people to get onto 
the housing ladder – those 
who live with parents or 
rent accommodation spend 
less than home-owners 
It has been difficult for 
younger people to get onto 
the housing ladder – those 
who live with parents or 
rent accommodation spend 
less than home-owners 
Item 3 TV cooking programmes 
have encouraged 
increasing numbers of 
people to cook from 
scratch 
The market is congested 
with high volumes of low 
priced goods 
TV cooking programmes 
have encouraged 
increasing numbers of 
people to cook from 
scratch 
The market is congested 
with high volumes of low 
priced goods 
     
Manufacturing 
1 
Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A large privately owned manufacturing company specialising in the development and production of fluid systems. 
Products are used by a wide range of businesses in different sectors including chemical, power, oil and gas, and 
water, both in the UK and overseas.   
Item 1 Specialised machinery is 
expensive, therefore high 
start-up costs discourage 
competitors entering the 
market 
Specialised machinery is 
expensive, therefore high 
start-up costs discourage 
competitors entering the 
market 
Specialised machinery is 
expensive, which means 
high costs for purchasing 
and maintaining 
equipment 
Specialised machinery is 
expensive, which means 
high costs for purchasing 
and maintaining 
equipment 
Item 2 Supplies to a wide range 
of businesses, allowing 
the company to spread its 
risk 
Supplies to a wide range 
of businesses, allowing 
the company to spread its 
risk 
Equipment is valuable, so 
risk of theft is high 
Equipment is valuable, so 
risk of theft is high 
Item 3 Advances in technology 
means that products can be 
made more efficiently 
Working capital cycle can 
be high due to the time it 
takes to manufacture 
products, meaning cash-
flow can be weak 
Advances in technology 
means that products can be 
made more efficiently 
Working capital cycle can 
be high due to the time it 
takes to manufacture 
products, meaning cash-
flow can be weak 
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Manufacturing 
2 
Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A large independent homeware store selling the latest ranges in kitchenware, home décor, and soft furnishings. The 
store features a wide array of items on display, whilst also offering click-and-collect and home delivery options via 
in store or online. 
Item 1 The product is specialised 
and the company has 
accumulated a large 
amount of industry 
knowledge, making it 
difficult for new 
competitors to enter the 
market 
The product is specialised 
and the company has 
accumulated a large 
amount of industry 
knowledge, making it 
difficult for new 
competitors to enter the 
market 
Large amounts of raw 
materials need to be stored, 
increasing the cost of 
warehouse rental 
Large amounts of raw 
materials need to be stored, 
increasing the cost of 
warehouse rental 
Item 2 Supplies to a wide range of 
businesses, allowing the 
company to spread it’s risk 
Supplies to a wide range 
of businesses, allowing 
the company to spread it’s 
risk 
Expensive shipping costs 
associated with 
distribution to other 
countries 
Expensive shipping costs 
associated with 
distribution to other 
countries 
Item 3 High levels of production 
mean the company can 
make savings due to 
economy of scale 
Distribution to distant 
locations increases the risk 
of theft, damage or loss of 
products during 
transportation 
High levels of production 
mean the company can 
make savings due to 
economy of scale 
Distribution to distant 
locations increases the risk 
of theft, damage or loss of 
products during 
transportation 
     
Pharmaceutical Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A national pharmaceutical company focussing the research, development, and marketing of a range of drug 
treatments and vaccinations.   
Item 1 Holds several patents 
which means the product is 
unique 
Holds several patents 
which means the product 
is unique 
Cost for research and 
development is high 
Cost for research and 
development is high 
Item 2 Engages in large amounts 
of research and 
development which avoids 
tax 
Engages in large amounts 
of research and 
development which 
avoids tax 
Under constant pressure to 
develop new products to 
stay ahead of competition 
Under constant pressure to 
develop new products to 
stay ahead of competition 
Item 3 Advances in technology 
means that production is 
increasingly efficient 
Must adhere to strict 
government policy 
Advances in technology 
means that production is 
increasingly efficient 
Must adhere to strict 
government policy 
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Travel Level 1  Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
Introduction A well-known ‘bricks-and-mortar’ travel agent situated in town offering holiday bookings to a wide range of 
destinations, in the UK and overseas. The company has expanded its online offering, and has expertise in adventure, 
action, and sports holidays. 
Item 1 Recovery of global 
tourism industry 
Recovery of global 
tourism industry 
An area which consumers 
look to cut back on during 
difficult economic times 
An area which consumers 
look to cut back on during 
difficult economic times 
Item 2 The number of domestic 
holidays has steadily 
increased over the last few 
years 
The number of domestic 
holidays has steadily 
increased over the last few 
years 
Big competitor companies 
hold a large market share 
Big competitor companies 
hold a large market share 
Item 3 The company is selling a 
desirable product 
Instability overseas can 
threaten consumer 
confidence 
The company is selling a 
desirable product 
Instability overseas can 
threaten consumer 
confidence 
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Appendix II – Business scenarios for Experiments 2-3 
Leisure Centre Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A premium independent leisure centre in town offering state of the art facilities, including 25m swimming pool, 
fitness centre, squash courts, and individual suites for classes and courses. 
Item 1 Boom in interest in sport 
following the London 
2012 Olympics 
Boom in interest in sport 
following the London 
2012 Olympics 
Weak economy, and lack 
of disposable income, 
means membership fees 
are an expensive 
commitment 
Weak economy, and lack 
of disposable income, 
means membership fees 
are an expensive 
commitment 
Item 2 Extremely wet weather in 
2012/13 means customers 
favouring indoor facilities 
Extremely wet weather in 
2012/13 means customers 
favouring indoor facilities 
Competition from large-
chain gyms which are able 
to offer 24 hour opening 
times 
Competition from large-
chain gyms which are able 
to offer 24 hour opening 
times 
Item 3 Government increasingly 
promoting activities that 
lead to a healthy, active 
lifestyle, for example as 
part of the Health, Work 
and Wellbeing initiative 
Advances in technology 
means that production is 
increasingly efficient 
Increase in popularity of 
free sports such as running 
and cycling increases 
competition 
Must adhere to strict 
government policy 
 
     
Coffee Shop Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A popular brand coffee shop situated on a busy high-street in the town centre, offering a selection of hot and cold 
drinks to take away or drink inside, as well as a variety of sandwiches and cakes.   
Item 1 Out of home coffee 
purchases remain popular, 
with many people visiting 
a coffee shop as part of 
their daily 
commute/routine 
Out of home coffee 
purchases remain popular, 
with many people visiting 
a coffee shop as part of 
their daily 
commute/routine 
Fast food outlets have 
increased their coffee 
product offering, 
increasing competition 
from non-specialist outlets 
Fast food outlets have 
increased their coffee 
product offering, 
increasing competition 
from non-specialist outlets 
Item 2 Fair trade products which 
support producers 
maintain goodwill with 
customers 
Fair trade products which 
support producers 
maintain goodwill with 
customers 
A very competitive 
market, with several well 
known brands operating 
coffee shops on the same 
high street 
A very competitive 
market, with several well 
known brands operating 
coffee shops on the same 
high street 
Item 3 Customers enjoy a 
product different to what 
they usually have at home, 
such as something 
authentic or seasonal 
products 
Historically been an area 
relatively immune to 
economic conditions – 
with consumers preferring 
to cut back in other areas 
Perception of high prices 
and poor value for money 
have caused consumers to 
explore cheaper 
alternatives 
Newness is an important 
consideration for 
consumers – retailers need 
to update ranges 
frequently 
 
     
     
    Coherent item 
    Incoherent item 
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Clothing Retail 1 Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s clothes, as 
well as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger consumers (16-24).    
Item 1 Prices are able to remain 
stable as consumers 
prioritise quality and 
durability 
Prices are able to remain 
stable as consumers 
prioritise quality and 
durability 
Young consumers in 
particular feeling 
financial pressure, and 
reducing their spending 
Young consumers in 
particular feeling 
financial pressure, and 
reducing their spending 
Item 2 Social media sites  are an 
effective way of increasing 
the consumers' awareness 
of fashion, brands and 
offers 
Social media sites  are an 
effective way of increasing 
the consumers' awareness 
of fashion, brands and 
offers 
High street shops face 
increasing pressure from 
online stores 
High street shops face 
increasing pressure 
from online stores 
Item 3 Brand loyalty remains 
high, especially for those 
with a distinct USP 
(Unique Selling Point) 
With the housing market 
looking to improve, 
increased house moves will 
lead to greater sales 
Several big brands hold a 
large market share 
The market is congested 
with high volumes of 
low priced goods 
     
Clothing Retail 2 Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s clothes, as 
well as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically been aimed at younger consumers (16-24).    
Item 1 Staff costs remain 
relatively low 
Staff costs remain 
relatively low 
Retailers face 
competition from non-
specialist stores such as 
Asda, Tesco etc 
Retailers face 
competition from non-
specialist stores such as 
Asda, Tesco etc 
Item 2 Shops are able to attract 
and maintain customers by 
differentiating from the 
competition 
Shops are able to attract 
and maintain customers by 
differentiating from the 
competition 
Consumers place 
increasing importance on 
delivery options – 
retailers need to invest in 
delivery networks and 
supply chain 
Consumers place 
increasing importance 
on delivery options – 
retailers need to invest 
in delivery networks 
and supply chain 
Item 3 Historically been an area 
relatively immune to 
economic conditions – 
with consumers preferring 
to cut back in other areas 
The company has 
accumulated a large 
amount of industry 
knowledge, making it 
difficult for new 
competitors to enter the 
market 
Newness is an important 
consideration for 
consumers – retailers 
need to update ranges 
frequently 
Working capital cycle 
can be high due to the 
time it takes to 
manufacture products, 
meaning cash-flow can 
be weak 
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Homeware Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A large independent homeware store selling the latest ranges in kitchenware, home décor, and soft furnishings. 
The store features a wide array of items on display, whilst also offering click-and-collect and home delivery 
options via in store or online. 
Item 1 Increased interest in home 
baking and cooking has 
increased the demand for 
cookware and bakeware 
Increased interest in home 
baking and cooking has 
increased the demand for 
cookware and bakeware 
Shops face large 
pressure from internet-
only sellers 
Shops face large 
pressure from internet-
only sellers 
Item 2 Consumers are cutting 
back on eating out, 
increasing the sales of 
cookware 
Consumers are cutting 
back on eating out, 
increasing the sales of 
cookware 
It has been difficult for 
younger people to get 
onto the housing ladder – 
those who live with 
parents or rent 
accommodation spend 
less than home-owners 
It has been difficult for 
younger people to get 
onto the housing ladder 
– those who live with 
parents or rent 
accommodation spend 
less than home-owners 
Item 3 TV cooking programmes 
have encouraged 
increasing numbers of 
people to cook from 
scratch 
High levels of production 
mean the company can 
make savings due to 
economy of scale 
The market is congested 
with high volumes of 
low priced goods 
Distribution to distant 
locations increases the 
risk of theft, damage or 
loss of products during 
transportation 
     
Manufacturing 1 Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A large privately owned manufacturing company specialising in the development and production of fluid systems. 
Products are used by a wide range of businesses in different sectors including chemical, power, oil and gas, and 
water, both in the UK and overseas.   
Item 1 Specialised machinery is 
expensive, therefore high 
start-up costs discourage 
competitors entering the 
market 
Specialised machinery is 
expensive, therefore high 
start-up costs discourage 
competitors entering the 
market 
Specialised machinery is 
expensive, which means 
high costs for purchasing 
and maintaining 
equipment 
Specialised machinery 
is expensive, which 
means high costs for 
purchasing and 
maintaining equipment 
Item 2 Supplies to a wide range of 
businesses, allowing the 
company to spread its risk 
Supplies to a wide range of 
businesses, allowing the 
company to spread its risk 
Equipment is valuable, 
so risk of theft is high 
Equipment is valuable, 
so risk of theft is high 
Item 3 Advances in technology 
means that products can be 
made more efficiently 
Brand loyalty remains 
high, especially for those 
with a distinct USP 
(Unique Selling Point) 
Working capital cycle 
can be high due to the 
time it takes to 
manufacture products, 
meaning cash-flow can 
be weak 
Several big brands hold 
a large market share 
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Manufacturing 2 Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A large independent homeware store selling the latest ranges in kitchenware, home décor, and soft furnishings. 
The store features a wide array of items on display, whilst also offering click-and-collect and home delivery 
options via in store or online. 
Item 1 The product is specialised 
and the company has 
accumulated a large 
amount of industry 
knowledge, making it 
difficult for new 
competitors to enter the 
market 
The product is specialised 
and the company has 
accumulated a large 
amount of industry 
knowledge, making it 
difficult for new 
competitors to enter the 
market 
Large amounts of raw 
materials need to be 
stored, increasing the 
cost of warehouse rental 
Large amounts of raw 
materials need to be 
stored, increasing the 
cost of warehouse rental 
Item 2 Supplies to a wide range of 
businesses, allowing the 
company to spread it’s risk 
Supplies to a wide range of 
businesses, allowing the 
company to spread it’s risk 
Expensive shipping costs 
associated with 
distribution to other 
countries 
Expensive shipping 
costs associated with 
distribution to other 
countries 
Item 3 High levels of production 
mean the company can 
make savings due to 
economy of scale 
The company is selling a 
desirable product 
Distribution to distant 
locations increases the 
risk of theft, damage or 
loss of products during 
transportation 
Instability overseas can 
threaten consumer 
confidence 
     
Pharmaceutical Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A national pharmaceutical company focussing the research, development, and marketing of a range of drug 
treatments and vaccinations.   
Item 1 Holds several patents 
which means the product is 
unique 
Holds several patents 
which means the product is 
unique 
Cost for research and 
development is high 
Cost for research and 
development is high 
Item 2 Engages in large amounts 
of research and 
development which avoids 
tax 
Engages in large amounts 
of research and 
development which avoids 
tax 
Under constant pressure 
to develop new products 
to stay ahead of 
competition 
Under constant pressure 
to develop new products 
to stay ahead of 
competition 
Item 3 Advances in technology 
means that production is 
increasingly efficient 
Fair trade products which 
support producers maintain 
goodwill with customers 
Must adhere to strict 
government policy 
Perception of high 
prices and poor value 
for money have caused 
consumers to explore 
cheaper alternatives 
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Travel Coherent-Low risk  Incoherent-Low risk Coherent-High risk Incoherent-High risk 
Introduction A well-known ‘bricks-and-mortar’ travel agent situated in town offering holiday bookings to a wide range of 
destinations, in the UK and overseas. The company has expanded its online offering, and has expertise in adventure, 
action, and sports holidays. 
Item 1 Recovery of global 
tourism industry 
Recovery of global 
tourism industry 
An area which consumers 
look to cut back on during 
difficult economic times 
An area which consumers 
look to cut back on during 
difficult economic times 
Item 2 The number of domestic 
holidays has steadily 
increased over the last few 
years 
The number of domestic 
holidays has steadily 
increased over the last 
few years 
Big competitor companies 
hold a large market share 
Big competitor companies 
hold a large market share 
Item 3 The company is selling a 
desirable product 
Government increasingly 
promoting activities that 
lead to a healthy, active 
lifestyle, for example as 
part of the Health, Work 
and Wellbeing initiative 
Instability overseas can 
threaten consumer 
confidence 
Increase in popularity of 
free sports such as running 
and cycling increases 
competition 
XI 
 
Appendix III – Business scenarios for Experiments 4-6 
Leisure Centre Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction 
A premium independent leisure centre in town offering state of the art facilities, including 25m swimming pool, fitness centre, squash courts, and individual suites for 
classes and courses. 
Item 1 
Offers a good variety of 
services 
Risk of injury to customers 
Offers a good variety of 
services 
Risk of injury to 
customers 
Popular day out for 
families 
Can be weather 
dependent 
Item 2 
Appeals to up-market 
customers 
Staff must be well trained 
Appeals to up-market 
customers 
Staff must be well 
trained 
Offers a good variety of 
services 
Risk of injury to 
customers 
Item 3 
Promotes a healthy, 
positive image 
Maintaining equipment is 
expensive 
Popular day out for 
families 
Can be weather 
dependent 
Appeals to up-market 
customers 
Staff must be well 
trained 
       
Coffee Shop Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction 
A popular brand coffee shop situated on a busy high-street in the town centre, offering a selection of hot and cold drinks to take away or drink inside, as well as a variety 
of sandwiches and cakes. 
Item 1 Good range of products 
High streets are congested 
with similar shops as 
competition 
Good range of products 
High streets are 
congested with similar 
shops as competition 
Regulars provide stable 
income 
Larger overheads 
associated with more 
upmarket premises and 
goods 
Item 2 Busy high street location High staff turnover Busy high street location High staff turnover Good range of products 
High streets are 
congested with similar 
shops as competition 
Item 3 Recognisable brand 
Needs to stand out to be 
successful 
Regulars provide stable 
income 
Larger overheads 
associated with more 
upmarket premises and 
goods 
Busy high street 
location 
High staff turnover 
       
      Coherent item 
      Incoherent item 
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Clothing Retail Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction 
A well-known clothing shop within the town centre’s shopping centre, offering men’s and women’s clothes, as well as footwear and accessories. The shop has historically 
been aimed at younger consumers (16-24). 
Item 1 
The brand is well 
established 
Sells to a limited age range 
The brand is well 
established 
Sells to a limited age 
range 
Schools provide a stable 
customer base 
Competition from on-
line companies 
Item 2 
Sells a good range of 
products 
May be unaffordable to 
younger customers 
Sells a good range of 
products 
May be unaffordable to 
younger customers 
The brand is well 
established 
Sells to a limited age 
range 
Item 3 
Has identified a target 
market 
Popularity is very 
dependent on reputation 
and image 
Schools provide a stable 
customer base 
Competition from on-
line companies 
Sells a good range of 
products 
May be unaffordable to 
younger customers 
       
Restaurant Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction 
A large family run restaurant on the high street in the centre of town. The restaurant serves a variety of mainly Italian dishes including pizza and pasta, and is popular with 
families. 
Item 1 
Good image thanks to 
being family run 
Limited variety of dishes 
Good image thanks to 
being family run 
Limited variety of 
dishes 
Promotes a healthy, 
positive image 
Maintaining equipment 
is expensive 
Item 2 
Popular type of food being 
served 
Family problems could 
disrupt business 
Popular type of food 
being served 
Family problems could 
disrupt business 
Good image thanks to 
being family run 
Limited variety of 
dishes 
Item 3 Has a good location 
Must adhere to food 
hygiene standards 
Promotes a healthy, 
positive image 
Maintaining equipment 
is expensive 
Popular type of food 
being served 
Family problems could 
disrupt business 
 
  
XIII 
 
Amusement Park Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction A large amusement park on the outskirts of London, featuring a range of thrill rides and games, as well as gentle and family rides. 
Item 1 Good location for tourists Reliant on good weather Good location for tourists Reliant on good weather Recognisable brand 
Must adhere to food 
hygiene standards 
Item 2 
Games provide an extra 
source of revenue 
Expensive up-keep 
Games provide an extra 
source of revenue 
Expensive up-keep Good location for tourists Reliant on good weather 
Item 3 
Popular day out for 
families 
Safety concerns for 
customers 
Recognisable brand 
Must adhere to food 
hygiene standards 
Games provide an extra 
source of revenue 
Expensive up-keep 
       
Cinema Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction A small independent cinema located in a large city. The cinema shows the latest blockbuster films as well as independent and alternative movies. 
Item 1 
Shows a wide variety of 
films 
Competition with larger 
cinemas 
Shows a wide variety of 
films 
Competition with larger 
cinemas 
Higher selling prices can 
mean more revenue 
Could attract undesirable 
customers 
Item 2 
Its uniqueness is a selling 
point 
Too small to put on large 
screenings 
Its uniqueness is a selling 
point 
Too small to put on large 
screenings 
Shows a wide variety of 
films 
Competition with larger 
cinemas 
Item 3 
Independence allows for 
greater control 
Need to invest in 
marketing to make 
people aware 
Higher selling prices can 
mean more revenue 
Could attract undesirable 
customers 
Its uniqueness is a selling 
point 
Too small to put on large 
screenings 
 
  
XIV 
 
Pub Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction A traditional pub in the centre of town, featuring a cosy interior as well as a beer garden, serving a variety of beers and ales, as well as a menu of traditional food. 
Item 1 
Inviting for new 
customers 
Tough to stand out 
against competitors 
Inviting for new 
customers 
Tough to stand out 
against competitors 
Independence allows for 
greater control 
Safety concerns for 
customers 
Item 2 
Customers know what to 
expect with traditional 
food 
No uniqueness offered 
Customers know what to 
expect with traditional 
food 
No uniqueness offered 
Inviting for new 
customers 
Tough to stand out 
against competitors 
Item 3 
Regulars provide stable 
income 
Could attract undesirable 
customers 
Independence allows for 
greater control 
Safety concerns for 
customers 
Customers know what to 
expect with traditional 
food 
No uniqueness offered 
       
Supermarket Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction A large supermarket just outside the town centre. The shop targets more upmarket shoppers, with high quality food ranges and organic products. 
Item 1 
Organic products promote 
a healthy image 
May be hard for 
customers to reach 
without a car 
Organic products promote 
a healthy image 
May be hard for 
customers to reach 
without a car 
Has identified a target 
market 
Needs to stand out to be 
successful 
Item 2 
Attracts more high end 
customers 
Selling price may be too 
high for some 
Attracts more high end 
customers 
Selling price may be too 
high for some 
Organic products promote 
a healthy image 
May be hard for 
customers to reach 
without a car 
Item 3 
Higher selling prices can 
mean more revenue 
Larger overheads 
associated with more 
upmarket premises and 
goods 
Has identified a target 
market 
Needs to stand out to be 
successful 
Attracts more high end 
customers 
Selling price may be too 
high for some 
 
  
XV 
 
Zoo Coherent-Low risk  Coherent-High risk Incoherent-Low risk Incoherent-High risk 
Early Incoherent-Low 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Early Incoherent-High 
risk (Exp 4 only) 
Introduction 
A large zoo on the outskirts of a major city. The zoo houses a variety of exotic animals, including a reptile house. The zoo has a good reputation of rescuing animals from 
around the world, and is particularly popular with school trips. 
Item 1 
Can help to educate 
people about conservation 
Costly to run 
Can help to educate 
people about conservation 
Costly to run Has a good location 
Popularity is very 
dependent on reputation 
and image 
Item 2 
Currently has a good 
reputation 
Need to be aware of 
health and safety issues 
Currently has a good 
reputation 
Need to be aware of 
health and safety issues 
Can help to educate 
people about conservation 
Costly to run 
Item 3 
Schools provide a stable 
customer base 
Popularity is very 
dependent on reputation 
and image 
Has a good location 
Popularity is very 
dependent on reputation 
and image 
Currently has a good 
reputation 
Need to be aware of 
health and safety issues 
 
